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ABSTRACT 
This study examines a first look at the implementation of Social Impact Bonds 
(SIB) for sustainability projects by comparing two cases.  The cases are described using 
System Dynamic (SD) modeling to portray the feedback structures and characteristics of 
the cases.  The comparison consists of two milestones looking at four case descriptors 
and how the cases align with the criteria outlined by previous research.  This provides 
practitioners with a first look at how a SIB could integrate into built infrastructure 
sustainability projects. 
The study results in six major contributions to practice and research.  First, the 
SIB model is useful for determining the impact different policies have on the system 
outcomes for a SIB in the Peterborough case.  This provides practitioners with a useful 
means of testing different scenarios for SIB success/ failure.  Second, the TAMU case 
and other sustainability improvement projects for universities make ideal candidates for 
the use of a SIB structure.  Third, the structures required for a SIB (pay for performance, 
pay from savings, investors, third party assessors, special purpose vehicles, etc.) are 
already used through ESCOs for sustainability projects.  Fourth, the study shows how 
BIS cases present a preventative intervention, with measureable outcomes that benefit a 
broad range in society.  This shows how BIS cases can extend the definition of “socio-
economic” and alter the requirements for government sponsorship.  Fifth, the BIS case is 
able to return practical savings faster, and the social SIB is able to return a greater 
savings in the long run.  Both projects present a preventative intervention through energy 
saving improvements or social programs.  While both projects are able to align the 
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incentives of program effectiveness, the SIB is also able to align the unit program cost.  
Finally, a SIB presents a viable opportunity for TAMU project if the funds from the 
State were not available.  This shows researchers how a BIS cases compare with SIB 
programs and it shows practitioners the similarities of SIB structures to existing BIS 
cases. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Context: Sustainable Improvement in the Built Infrastructure 
The intent of this study is to compare the characteristics, structure and results of a 
sustainability project and a project using a Social Impact Bond (SIB), so that researchers 
and practitioners may have better insight into the application of a SIB in sustainability 
projects.  Facility owners and managers need innovative financial tools and strategies to 
provide more funding option to improve the sustainability of built infrastructure.  
Sustainable improvement has attracted a lot of attention because of the beneficial 
externalities that are provided such as, improved air quality (Kats 2010).  Some 
sustainable improvements are underfunded because of these externalities, such as solar 
panels, while others are underfunded because of decision maker influences.  Therefore, 
finding creative investment tools will aid facility owners and managers in pursuing 
sustainable improvements. 
Sustainability improvement has become a key issue for the built infrastructure 
over the last decade.  The built infrastructure is one way people influence the 
environment, such as roads, bridges, hospitals, churches and grocery stores (Kats 2010).  
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines sustainability as the conditions 
which allow humans and nature to exist in productive harmony for social, economic and 
other requirements of present and future generations (US EPA n.d.).  In 2009 President 
Barak Obama issued executive order 13514 requiring federal agencies to reduce building 
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energy consumption (Obama 2009).  Sustainable improvement or “green construction” 
in the built infrastructure is the improvement of systems and structures in the built 
environment to reduce consumption, improve environmental quality, and account for 
operational costs (Kibert 2008, Kats 2010).  The benefits of sustainability continue to 
attract the attention of both public and private organizations.  This illustrates the 
importance of sustainability for the built infrastructure. 
Sustainable improvement in the built infrastructure is a public good and service.  
Public goods and services are nonexclusive and non-rival.  A common example of a 
public good or service is a streetlight, because the light cannot be excluded from some 
people seeing the area it illuminates and is not hindered by multiple users.  Similarly for 
built infrastructure sustainability, energy costs have increased in conjunction with 
population demand (Kats 2010).  Sustainable improvements that reduce energy 
consumption and greenhouse gas (GhG) emissions improve energy markets and the air 
quality for the region (Kibert 2008, Gruber 2011, Daly and Farley 2011).  This supports 
the idea that sustainable improvements in built infrastructure have similar issues as 
public goods and services because sustainability projects have benefits that are non-rival 
and nonexclusive. 
 Public goods and services tend to be underfunded. Since public goods and 
services are non-rival and nonexclusive they have issues, like free-riders, that stem from 
externalities (Gruber 2011).  The free rider issue occurs when the provisions of some 
contributors meet the requirements of non-contributors, and the non-contributors exact 
the benefits of the service without the costs (Gruber 2011, Daly and Farley 2011).  This 
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supports the idea that sustainable improvement in built infrastructure suffers from 
funding issues in that the benefits are shared beyond the investors. 
Public goods and services use well defined property rights to create market 
opportunities for proper funding.  The Coase theorem states that well defined property 
rights can resolve externality issues (Gruber 2011, Daly and Farley 2011).  For example, 
one of the by-products of industrial production is waste that may be diluted into rivers 
and lakes.  If the waste reduces the amount of fish that can be pulled from the river, then 
the manufactured price of the waste should include the cost of the fish population 
reduction.  Coase theorem defines the fish population as a property that if damaged or 
destroyed would require compensation.  Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are a solution that 
uses the Coase theorem to account for private externalities that organizations create 
when private goods or services are joined with public sector affairs (Gruber 2011, Daly 
and Farley 2011).  Therefore, quantifying the goods and services that result in 
externalities is an important issue that sustainable built infrastructure programs must 
address in order to identify beneficiaries. 
  In built infrastructure, utility consumption can be defined as a property right.  
Organizations that can reduce their utility consumption are able to spend their savings on 
paying off the investment in projects or by reinvesting in more sustainability projects 
(Van Der Like & Meehan, 2009; Kim, Hessami, Faghihi, & Ford, 2012).  If an 
organization does not want to invest in sustainability options, then that organization 
could instead set up a performance based contract, or a pay from savings contract 
(Steinberger, van Niel, & Bourg, 2009).  So like property rights, the consumption of 
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utilities can be bought or sold among competing interests. This illustrates how 
organizations use well defined performance measures for energy consumption and costs 
that allow for sustainable projects to be considered based on financial qualities over the 
altruism of the projects’ natures. 
However, even with well-defined performance measures, a sustainability project 
can still be underfunded due to risk and competition for funds.  Risk adversely affects a 
project’s cause when competing for funding with other projects (Bowman, 1980).  As 
the risks increase for a project—assuming that rewards are held constant for project 
success—companies are more likely to avoid funding the riskier project and pass off on 
the potential benefits (Bowman, 1980).  Therefore, organizations are more likely to enact 
the projects that return the greatest perceived benefits. 
Some organizations lack the ability to hedge sustainable infrastructure projects. 
Large organizations, such as universities and the retail industry, have significant 
investments that benefit from sustainable construction and innovation (Kibert, 2008; 
Kats, 2010).  Some of the impact of the risk in sustainable investment for these 
organizations is lost in economies of scale (Business Case Studies LLP, 2013); however, 
smaller organizations may see the risk of failure as greater than the benefits of success.  
If organizations see risk in sustainable built infrastructure programs, then they would 
alter the values of benefits and costs based on the perceived risk (Trigeorgis, 1996).  
These would explain the overestimation found in Greg Kats book “Greening our Built 
World,” where a survey of professionals estimated 17% cost increase and a survey of 
projects found 2% (2010).  Therefore, sustainable projects have issues with funding from 
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the beneficiary when the beneficiary lacks the knowledge and data to properly assess 
their benefits and costs. 
 There are four types of risk that an organization must consider for a new project: 
execution risk, measurement risk, performance risk, and the risk of unintended 
consequences.  Execution risk is the risk of a project not performing similar to the tests.  
Measurement risk is the risk that measurements are fair and equal to all stakeholders.  
Performance risk is the risk of the project showing actual performance.  Unintended 
consequences are the risk of an externality resulting from the project.  These four types 
of risk illustrate the risk considerations for project decision making. 
 A guarantee eliminates execution risk and performance risk from the owner 
agency in exchange for a share of the savings.   Energy service companies (ESCOs) 
were brought to the U.S. in the late 1970s by Scallop Thermal, a division of Royal Dutch 
Shell as a formal structure, but the original idea came from a guarantee that Compagnie 
Générale de Chauffe (CGC) had been offering for almost 100 years prior (Hansen, 
Langlois, & Bertoldi, 2009).  ESCOs offer a plan for sustainable improvement in built 
infrastructure and then either guarantee or fund the improvements for a portion of the 
savings (Vine, 2005; Hansen, Langlois, & Bertoldi, 2009).  Therefore ESCOs provides a 
risk solution to the underfunding of sustainability projects. 
How can ESCOs fund all the needed sustainability projects for the built 
infrastructure?  When the price of energy is high, ESCO’s are extremely profitable; 
however low energy prices marginalize the profitability of sustainable improvements 
and extend the payback period for borrowed capital (Vine, 2005; Hansen, Langlois, & 
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Bertoldi, 2009).  As a result the number of ESCOs that use pay from savings has 
declined (Hansen, Langlois, & Bertoldi, 2009).  ESCOs still struggle with adverse 
cultures to project finance and substantial market opportunities (Vine, 2005). Therefore, 
organizations, including ESCOs need additional financial strategies to fund 
sustainability projects.  
What creative financial solutions could provide funding for sustainability 
projects in the built infrastructure when the owner does not want to pay for the 
improvements?  Who else besides ESCOs can initiate funds for a sustainability project?  
What drives the success and failure of sustainability projects?  How can these strategies 
be studied before one is implemented?  These are the questions that practitioners need 
answered when considering the use of an ESCO for new sustainability projects.  
Therefore, some practitioners lack the necessary knowledge and/or data to properly 
assess the value of sustainable improvement for their organization. 
Motivation for Research: Issues with Funding 
Facility owners and managers use inappropriate knowledge and data to assess the 
profitability of a sustainability project.  Decision makers consider two dominate 
strategies for investment selection, the net present value (NPV) and the benefit cost ratio 
(BCR) (Trigeorgis, 1996; Kim, Hessami, Faghihi, & Ford, 2012).  These strategies are 
used to target specific issues and concerns of the owner.  An NPV, also referred to as a 
present discount value (PDV), assessment will determine the worth of a project to the 
owner (Trigeorgis, 1996).  For sustainable improvements in built infrastructure, this 
assessment depends on energy costs and its fluctuations (Vine, 2005; Hansen, Langlois, 
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& Bertoldi, 2009).  However, improper methods of substitution and comparison may 
inflate costs and reduce the NPV (Kibert, 2008).  Sustainability projects are likely to 
have long payback periods and require a substantial initial investment (Hansen, 
Langlois, & Bertoldi, 2009).    Therefore, facility owners and managers need to 
understand the fluctuation of utility costs and the methods for conducting an accurate 
NPV assessment. When owners use a BCR assessment, also referred to as a cost benefit 
analysis (CBA), the options with the greatest return for the initial investment amount are 
chosen (Trigeorgis, 1996).  Increasing the initial investment or reducing the returns of a 
project reduces its BCR.  If owners are over estimating the cost of sustainability projects 
as Kats suggests, then sustainability projects are less likely to receive funding (2010).  
This illustrates the issue facility owners and managers have with funding sustainability 
projects.  Therefore, facility owners and managers need the appropriate knowledge and 
data to properly assess the value of sustainable built infrastructure projects. 
Problem Statement: Beneficial Financial Structures 
Organizations will overestimate the cost of sustainability programs, under 
estimate the benefits of sustainability programs or apply some combination of both in 
their decision making process.  When organizations alter the projections of benefits or 
costs, such as deflation rates, they are adding a factor of safety to the system.  Factors of 
safety are used by engineers to safe guard against failure in system unknowns (Ullman, 
1992).  Companies will use the interest charged on a loan as the value of borrowing 
money including the cost of default (Pearce & Warford, 1993); however, the cost of 
energy saved from these improvements may go unclaimed.  Organizations without 
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sustainable expertise need the knowledge and data to properly spend funds to improve 
the sustainability of their built infrastructure (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). This illustrates 
the relationship between knowledge and overestimation of costs for sustainability 
projects that result in sustainability projects being terminated by organizations during the 
preliminary phase. 
ESCOs provide expertise in developing, installing, and financing comprehensive 
performance based energy efficient or load reducing projects to their clientele.  The 
Siemens Corporation is an example of an ESCO and the Texas A&M University 
(TAMU), is an example of a client.  TAMU and Siemens have entered into an agreement 
for Siemens to guarantee savings from sustainable improvement up to the value of a loan 
with interest (Kim, Hessami, Faghihi, & Ford, 2012).  In this relationship, the ESCO 
prescribes and enacts various sustainable built infrastructure projects with the owner’s 
funds (Kim, Hessami, Faghihi, & Ford, 2012).  TAMU and other public schools are able 
to borrow the needed funds from the state of Texas at a 2% interest rate (Kim, Hessami, 
Faghihi, & Ford, 2012; Combs, 2013).  This supports the idea that the involvement of an 
ESCO can shift risk from sustainable projects that the owner is willing to invest. 
The problem that practitioners run into is thinking that the utility savings cannot 
be reinvested and the savings need to cover the repayment.  What if the benefits from the 
investment are not steady or consistent?  What funding structure for built infrastructure 
sustainability improvement can allocate risk and reward to protect owners and attract 
capital investors?  
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The dynamic nature of the problem appears at first to be an issue of limit to 
growth as shown below. “Limits-to-growth” (LTG) is a system archetype (Senge, 1990; 
Braun, 2002).  System archetypes are repeated system behaviors found across different 
industries.  Sustainable improvements are an example of an LTG because the 
improvements are reducing the utility costs under the assumption that the organization 
does not want to become a major producer.  As shown in Figure 1 below, the savings are 
limited by the availability and effectiveness of the programs.  The savings creates a fund 
for sustainability programs that have not been implemented.  As funds are invested, an 
organization’s program options and ability to change is reduced leaving fewer options to 
invest, similar to the investment and option constraint seen in construction.  This is an 
example of an organization allowing their utility savings to compound, only hindered by 
the performance of the sustainable options as shown in Figure 1. 
  
 
Figure 1: Basic Sustainability LTG Structure 
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Legend of Loops: Figure 1 
R1: Sustainable Program Reinvestment- Program improvements reduce costs which 
increase the savings of the program and increase the amount that can be reinvested 
into additional programs. 
B1: Limits to Available Program Improvements- The more programs invested in the 
fewer programs left for investment. 
 However, the problem that practitioners face is not a traditional LTG issue.  Even 
though LTG is a common issue, practitioners cannot just focus on the limits of the 
sustainable improvement (Senge, 1990; Braun, 2002) because of the loan.  The 
traditional LTG does not account for multiple impacts constraining the reinforcing 
structure (Braun, 2002).  Under the presumption of the traditional LTG for built 
infrastructure, the savings exist for the sole purpose of funding more options, the 
problem that practitioners face should include a tradeoff or constraint for LTG systems 
dealing with savings.  This explains why the traditional LTG archetype ignores an 
important factor in managing the financing of the reinforcing structure. 
 This study will take a new look at the LTG system archetype, from the 
perspective of sustainable finance, to better understand how built infrastructure 
managers and owners can subvert the risk of financing.  The issue that practitioners face 
in funding sustainability programs is an inflated perception of costs (Kats, 2010).  The 
problem that practitioners face is that the inflated perception of costs may prevent 
projects from being pursued.  This can be represented by the alternative CLD found in 
Figure 2 below.  Therefore, this study will internalize a feedback structure viewed as an 
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externality to test a potential solution for facility managers and owners that alters their 
value of risk and reward. 
 
 
Figure 2: Additionally Constrained Sustainability LTG Structure  
 
Legend of Loops: Figure 2 
R1: Sustainable Program Reinvestment- Program improvements reduce costs which 
increase the savings of the program and increase the amount that can be reinvested 
into additional programs. 
B1: Limits to Available Program Improvements- The more programs invested in the 
fewer programs left for investment. 
B2: Recapturing of Savings-Increasing program savings causes an increase in the 
recaptured savings 
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CHAPTER II  
HYPOTHESIS: SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS FOR BUILT INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
The Social Impact Bond (SIB) financial structure can balance risk and reward for 
sustainable improvement projects in built infrastructure.  SIBs are different from 
traditional bonds (Fox & Albertson, 2011).  SIBs are a new financial tool that combines 
multiple social funding ideas to encourage private funding for social equality (Loder, 
Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010).  SIBs divert risk from the owner to the investors 
by using performance based contracts when public funds would only be available if 
budget cuts could be achieved elsewhere (Strickland, 2010; Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & 
Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  SIBs are a financial 
structure that protects the owner from some of the risk and provides substantial returns 
to attract long term investors. 
Background: Ideas Surrounding SIBs 
SIBs are a new form of financing for public agencies.  The term SIB was first 
coined in 2008 by the Young Foundation (YF) with Social Finance (SF) and City 
Leader’s Group (CLG) (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010).  The 
conglomerate developed SIBs in response to the increasing demand for research and 
development (R&D) of social issues (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; 
Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  SIBs differ from traditional low risk, low 
reward bonds in that with a SIB the owner entity—typically a government or public 
agency—attempts to remove their financial risk of paying for a program before the 
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performance measures are realized (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010).  
Governments offer a share of the reward to the private sector markets in exchange for 
the risk of what potentially may be a capital intensive, government improvement 
program (Hutton, 2011; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  In the fall of 2010, 
the first SIB was enacted by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) at Her Majesty’s Prison 
(HMP) Peterborough (Strickland, 2010). In the summer of 2011, lessons learned about 
the establishment of the Peterborough SIB were released (Disley, Rubin, Scraggs, 
Burrowes, & Culley, 2011).  By the spring of 2012, the methodology for the comparison 
of the Peterborough SIB was developed and published with an anticipation of the first 
cohort’s results to be reported around 2014 (Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 
2012).  This illustrates the need for testing to develop knowledge of application and 
expectancy for SIBs. 
SIBs combine different social investment methods to create a more holistic 
approach to social issues. The SIB financing combines ideas from four different 
investment methods for social benefits: direct commissioning for outcomes, Advance 
Market Commitments (AMCs), Tax Increment Financing (TIF), and Clean Development 
Mechanisms (CDM) (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010).  Direct 
commissioning for outcomes is a pay for performance contract (Fox & Albertson, 2011).  
SIBs use direct commissioning to reduce risk from the owner (Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, 
& Bo'sher, 2011).  AMCs are payment guarantees to encourage R&D (Tetteh, 2012).  
SIBs use AMCs to encourage R&D for social issues (Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & 
Bo'sher, 2011).  TIFs use extra tax revenues generated from projects as repayments 
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(Davis, 1989).  SIBs may use TIF strategies to capture added benefits of a project 
through increased government revenue (Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  
CDMs are tradable commodities for carbon emissions and GhG markets that allow 
companies to capture and trade the savings from air quality permits (Lee, Park, Kim, 
Kim, & Kim, 2013).  SIBs use the same concept to target organizations’ budgets, so that 
a public agency that reduces their costs can capture the budget savings (Mulgan, Reeder, 
Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  These four forms have been used for community 
development, improving health care systems, sustainable improvement, and controlling 
infectious diseases (Davis, 1989; Tetteh, 2012; Conceicao & McCarthy, 2011; Lee, Park, 
Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2013).  This illustrates the broad use of applications leading to the 
development of SIBs. 
SIBs are higher risk bonds with long pay off periods.  If the program is 
unsuccessful in providing savings to the owner, then the owner is not obligated to pay 
for the bond (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & 
Bo'sher, 2011).  Performance is measured by outcomes instead of inputs (Fox & 
Albertson, 2011).  In the case of a prison SIB, the reduction of recidivism, or the 
reconviction rate, determines whether the investors receive repayment (Fox & Albertson, 
2011; Glahn & Whistler, 2011).  Since the outcomes take time to measure payments are 
unlikely to form a steady, predictable pattern in the short run (Hatry, 2006; Loder, 
Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011; Glahn 
& Whistler, 2011).  For example, in the prison SIB case (described later) investors must 
wait till a significant number of offenders have been released from the system with 
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ample opportunity for reconviction (Fox & Albertson, 2011; Disley, Rubin, Scraggs, 
Burrowes, & Culley, 2011; Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  In one 
prison case, significant offenders is 1000 offenders and ample opportunity is a year after 
the final offender’s release with a minimum of six months for systems to update the 
status of offenders (Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  Therefore, SIBs are 
a high risk, long term bond that does not receive predictable returns. 
SIBs provide an innovative form of financing social improvements for public 
goods and services where the owner is not required to fund the projects.  SIBs address 
two major issues of funding for public goods and services: underfunding and ineffective 
funding (Strickland, 2010).  Public goods and services tend to be underfunded because 
they are non-rival and non-exclusive (Gruber, 2011; Daly & Farley, 2011).  
Furthermore, when funds are spent on public goods and services they are expected to 
deliver outcomes as a result of those services (Moynihan, 2008).  The built in 
performance contract in a SIB provides a guarantee to the owner that either the project 
will succeed or the owner will not be held liable for payment (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & 
Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011). The payment by results 
(PBR) contract enables the use of SIBs in performance based budgeting (PBB), a tool 
used by governments to determine how to spend money (Wholey, 1999; Moynihan, 
2008).  These contracts transfer the risk associated with implementing or rolling out an 
intervention targeting a system’s efficiency from the owner agency to the investors 
(Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 
2011).  The risk of intervention or innovation may require substantial resources as the 
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previous system becomes obsolete (Henderson & Clark, 1990).  PBR contracts differ 
from traditional Plan, Specify and Estimate (PSE) contracts, because the private entity is 
no longer following the prescription of the problem but instead is given a schedule of 
desired outcomes and related compensation (Evelhoch, Michelsen, Mitchell, Pomponio, 
& Webb, 2000).  SIBs require no commitment of capital by the owner agency until the 
program outcomes have been analyzed and result in cost savings (Loder, Mulgan, 
Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Strickland, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 
2011).  Normally, pay-for-performance contracts carry a taboo of controversy for public 
and nonprofit industry because of flawed performance criteria (Hatry, 2006).  However, 
governments can reduce waste on failed models and studies by connecting the monetary 
savings of a comprehensive performance measurement system (PMS)—as defined 
(Hatry, 2006)—with a pay-for-performance (PFP) contract that sells the capital 
exposure, associated with research and development or implementation for public policy 
and practice, to private investors (Fox & Albertson, 2011).  With the right performance 
measures, that include monetary savings to implement a pay-from-savings SIB, the cost 
of government can decrease by improving their performance (Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & 
Bo'sher, 2011; Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010). This supports the idea that 
SIBs could establish a market for R&D opportunities on social issues. 
The Young Foundation specifies seven criteria a project must have to be 
considered eligible for a SIB regarding the: prevention, improvement, evidence, 
measurable, incentives, savings, and preferences.  Table 1 below lists the criteria with 
their descriptions. 
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Table 1: Seven Criteria for a SIB (after Mulgan et al. 2011) 
  Criteria Description 
1 Preventative intervention 
The intervention is preventive in nature and sufficient funding for the 
intervention is currently unavailable 
2 
Improves wellbeing in an 
area of high social need 
The intervention improves social wellbeing and prevents or ameliorates a poor 
outcome 
3 Evidence of efficacy 
The intervention is supported by evidence of its efficacy and impact, giving 
funders confidence in the scheme’s likely success 
4 Measureable impact 
Whether it is possible to measure the impact of the intervention accurately 
enough to give all parties confidence of the intervention’s effect, including a 
sufficiently large sample size, appropriate timescales and impacts that closely 
related to the savings and relatively easy to measure 
5 Aligns incentives 
A specific government stakeholder achieves savings or lower costs as a result 
of actions undertaken by others. These savings need to be cash releasing and 
provide an actual saving to government stakeholders 
6 Savings greater than costs 
The savings for the specific government stakeholder are relatively immediate 
and much greater than the cost of the intervention and transaction costs. This 
provides investors with enough return to absorb the risks inherent in the 
scheme, and can provide significant funds for social investment 
7 
Government preference 
for a SIB 
Government policy for the specific agenda is keen on or at least open to the use 
of a SIB 
 
 Joining Public and Private 
Public Private Partnerships (P3) are a form of cooperative agreement between 
public agencies and private organizations.  P3s are meant to establish a shared role in 
power between the public government and private firm(s), such as tax exemptions for 
  
18 
services to improve housing (Miraftab, 2004; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011).  Toll 
roads are often portrayed as the exemplar of P3s (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011).  P3s 
have been largely successful as toll roads in alleviating issues of public funding for 
roadway systems around the world (Damnjanovic, Duthie, & Waller, 2008).  Increases 
in roadway demand causes traffic.  Increased traffic causes people to spend more time 
commuting.  Increased commute time may causes people to increase the value of their 
time which would create a market opportunity for someone to provide a non-congested 
means of travel.  State roadway agencies have rented out tolling rights to private 
organizations who are willing to finance and operate these non-congested roadways 
(Poole & Samuel, 2006).  However, not all social funding issues present an opportunity 
for a market between levels of service.  In instances where government agencies are 
moving public services off book, the use of P3s for social services either reduces the 
demand, or increases the revenues through a fee, but the quality of services rarely 
improve (Motenko, et al., 1995; Osborne & Hutchinson, 2004).  The issues with P3s 
arise when services are only delivered to those willing and able to pay the additional fees 
on top of normal levels of taxation (Motenko, et al., 1995; Osborne & Hutchinson, 
2004).  This explains the lack of private funding in social issues where markets could 
exist. 
SIBs are like P3s with two distinctions from a traditional P3 focusing on social 
issues: the performance contract and new scope for the public agency.  Since SIBs are 
used in R&D for social issues, they fit what Derick Brinkerhoff and Jennifer Brinker 
term as a “Capacity Building” P3 (2011).  SIBs widen the scope of public agencies by 
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targeting funds in areas where public funding is non-existent or underfunded (Loder, 
Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  For 
example, the government does not provide loan assistance for released offenders, but a 
prison SIB may (Disley, Rubin, Scraggs, Burrowes, & Culley, 2011).  SIBs are an 
improvement for traditional social P3s.  Governments exist to ensure equality and 
fairness instead of efficiency and effectiveness; this differs from a traditional P3 
structure in that a SIB is not replacing a government organization (Miraftab, 2004; 
Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy, 2011; Strickland, 2010).  SIBs use private 
funding to deliver public goods; however, the cost of the programs are funded by the 
savings they provide (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Strickland, 2010; 
Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  With a SIB, the private entities are only paid 
from public funds when success has been measured and public costs have been reduced 
(Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  This explains why SIBs would function 
as an emerging P3 where traditional social P3s would fail. 
Roles of Participants in an SIB 
 SIBs require five key stakeholder groups: owners, investors, consultants/ 
contractors, third party assessors, and the target population.  The owner(s) represents the 
benefiting organization(s) that would receive a portion of the savings if the program is 
successful (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & 
Bo'sher, 2011; Glahn & Whistler, 2011).  The investors are the group funding the project 
under the guarantee of payment when the program is successful (Fox & Albertson, 2011; 
Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  The consultants/ contractors are the 
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service providers implementing the programs for the investors (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, 
& Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011; Glahn & Whistler, 
2011).  The third party assessors analyze the data to determine the success or failure of 
the project along with the payment value (Glahn & Whistler, 2011; Cave, Williams, 
Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  The target population is the socio-economic 
disadvantaged group whose behavior is modified by the program (Loder, Mulgan, 
Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  This illustrates 
the functions of different SIB stakeholders. 
 The owner and investor stakeholders are the most critical stakeholders.  If the 
owner goes unidentified, then there are no returns for the investors.  If there are no 
returns for the investors, then there are no funds for the program.  Without any of the 
stakeholders the program cannot exist, but without these two stakeholders the SIB 
cannot exist. 
Owner Application of SIB for Sustainability Programs 
Owners may benefit from a sustainability SIB by reducing their operating costs 
and improving their work environment by gaining access to capital for sustainability 
improvement projects.  Owners may be adverse to the risks of trying certain 
sustainability projects and as a result will not implement them.  A SIB would allow 
experts, who have a better grasp of the risks, to have oversight of the implementation 
process (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 
2011).  Meanwhile, the owner has no additional out-of-pocket expenses, similar to some 
ESCOs (Strickland, 2010; Vine, 2005; Hansen, Langlois, & Bertoldi, 2009).  As the 
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benefits of the implemented program increase, the owner’s operating costs should 
decrease (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & 
Bo'sher, 2011).  These savings would collect into an account that would share the 
savings with the investors (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, 
Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  This illustrates how the owner can receive a return 
from the sustainability projects without being exposed to the risks. 
Investor Application of SIB for Sustainability Programs 
Investors may benefit from a sustainability SIB by capitalizing on a share of the 
long term cost savings from the programs implemented.  A SIB is long term investment 
(Disley, Rubin, Scraggs, Burrowes, & Culley, 2011).  Even though energy has a sporadic 
history of increasing and decreasing costs (Ghosal, 2000), the price of energy has 
generally increased since the 1970s.  Since the savings from sustainability programs are 
tied with the utility costs, the value of a sustainability SIB will increase with the utility 
markets over time.  As the benefits of the implemented program increase, the investors’ 
returns may also increase (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, 
Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  Therefore, investors can find monetary compensation 
for both risk and reward of sustainability projects. 
Application of an SIB 
A Prison System Proof of Concept 
 One of the founding cases that inspired SIBs comes from the relationship 
between prison system programs and their funds.  The recidivism of a prison system 
starts with the design of the prisons and extends into the programs implemented in their 
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system (Hood, 2013).  In recent years, the “Tough on Crime” stance has begun to wane 
from politics as evidence of practice reveals increases in prison populations (King Jr., 
2013).  Prisons are more likely to see increases in recidivism when under financial 
constraint (King Jr., 2013; Hood, 2013).  This reinforcing structure is checked by the 
funding of the prison system and a limits-to-growth (Senge, 1990; Moynihan, 2008).  
Figure 3 below illustrates the reinforcing structure of a prison system that can lead to 
either an increase or a decrease in the prison population. 
The issues in funding rehabilitation programs in a prison system fit the seven 
criteria for a SIB—listed later in the table found on page 90.  Funding rehabilitation 
programs could resolve the overcrowding issues in prisons (Glahn & Whistler, 2011).  
Short term offenders incarcerated for theft or other non-violent offences are unlikely 
able to self-fund these interventions (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; 
Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  Groups like St. Giles Trust (SGT), Bridges 
to Life (BTL) and others have had substantial success when properly funded (Loder, 
Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011; 
Bridges-to-Life(BTL), 2011; Mayfield-Greiger & Rudnicki, 2007).  The savings can be 
measured as the reduction of recidivism or reconvictions (Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & 
Bo'sher, 2011; Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  The performance contract 
then establishes the reduction of recidivism to be equal or greater to the value paid for 
success (Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  This incentivizes the investors 
to improve the quality of service in order to guarantee their returns (Loder, Mulgan, 
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Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  This illustrates 
the requirements for a prison system to establish a SIB. 
 
 
Figure 3: Basic Prison Casual Loop Diagram  
 
Legend of Loops: Figure 3 
R1- Paid-from-Success Rehabilitation loop: Prison budget funds program which 
reduces population and generates savings which are used to pay for the program. 
B1- Limits to Improvement loop: Decreased recidivism reduces improvement 
available, which limits the amount of future recidivism reduction. 
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B2- External Constraint loop: Increases in budget surplus trigger increases in the 
returned budget from the prison, which limits the amount of future Operating 
Budgets. 
 Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Peterborough 
 The first SIB implemented, Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Peterborough prison 
SIB, was implemented as a proof of concept that a SIB could provide positive returns for 
the investors and owners. The six-year SIB funds are designed to reduce the recidivism 
of released short term offenders from the HMP Peterborough by funding intervention 
programs—criteria 1 from Table 1 (Strickland, 2010; Disley, Rubin, Scraggs, Burrowes, 
& Culley, 2011; Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012). Short term offenders are 
young and commit non-violent offences; however, after their first conviction they are 
unemployed and homeless—criteria 2 of Table 1 (Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 
2011; Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  The program is operated by 
NGOs that consist of organizations with proven track records but insufficient funds to 
operate on a scale as large as the Peterborough system—criteria 3 of Table 1 (Loder, 
Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  The 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the governing agency for prisons in the U.K., expects savings 
from the reductions in the number of arrests, convictions, and prison terms. 
The Peterborough SIB investors provided £5 million across a maximum period of 
six years through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to fund the non-government 
organizations (NGO) (Strickland, 2010).  To measure performance the Peterborough SIB 
has two groups with four cohorts of first-time released offenders (Cave, Williams, 
  
25 
Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  In the Peterborough group, the first three cohorts consist 
of up to 1000 first time offenders each (Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).   
The fourth cohort is the articulation of the first three cohorts (Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & 
Hedderman, 2012).  The second group is a comparison group made up of statistically 
similar offenders—as determined by the third party assessor—of a value equaling about 
10 times that of the Peterborough group—criteria 4 of Table 1 (Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, 
& Hedderman, 2012).  The investors may receive a greater return on their investment by 
further reducing recidivism—criteria 5 of Table 1 (Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & 
Hedderman, 2012).  If the program reduces recidivism between the Peterborough and 
comparison group by 10% for any of the first three cohorts or 7.5% for the fourth cohort, 
then the MOJ will pay a portion of the savings to the investors—criteria 6 of Table 1 
(Strickland, 2010).  This illustrates the first active SIB used by the MOJ to fund a 
program that may reduce their budget—criteria 7 of Table 1. 
The Peterborough SIB potentially addresses at least two major challenges for 
rehabilitation programs: adequacy of resources and aggressiveness of the 
implementation schedule (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010).  Government 
agencies, like Alabama Department of Corrections (ALDOC), are looking for ways to 
reduce prison expenses (Moynihan, 2008).  The BTL rehabilitation program in Texas is 
an example of how successful a program can be if these two challenges are addressed 
(Mayfield-Greiger & Rudnicki, 2007; Bridges-to-Life(BTL), 2011).  A SIB addresses 
resource allocation by incentivizing investors to provide adequate funds for success.  A 
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SIB addresses challenges with the implementation schedule by structuring oversight 
from the investors, who will seek to roll out the program for the maximum profitability. 
Relationship between Social and Sustainable Issues 
 Sustainability issues struggle with funds because, like social issues, there are a 
lot of public benefits associated in sustainable programs and a lack of trust in estimates.  
As individual projects, sustainability projects have very little effect on the rest of the 
developed world; however, as the number of projects grow those effects are amplified 
(Kibert, 2008).  Just as a prison system may rely on the altruistic donations by a few, 
built infrastructure hopes for enough of an investment in sustainability to keep demand 
down.  Furthermore, estimates for costs have not improved in roadway construction over 
the last half century (Flyvberg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002).  This explains why sustainability 
and social issues may struggle financially.  
 This study seeks to identify how, and how well, a SIB could work for 
sustainability projects in the built infrastructure.  Sustainability is a social issue (Kibert, 
2008; Kats, 2010).  The founding of SIBs uses an idea from sustainable development 
(Lee, Park, Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2013).  Sustainable improvements are a preventative 
intervention, but some owners may not have the capital or may be unwilling to risk the 
capital they have access to on sustainable improvements (criteria 1).  Improvements are 
going to be more beneficial for projects with the greatest need for sustainability (criteria 
2).  The projects would only use tools and methods with proven success (criteria 3).  The 
impact of the project can be measured by the reduction of energy (criteria 4).  The 
investor and owner are incentivized to reduce energy consumption (criteria 5).  The only 
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projects that would make it to fruition are the projects where the savings are greater than 
the costs and the owner agency is open to a sustainable SIB (criteria 6 and 7).  
Therefore: 
H1: The structure of a SIB can be applied to the financing of a sustainability 
improvement project for built infrastructure. 
Hypothesis: A SIB financial structure could be used just as effectively as a 
guarantee to fund sustainability projects when funds do not exist or are 
unavailable by the owner agency.  
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CHAPTER III  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Three components are needed to test how a SIB can impact the  risk/reward in a 
built infrastructure sustainability improvement project.  First, a case study of both a SIB 
and a sustainable improvement project must exist, because the case studies provide a 
means of examining the structures and effects of the financial structure.  Second, the 
cases must be structurally comparable, because comparability of structure provides a 
form of face validation that explains the differences in results.  Third, there must be 
results from the cases that can be measured and compared, because the results indicate 
the outcomes of the financial tools.  If the examples are comparable and the results 
available, then the differences in results may support the hypothesis.  This illustrates the 
required scope for the study. 
 Modeling a case study provides a greater opportunity to study the system 
components than just an analysis of the case results.  Formal models provide detailed 
descriptions of system structures (Martinez-Moyano, 2012).  These detailed models may 
be generalized for comparison with other models.  When different systems have 
common behavior, they are sometimes classified into a system archetype.  These 
archetypes outline the controlling structure that organizations and decision makers use in 
altering program performance.  System archetypes are identified by both their feedback 
loops and their delays (Senge, 1990).  Feedback loops are classified as either balancing 
or reinforcing (Sterman, 2000; Senge, 1990).  A balancing loop keeps a system focused 
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on a target value, similar to a pendulum trying to swing toward the center of an arc.  A 
reinforcing loop causes continuous escalation and can be classified as either virtuous or 
vicious (Senge, 1990).  A virtuous reinforcing loop grows continuously out of control 
toward a positive resultant.  For example, an investment account, left alone with a high 
interest rate, will continue to amass fortune—seen in Figure 4.  Conversely, a vicious 
reinforcing loop grows out of control toward a negative resultant—seen in Figure 4.  For 
example, a loan, left unpaid with a high interest rate, will continue to amass debt.  
Varying delays and combinations of these structures comprise the various known system 
archetypes.  This explains how systems can be compared across different industries by 
using common structures. 
 
 
Figure 4: Virtuous and Vicious Reinforcing Loops in a "Limits to Growth" System 
Archetype 
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A SIB and a sustainable built infrastructure project with similar structures can be 
compared for similarities and differences in key stakeholders and policy actions using 
generalized performance measures.  The common traits between models of the two 
systems can be used as performance criteria and the differences can be used as 
descriptors for changes in the results.  For example, both models will use a means of 
measuring program performance.  If both models use reductive measures, then both 
program structures will represent a LTG.  Conversely, prisoner reconvictions cannot go 
below zero, but if energy use goes below zero, then the user is classified as a producer.  
The difference between an absolute zero (recidivism value) and a softer zero (energy 
use) is the strength of the balancing limit to growth.  In both cases profits may appear 
similar, but revenues and costs may appear different.  This illustrates the use of face 
validation between the model structures for an accurate and informed comparison. 
System Dynamics modeling (SDM) (Sterman, 2000; Forrester, 1961) provides 
the ideal medium to formally study the dynamic feedback relationship between the key 
stakeholders, the system, and the environment of the system.  SDM is a methodology 
that focuses on the system feedback loops using computer aided modeling software to 
calculate complex non-linear equations (System Dynamics Society, 2013).  The purpose 
of building a model is to gain insight and understanding about the real system without 
the drawbacks to cost, time, and other complications of ethics (Sterman, 2000).  The 
models will be screened using the standard methods for analyzing system dynamic 
models (Sterman, 2000).  These methods include statistical screening, SDM Docs, 
Extreme Conditions, univariate sensitivity analysis, and more (Sterman, 2000; Taylor, 
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Ford, & Ford, Improving model understanding using statistical screening, 2010; 
Martinez-Moyano, 2012).  Therefore, SDM has the tools and methods for analyzing and 
comparing the two project types.   
Therefore, the hypotheses—a SIB provides a funding option that reduces the 
owner’s exposure to risk—will be tested using four milestones for the applicability of a 
SIB financial structure in a built infrastructure sustainability improvement program: 
1. Modeling and understanding how a SIB works 
2. Identifying a comparable built infrastructure sustainability model 
3. Comparing the structures of a SIB to existing sustainable financial options 
4. Comparing the results of a SIB with those of a sustainability project.   
Modeling a SIB using SDM is an important start because it has not been done 
before.  Furthermore, HMP Peterborough is the first SIB enacted and is not expected to 
be completed until 2019 (Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  Therefore, the 
creation of a SIB model provides a base to compare a sustainable finance option with a 
SIB.  A comparable model of a sustainable project built infrastructure case will reduce 
differences between itself and the SIB model.  The comparison of the two model 
structures would provide a list of differences and similarities.  This list would show 
causes for the different results of the model analysis.  This illustrates the process of 
comparing the two financial structures and their project characteristics. 
Milestone 1: Model an Existing SIB 
There are five accepted steps to the SDM methodology (Sterman, 2000).  The 
first is problem articulation which focuses on identifying and defining themes, key 
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variables, time horizons, and the dynamic nature of the problem (Sterman, 2000).  The 
second is the formulation of the dynamic hypothesis using variable mapping and looking 
for endogenous factors (Sterman, 2000).  The third is the formulation of the simulation 
model or the specification, estimation and testing of values, relationships and behaviors 
from literature (Sterman, 2000).  The fourth is testing the model by comparing reference 
modes, and the fifth step is to design and evaluate relevant policies (Sterman, 2000). 
Step 1: Problem Articulation 
The first step in SDM is the articulation of the problem (Sterman, 2000).  Models 
are built like targets; there is point to be made even when missing the initial target.  The 
theme specifies the problem the model should address so the work can be taken in 
context.  The problem is described to draw attention to an issue and focus the model on 
particular policy actions.  This study will focus on the successful completion of projects 
and how the key stakeholders are affected by the results. 
Step 2: Formulation of the Dynamic Hypothesis  
The second step separates SDM from other modeling methods because it looks at 
policy changes over time by formulating a dynamic hypothesis.  John Sterman defines a 
dynamic hypothesis as a working theory of how the problem arose with endogenous 
characteristics (2000).  There are several tools in SDM for defining the dynamic 
hypothesis.  The first sub-step is to map the system structures.  A model boundary chart 
(MBC) and subsystem diagram is a great way to show the boundaries and architecture of 
the model.  Causal loop diagrams (CLD) are another way to express a dynamic 
hypothesis by showing the relationship between different variables while stock and flow 
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maps describe the accumulation and flow of goods and services (Sterman, 2000).  This 
study uses the CLD to explain the dynamic hypothesis and how a SIB alters the 
constrained LTG. 
Step 3: Formulation of a Simulation Model 
The formulation of a simulation model as the third step allows for real world 
scenarios to be enacted without real world costs.  Formalizing the modeling structure 
allows the hypothesis to be tested (Sterman, 2000).  Implementing policy change in real 
world systems can be costly if the hypothesis is wrong.  Building a model allows 
practitioners and researchers to test the hypothesis without impacting the real systems 
(Sterman, 2000).  This explains how the SDM simulation model is used in the study. 
Step 4: Testing  
The fourth step of testing the model validates the usefulness of the model.  There 
are two model tests used to validate the models in this study: reference mode comparison 
and extreme conditions testing.  Reference mode comparison is a comparison between 
different real world scenarios and the results from the model to build confidence in the 
model properly representing the issues at hand (Sterman, 2000).  Reference mode 
comparison will be used to compare between models, but not to validate models because 
the outcomes of the Peterborough SIB will not be available till sometime after 2019.  
While the SIB literature lacks quantitative data on the results of the Peterborough case 
the qualitative expectations for the system are well documented (Strickland, 2010; 
Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 
2011).  Therefore, the extreme conditions testing, a test of exogenous values and their 
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expected behavior in extenuating circumstances, will be used to build confidence in the 
model (Sterman, 2000).  These are the testing methods for the model development in this 
study. 
Step 5: Policy Design and Evaluation 
The fifth step is policy design and evaluation.  Through tools, such as statistical 
screening, univariate sensitivity analysis, and policy interactions, SDM modelers are 
able to simulate real world scenarios, and infer valuable contributions to system behavior 
(Sterman, 2000; Taylor, Ford, & Ford, Improving model understanding using statistical 
screening, 2010).  Statistical screening is used to show the correlation over time of 
different exogenous variables to specified performance variables (Taylor, Ford, & Ford, 
Improving model understanding using statistical screening, 2010).  If performance 
variables are specified to represent key stakeholder interests, then the correlation over 
time shows the importance of these variables to the key stakeholder.  The addition of a 
univariate sensitivity analysis provides a magnitude for the significantly correlated 
variables.  Whereas the statistical screening shows the significance of different 
exogenous variables, then the univariate sensitivity analysis shows the importance of 
those variables.  By identifying the significant and important variables, this study can 
identify common problems and possible solutions.  The results of policy analysis provide 
a comparison of final benefit/cost levels within different SIB scenarios.  This illustrates 
how the policy design and evaluation phase of the SDM process is used in the current 
work. 
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Milestone 2: Identify a Model of a Sustainable Built Infrastructure Case 
 The second milestone is like validating a SIB financial structure to a non-SIB 
financial structure. The costs and benefits between the two financial structures should be 
exemplified by identifying and comparing a SD model of a built infrastructure 
sustainability review for a possible application of a SIB structure to a case where a SIB 
is used.  The project selected will share similar model development traits to the SIB case.  
From the problem articulation to the possible policy designs, there should be some 
resemblance between the two models.  These common traits allow the models to be 
compared. 
Milestone 3: Comparing and Contrasting Model Characteristics  
 The third milestone is a comparison between the two model structures which 
develops a list of similarities and differences.  This emulates a face validity test between 
the two models’ structures and mapping.   The comparison identifies their similarities 
and differences using a seven step process.   
Step 1: Identify the causal structures in both models’ causal loop diagrams 
(CLD) as well as their function. 
Step 2: Identify the comparable structures between the two models’ CLDs and 
pair structures when possible. 
 Step 3: Identify what makes the similar causal feedback structures different. 
Step 4: Identify key structures in formal models and characterize their roles and 
separate larger structures into smaller structures as needed. 
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Step 5: Identify and pair the comparable structures between the two models’ 
formal structures. 
 Step 6: Identify what makes the similar formal simulation model structures 
different. 
These steps explain the delineation used to define a list of causes for performance 
variance between the two models. 
Milestone 4: Defining Model Performance 
The fourth milestone is defining owner and investor performance measures as a 
basis for comparing a SIB to a non-SIB financial structure.  These measures may be 
different from the contractual performance measures in the project.  The programs’ 
performance measures determine the success and failure of the program in achieving the 
desired goal (Hatry, 2006; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011; Cave, Williams, 
Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  How the programs’ measures of success are established 
drives the risk assumed by different stakeholders (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & 
Shelupanov, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  The key stakeholders’ 
performance measures represent their interests in the project.  The owners and investors 
are two major roles of the key stakeholders in a SIB (Disley, Rubin, Scraggs, Burrowes, 
& Culley, 2011; Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 2012).  Therefore, each key 
stakeholder should have a performance measure for their success and the success of the 
project. 
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Defining the Owner Benefits 
The owner’s benefits will be measured as a percentage change in program 
outcomes and the cost savings.  The owner’s interests are represented in the contractual 
performance measures that result in savings.  The balanced scorecard literature supports 
the assumption that the categories of consumer satisfaction, internal processes, 
knowledge and data, or financial management are reflected to and from the goal or 
mission of an organization.  Measuring both the program performance and savings of the 
program will bracket the operations and goals of the owner.  This explains the use of two 
performance measures to represent the owner’s interests in both project cases. 
Defining the Investor Benefits  
 The final internal rate of return (IRR) provides a generalized measure of 
attractiveness for the investors’ benefit.  The IRR represents the average interest rate of 
the investment for a net present value (NPV) equal to zero.  Though NPV and IRR are 
often used for considering the most financially viable option (Trigeorgis, 1996), using an 
IRR instead of an NPV provides a generalized measure that will not be skewed by the 
investment amount.  This explains the use of the IRR to moderate the investors’ view of 
a successful program in both cases. 
Comparing Across Models 
 The results of the SIB will be compared with the built infrastructure 
sustainability case model as though it were a reference mode.  The four aforementioned 
steps set the background for four resultants to understand how a SIB could work in a 
built infrastructure sustainability program: 
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1. A comparison of the statistical screening results to answer the change in the 
stakeholder preferences between the cases.  One hypothesis of a SIB is that the 
owner and investors will align their incentives. This is tested by looking at the 
common variables between owner and investor in both cases statistical screening 
results.  This shows how preferences change in using a SIB financial structure. 
2. A comparison of generalized outcomes (i.e. performance outcome percent 
change, owner savings, and Investor IRR) provides an answer to changes in 
magnitude for key stakeholder benefits.  Combing these variables (e.g. investor 
IRR/ owner savings) and comparing between cases will tell how the costs and 
benefits change between cases for the different stakeholders.  This information 
may be used to addresses questions about the benefits, costs and risks incurred by 
the owner.  This shows the change in costs and benefits of different stakeholders 
when using a SIB financial structure. 
3. A comparison of similar policy experimentation would answer the rigor of the 
financial tool under different circumstances.  This technique is used in 
conjuncture with the generalized outcomes to answer “what if” questions.  Some 
of the policy questions that are asked include: 
a. What if the program is a complete failure? 
b. What if the program is an astounding success? 
c. What if the savings are siphoned from their existing fund? 
This shows case specific differences in how a SIB functions. 
  
39 
4. Last, a comparison univariate sensitivity analysis from common variables 
determined as significant from the statistical screening analysis.  This is used to 
determine the sensitivity of performance measures with drivers.  This shows 
whether there is any variance in the sensitivity of the change when using a SIB. 
 With these four results, the SIB case may be compared with the sustainability 
case in built infrastructure using Mulgan’s et al. (2011) seven criteria.  The first step 
provides a means of attaining results. The second step identifies a comparable 
sustainability project.  The third step defines the differences between the two using a 
facial validity test.  The fourth step identifies the resulting differences of the models and 
their outcomes.  With that comparison the study may yield an analysis on the changes in 
preferred variables and how the key stakeholders fair in a variety of scenarios.  With this 
information, practitioners and researchers can gain insight into the application and 
environment for a successful SIB.  This explains the methodological steps of this study 
for the comparison between a SIB and a built infrastructure sustainability project. 
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CHAPTER IV  
SIB MODEL DEVELOPMENT: THE HMP PETERBOROUGH CASE STUDY1 
 
Problem Articulation 
The impact of a SIB on a system is not fully understood.  SIBs were developed to 
aid underfunded and disputed social issues (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 
2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  In 2011 the first case study began and 
since then several others have gone into development (Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & 
Bo'sher, 2011; Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, & Shelupanov, 2010; Strickland, 2010; 
Rockefeller Foundation, 2012). The goal of these case studies is to provide evidence of 
effectiveness (Strickland, 2010). Practitioners looking to use SIBs would be interested in 
understanding the factors that affect SIB outcomes.  Therefore, the problem this portion 
of the study focuses on is the ability of SIBs to work successfully. 
Prisons measure performance in multiple dimensions. One measure is the 
population of offenders held in prisons. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP) mission is 
to imprison offenders and provide rehabilitation. Assuming a steady or rising general 
population and a declining prison population with this goal provides a better outcome 
than a growing or steady prison population.  This objective is partially reflected in the 
                                                 
1 This chapter is an adaptation of White III, R. J., & Ford, D. N. (2013) “Dynamic Drivers of Successful 
Social Impact Bonds,” in the proceedings of the 2013 International System Dynamics Conference, 
Cambridge, MA, System Dynamics Society. 
(http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2013/proceed/papers/P1294.pdf)  
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prison’s recidivism, the fraction of released offenders that are reconvicted (Castillo, et 
al., 2004; Disley, Rubin, Scraggs, Burrowes, & Culley, 2011). Prisons also measure 
performance using unit cost per offender year (e.g. dollars per offender-year) 
(Moynihan, 2008). Like in many systems, these performance measures create tradeoffs. 
Rehabilitation programs can lower the recidivism rate for a prison system by influencing 
released offenders away from a life of crime, but these programs cost money and thereby 
also increase the cost per offender (Loder, et al. 2010, Mulgan, et al. 2011). Therefore 
efforts to limit cost can prevent the initiation and use of rehabilitation programs. Thus 
rehabilitation programs are likely to be underfunded when cost per offender is the 
primary performance metric. Therefore, a major challenge for prisons systems is how to 
fund rehabilitation programs with little public funding (Moynihan D. P., 2008; Loder et 
al., 2010; Mulgan et al., 2011). Donald Moynihan (2008) describes the Alabama 
Department of Corrections (ALDOC) as an example of this dilemma. ALDOC was 
underfunded, requiring it to operate at almost 200% capacity (Britt 2012). Single guards 
were responsible for 200 offenders, forcing them to stand back and try to prevent full 
scale riots (Britt 2012). Under such circumstances funds for rehabilitation programs 
could not even be considered. 
Figure 5 shows a portion of the feedback structure of an offender rehabilitation 
program. When operating as a vicious cycle of decay reinforcing loop 1 (R1) degrades 
prison system performance by reducing rehabilitation programs and thereby increasing 
recidivism as budgets are reduced, which increases reconvictions, prison populations and 
costs, thereby reducing funds for rehabilitation programs farther. Figure 5 also illustrates 
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the challenge of initiating changes if the total prison budget (Figure 5, right) is 
constrained without an allowance for surplus or deficit. A reduction in the total budget of 
a prison system operating in a steady state can reduce the discretionary budget enough to 
initiate the vicious cycle of decay. 
However, reinforcing loop 1 (R1) in Figure 5 also describes a potential solution 
if the reinforcing loop operates as a virtuous cycle of improvement instead of a vicious 
cycle of decay. In this behavior mode loop R1 depicts the use of a paid-from-savings 
approach in which a rehabilitation program reduces recidivism and then reconvictions, 
thereby reducing a prison’s population and operating costs. This increases operating 
savings, which can be used to continue to fund the rehabilitation program. These 
improvements are limited by the minimum recidivism that the rehabilitation programs 
can create (Figure 5, loop B1). Changing the behavior mode of this reinforcing loop into 
a virtuous cycle of improvement is the primary objective of a Social Impact Bond 
applied to offender rehabilitation. A SIB can solve this financing problem by having its 
investor provide the required funds to start and initially operate a rehabilitation program 
and be repaid (with profit) from the operating savings (Figure 5, loop R2). Thus a SIB 
can change the prison budget dynamics from tradeoffs (Figure 5, loop B2) among 
alternative uses or a vicious cycle of decay to the use of savings from reduced recidivism 
to continuously improve the prison system. After the SIB ends, the prison system can 
operate the rehabilitation program in perpetuity with its share of the savings generated 
by the SIB-funded program and future savings. In addition, after the SIB has ended the 
investors can continue this dynamic by reinvesting in a larger or different rehabilitation 
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programs (Disley, Rubin, Scraggs, Burrowes, & Culley, 2011). See Strickland (2010), 
Loder et al. (2010), Mulgan et al. (2011), and von Glahn and Whistler (2011) for 
detailed descriptions of a SIB for offender rehabilitation. 
 
 
Figure 5: Prison System Rehabilitation Program CLD  
 
Legend of Loops: Figure 5 
R1- Paid-from-Success Rehabilitation loop: Prison budget funds program which 
reduces population and generates savings which are used to pay for the program 
R2- Social Impact Bond loop: SIB invests in rehabilitation program, reducing 
population and creating savings, part of which are paid to investors as returns  
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B1- Limits to Improvement loop: Decreased recidivism reduces improvement 
available, which limits the amount of future recidivism reduction 
B2- External Constraint loop: Increases in budget surplus trigger increases in the 
returned budget from the prison, which limits the amount of future Operating 
Budgets 
Model Structures 
 The Peterborough SIB model has three sectors, depicting the prison system, the 
performance measurement, and SIB finances.  In general, the prison system structure 
models the flow of offenders through the system and the effects of the SIB on prison 
population dynamics (Strickland 2010). The performance measurement sector compares 
the offenders in the Peterborough cohorts and a comparison group of offenders to assess 
the performance of the SIB (Cave et al., 2012). The SIB finances sector use the 
performance assessment to simulate the financial returns to investors according to the 
SIB (Strickland, 2010; Disley et al., 2011; Cave et al., 2012). 
 Prison System Model Sector Structure 
 The prison system sector provides a simplified view of how people move in, out, 
and around the prison system.  New offenders are incarcerated from the general 
population (Figure 6, upper left).  In the model released offenders unknowingly come 
from one of two stocks: those who function within the norms of society (rehabilitated 
offenders) or those who will recommit (undiscovered reoffenders).  At the time of 
release the actual prison system does not know what fraction of released offenders will 
recommit, be arrested and convicted again, and reenter the prison.  But the model 
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distinguishes these stocks and their related flows using Stickland’s (2010) historical 
value of 75% re-offending fraction to initialize the model.  After their release, offenders 
are reintroduced to society where they either stay clear of trouble as rehabilitated 
offenders (i.e. are rehabilitated, Figure 6, top center) or recommit crimes (i.e. are 
unrehabilitated, Figure 6, left) and will eventually re-offend, be arrested and convicted, 
and returned to prison (Figure 6, bottom) (Disley, Rubin, Scraggs, Burrowes, & Culley, 
2011). The model simulates these two types of released offenders separately.   
 
 
Figure 6: Rework Cycle of a Prison System 
 
Rehabilitated offenders leave the system after the one-year probation period (Figure 6, 
upper right). Those that will recommit and be reconvicted remain under the same 
probation period until they are reconvicted.  Once reconvicted, an offender returns to the 
prison for the duration of their holding, where they are again released into the same 
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system (some being rehabilitated and the rest unrehabilitated).  The prison system has a 
structure of stocks and flows similar to the rework cycle in most system dynamic project 
management models (see Lyneis and Ford, 2007) with work being replaced by 
offenders, the fraction requiring rework being replaced by the recidivism fraction, and 
the quality assurance function replaced by the probation period. Similar to how 
improved work quality reduces rework in project models, reducing the recidivism of first 
time offenders can greatly reduce the magnitude of repeat offenders (Langan & Levin, 
2002). 
 Performance Measures Model Sector Structure 
 The performance management sector compares the offenders in the Peterborough 
system with a control group. To assess the effects of SIBs, the performance 
measurement sector compares the offenders in the four Peterborough cohorts to four 
parallel cohorts in a comparison group of offenders at other UK prisons. The effects of 
large scale factors such as a national decline in crime do not influence program 
performance because prison reconviction is compared to concurrent offender cohorts.  
Reconviction rate is used as the performance measure for recidivism (Cave et al., 2012).  
The third party assessor, QinetiQ, accumulates the entrants of first time offenders into 
the Peterborough prison system (Figure 7, top right).  After the cohort closes, every first-
time offender’s reconvictions are accumulated from national databases (Figure 7, bottom 
left).  The reconviction rate, listed in the model as the Reconviction Fraction (Figure 7, 
center), is the number of reconvictions divided by the number of offenders in the cohort.  
Success is defined as a reduction in recidivism or reconviction rate of 10% or more than 
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the reconviction rate in the comparison cohort for each of the three 1000 offender 
(maximum) cohorts at Peterborough or a reduction in recidivism of 7.5% or more than 
the recidivism change in the comparison cohort for the fourth (combined) Peterborough 
cohort (Figure 7, left).  If the performance meets either of these targets the MOJ pays the 
SIB investors a specified fraction of the savings captured by the MOJ based on the 
reconvictions prevented (Figure 7, bottom). 
 
 
Figure 7: Performance Measurement System 
 
Financial Model Sector Structure 
 The SIB financial sector uses the assessments of success from the performance 
measurement sector to simulate payments to investors and calculate returns.  Investors 
providing funds for program operations and expenses create outflows of investor cash to 
the SIP (Figure 8, bottom left).  The SIP uses the investors’ funds to pay the One Service 
providers for program costs (Figure 8, bottom right).  Loder et al. (2010) and Mulgan et 
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al. (2011) describe the costs of the program, including the overhead for the special 
purpose vehicle used to structure and operate the SIB. If the program is successful the 
MOJ makes payments based on savings captured to the SIB investors, creating cash 
inflows to the investors. The benefits of the program used to determine payments are the 
savings in reconvictions and re-incarceration (Strickland, 2010; Mulgan et al., 2011; 
Cave et al., 2012). The modelers assumed (consistent with the SIB intent) that if the 
program is successful the MOJ will use its savings (including those that were used to pay 
SIB investors) to continue to operate the rehabilitation program (Figure 8, top).  This 
closes the “big” feedback loop from funding from the SIB through the prison system, 
performance measurement and finances, and back to funding the program (by the MOJ 
after the SIB), and the shifting of dominance from loop R2 in Figure 5 (SIB-based 
success) to loop R2 (internally supported success).  If, in contrast, the program is 
unsuccessful the MOJ makes no payments to the SIB investors and the program closes 
out after the investment period.  Standard formulas with an assumed discount rate are 
used to estimate benefit cost ratios (BCR) and the net present value (NPV) of the SIB for 
the investor. 
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Figure 8: Stocks and Flows with Financial Structure of a SIB 
Model Documentation 
 See Appendix I for a complete equation listing, variable names, descriptions, and 
citations for the HMP Peterborough SIB Model.  
Model Calibrations 
 The model was calibrated to the Peterborough SIB case using publicly available 
literature as referenced in Table 2, below.  Langan & Levin (2002), Loder et al. (2010), 
Strickland (2010), Mulgan et al. (2011), Disley et al. (2011), and Cave et al., (2012) 
describe the program impact, costs, assessment process and timing, and magnitude. 
Mulgan et al. (2011) and Loder et al. (2010) describe the expected impact of the 
rehabilitation program as well as various costs added to the assessment. Strickland 
(2010) identifies the value of investment and limits of the investment. Disely et al. 
(2011) also provide results of a preliminary assessment of the SIB in terms of magnitude 
and affect. Model values coincide with the information on the SIB and program found in 
this literature. Values that were not described in the literature were estimated and the 
model initially set to steady state conditions. For example, Disely et al. (2011) noted that 
Social Impact
Partnership
One Service
Program
Payments from
SIP
Program
Costs
Investing
Investor Accounts
Owner Acounts
Owner Program
Payments
Investor
Returns
Prison System
Costs
Prison System
Budget
  
50 
about 315 new offenders entered HMP Peterborough in just over six months and the 
steady state model uses about 317 in a similar time frame. Cave et al. (2012) noted that 
the normal reconviction rate for HMP Peterborough was 1.64 persons per month for data 
collected up to one year after the close of the cohort. The calibrated model calculates 
about 1.53 persons per month in a similar time frame. 
Table 2, below, lists the variables used to calibrate the model including author 
defined variables, and initial conditions: 
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Table 2: Calibrated Values 
 
Exogenous Variable Description Calibration Units Source
Average Prisoner 
incarceration Rate for 
Peterborough
 This represents the maximum number of new people that 
can be placed in the prison system, all other prisoners 
must go to a different prison system. 
57.83 or 
694/12  
Offenders/ 
Month
Cave et al. (2012)
Minimum Change in 
Reconvictions
This represents the minimum change in reconvictions for 
the program to be considered a success.
10% (7.5%) DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Mulgan 
et al. 2011, Cave et al. 
2012)
Normal Recidivism 
Fraction
The normal quality of the system without having the 
project in play.
75% DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Loder et 
al. 2010, Mulgan et. al. 
2011)
Offender Multiplier 
between Prison 
Systems
This represents the ratio of people needed in each 
grouping to have an appropriate power level.
10 DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Probationary Period 
Length
This represents how long the rehabilitation program lasts 
and how long prisoners are tracked for reconvictions.
12 Months
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Cave 
et al. 2012)
Program Cost per 
Member
This is the average cost per member for the program. 1.5
k£/ 
Offender
Mulgan et al. (2011)
Standard Cohort 
Length
This is the standard time length of a cohort. 24 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Standard People in 
Cohort
It represents how many new incarceration releases are 
needed to finish a standard cohort.
1000
First-time 
Offenders
Cave et al. (2012)
Time for System 
Update
This represents the time taken for systems to update any 
information change in the sysem.  This includes both the 
recording of reconvictions and Budget surpluses.
6 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time after Cohort for 
Reconviction 
Collection
This represents the time from when cohort collection ends 
and the reconviction collection ends.
12 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time Spent in Prison 
for a Conviction
The average time a short-term offender remains in prison 
per visit.
1.5 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Yearly Cost of 
Incarceration
This represents the annum cost for each incarceration by 
the British government per person that is in prison.
39
k£/ 
Offender
Loder et al. (2010)
Conviction Cost
This represents the legal costs per conviction.  There is a 
discrepancy of conviction costs.
2.853
k£/ 
Offender
SEU (2002) & Mulgan et al. 
(2011)
Expected Program 
Investment amount
This represents the minimum required investment from 
the investors.
5000 k£ Strickland (2010)
Offenders' Willing to 
enter program 
Fraction
This represents the percentage of prisoners that elect to 
go through the program.
70% DMNL Disely et al. (2011)
Annual Interest Rate 
for Investment 
[Maximum]
This represents the maximum interest rate rate that 
investors can accrue from their investment for a successful 
case.
13% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Annual Interest Rate 
for Investment 
[Minimum]
This represents the minimum interest rate that investors 
can accrue from their invesment for a successful case.
7.5% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Recidivism Reduction 
Fraction
This represents the change in recidivism that occurs from 
the program.
0.3 DMNL
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Loder 
et al. 2010)
Fraction for Investor 
shares
This represents the percentage share of savings that the 
investors receive in a successful project.  The actual value 
is confidential and the value listed is estimated.
50% DMNL
Disely et al. (2011) and 
Author Defined
MOJ Starts Paying
This represents the time that the MOJ starts paying and is 
tuned to the end of offenders collecting in the SIB.
73 Months Model/ Author Defined
Normal Recidivism 
Discovery Time
The average amount of time it takes to convict a recently 
released offender of a new crime.
6 Months Cox (2006)
Initial Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
This represents the number of released offenders awaiting 
their discovery for reconviction that starts the model in 
steady state.
1041 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
This is the tunded value for the initial prisoners that starts 
the model in steady state.
86.75 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
This represents the initial amount of offenders that have 
been reconvicted in the prison to start the model in steady 
state.
260.25 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Time to Adjus 
Maximum Program 
Cost
Time delay to change the maximum program costs. 1 Months Author Defined
Investor Discount 
Rate
This represents the discount rate for investors as an 
alternate investment rate of return.
5% DMNL Author Defined
MOJ Discount Rate
This represents the discount rate for the MOJ as an 
alternate investment rate of return.
3% DMNL Author Defined
Fraction of Surplus 
Returned
This represents the fraction of budget surplus between the 
expected and actual expenses that is returned to the MOJ.
50% DMNL Author Defined
Time Program has to 
Pay
The time interval across which payments are made to the 
investors of Social Impact Partnership
3 Months Author Defined
Time MOJ Backlog 
Payments
This represents the time delay used by the MOJ to pay the 
savings of the program for program operations.
12 Months Author Defined
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Table 2: Continued 
 
 
Typical Model Behavior 
 Typical model behavior is illustrated by two performance variables one 
representing the SIB investors and the other representing the MOJ.  Although recidivism 
is the metric used in the SIB, a (perhaps the) primary performance measure of the MOJ 
is the reduction in the Peterborough population. Figure 9: Typical Model Behavior-HMP 
Peterborough Prison Population Reduction shows the simulated behavior over time of 
this variable for the calibrated model.  
After a period of steady state operations (months 0-20) the program begins and 
more offenders are rehabilitated in the Peterborough system, reducing the prison 
population (months 20-60). However, as available funds decrease, so does the number of 
offenders allowed to enter the program, slowing the rate of improvement (months 30-60) 
Exogenous Variable Description Calibration Units Source
Average Prisoner 
incarceration Rate for 
Peterborough
 This represents the maximum number of new people that 
can be placed in the prison system, all other prisoners 
must go to a different prison system. 
57.83 or 
694/12  
Offenders/ 
Month
Cave et al. (2012)
Minimum Change in 
Reconvictions
This represents the minimum change in reconvictions for 
the program to be considered a success.
10% (7.5%) DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Mulgan 
et al. 2011, Cave et al. 
2012)
Normal Recidivism 
Fraction
The normal quality of the system without having the 
project in play.
75% DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Loder et 
al. 2010, Mulgan et. al. 
2011)
Offender Multiplier 
between Prison 
Systems
This represents the ratio of people needed in each 
grouping to have an appropriate power level.
10 DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Probationary Period 
Length
This represents how long the rehabilitation program lasts 
and how long prisoners are tracked for reconvictions.
12 Months
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Cave 
et al. 2012)
Program Cost per 
Member
This is the average cost per member for the program. 1.5
k£/ 
Offender
Mulgan et al. (2011)
Standard Cohort 
Length
This is the standard time length of a cohort. 24 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Standard People in 
Cohort
It represents how many new incarceration releases are 
needed to finish a standard cohort.
1000
First-time 
Offenders
Cave et al. (2012)
Time for System 
Update
This represents the time taken for systems to update any 
information change in the sysem.  This includes both the 
recording of reconvictions and Budget surpluses.
6 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time after Cohort for 
Reconviction 
Collection
This represents the time from when cohort collection ends 
and the reconviction collection ends.
12 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time Spent in Prison 
for a Conviction
The average time a short-term offender remains in prison 
per visit.
1.5 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Yearly Cost of 
Incarceration
This represents the annum cost for each incarceration by 
the British government per person that is in prison.
39
k£/ 
Offender
Loder et al. (2010)
Conviction Cost
This represents the legal costs per conviction.  There is a 
discrepancy of conviction costs.
2.853
k£/ 
Offender
SEU (2002) & Mulgan et al. 
(2011)
Expected Program 
Investment amount
This represents the minimum required investment from 
the investors.
5000 k£ Strickland (2010)
Offenders' Willing to 
enter program 
Fraction
This represents the percentage of prisoners that elect to 
go through the program.
70% DMNL Disely et al. (2011)
Annual Interest Rate 
for Investment 
[Maximum]
This represents the maximum interest rate rate that 
investors can accrue from their investment for a successful 
case.
13% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Annual Interest Rate 
for Investment 
[Minimum]
This re resents the minimum in erest rate that investors 
can accrue from their invesment for a successful case.
7.5% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Recidivism Reduction 
Fraction
This represents the change in recidivism that occurs from 
the program.
0.3 DMNL
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Loder 
et al. 2010)
Fraction for Investor 
shares
This represents the percentage share of savings that the 
investors receive in a successful project.  The actual value 
is confidential and the value listed is estimated.
50% DMNL
Disely et al. (2011) and 
Author Defined
MOJ Starts Paying
This represents the time that the MOJ starts paying and is 
tuned to the end of offenders collecting in the SIB.
73 Months Model/ Author Defined
Normal Recidivism 
Discovery Time
The average amount of time it takes to convict a recently 
released offender of a new crime.
6 Months Cox (2006)
Initial Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
This represents the number of released offenders awaiting 
their discovery for reconviction that starts the model in 
steady state.
1041 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial First tim  
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
This is the tunded value for the initial prisoners that starts 
the model in steady state.
86.75 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
This represents the initial amount of offenders that have 
been reconvicted in the prison to start the model in steady 
state.
260.25 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Time to Adjus 
Maximum Program 
Cost
Time delay to change the maximum program costs. 1 Months Author Defined
Investor Discount 
Rate
This represents the discount rate for investors as an 
alternate investment rate of return.
5% DMNL Author Defined
MOJ Discount Rate
This represents the discount rate for the MOJ as an 
alternate investment rate of return.
3% DMNL Author Defined
Fraction of Surplus 
Returned
This represents the fraction of budget surplus between the 
expected and actual expenses that is returned to the MOJ.
50% DMNL Author Defined
Time Program has to 
Pay
The time interval across which payments are made to the 
investors of Social Impact Partnership
3 Months Author Defined
Time MOJ Backlog 
Payments
This represents the time delay used by the MOJ to pay the 
savings of the program for program operations.
12 Months Author Defined
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Exogenous Variable Description Calibration Units Source
Average Prisoner 
incarceration Rate for 
Peterborough
 This represents the maximum number of new people that 
can be placed in the prison system, all other prisoners 
must go to a different prison system. 
57.83 or 
694/12  
Offenders/ 
Month
Cave et al. (2012)
Minimum Change in 
Reconvictions
This represents the minimum change in reconvictions for 
the program to be considered a success.
10% (7.5%) DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Mulgan 
et al. 2011, Cave et al. 
2012)
Normal Recidivism 
Fraction
The normal quality of the system without having the 
project in play.
75% DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Loder et 
al. 2010, Mulgan et. al. 
2011)
Offender Multiplier 
between Prison 
Systems
This represents the ratio of people needed in each 
grouping to have an appropriate power level.
10 DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Probationary Period 
Length
This represents how long the rehabilitation program lasts 
and how long prisoners are tracked for reconvictions.
12 Months
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Cave 
et al. 2012)
Program Cost per 
Member
This is the average cost per member for the program. 1.5
k£/ 
Offender
Mulgan et al. (2011)
Standard Cohort 
Length
This is the standard time length of a cohort. 24 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Standard People in 
Cohort
It represents how many new incarceration releases are 
needed to finish a standard cohort.
1000
First-time 
Offenders
Cave et al. (2012)
Time for System 
Update
This represents the time taken for systems to update any 
information change in the sysem.  This includes both the 
recording of reconvictions and Budget surpluses.
6 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time after Cohort for 
Reconviction 
Collection
This represents the time from when cohort collection ends 
and the reconviction collection ends.
12 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time Spent in Prison 
for a Conviction
The average time a short-term offender remains in prison 
per visit.
1.5 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Yearly Cost of 
Incarceration
This represents the annum cost for each incarceration by 
the British government per person that is in prison.
39
k£/ 
Offender
Loder et al. (2010)
Conviction Cost
This represents the legal costs per conviction.  There is a 
discrepancy of conviction costs.
2.853
k£/ 
Offender
SEU (2002) & Mulgan et al. 
(2011)
Expected Program 
Investment amount
This represents the minimum required investment from 
the investors.
5000 k£ Strickland (2010)
Offenders' Willing to 
enter program 
Fraction
This represents the percentage of prisoners that elect to 
go through the program.
70% DMNL Disely et al. (2011)
Annual Interest Rate 
for Investment 
[Maximum]
This represents the maximum interest rate rate that 
investors can accrue from their investment for a successful 
case.
13% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Annual Interest Rate 
for Investment 
[Minimum]
This represents the minimum interest rate that investors 
can accrue from their invesment for a successful case.
7.5% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Recidivism Reduction 
Fraction
This represents the change in recidivism that occurs from 
the program.
0.3 DMNL
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Loder 
et al. 2010)
Fraction for Investor 
shares
This represents the percentage share of savings that the 
investors receive in a successful project.  The actual value 
is confidential and the value listed is estimated.
50% DMNL
Disely et al. (2011) and 
Author Defined
MOJ Starts Paying
This represents the time that the MOJ starts paying and is 
tuned to the end of offenders collecting in the SIB.
73 Months Model/ Author Defined
Normal Recidivism 
Discovery Time
The average amount of time it takes to convict a recently 
released offender of a new crime.
6 Months Cox (2006)
Initial Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
This represents the number of released offenders awaiting 
their discovery for reconviction that starts the model in 
steady state.
1041 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
This is the tunded value for the initial prisoners that starts 
the model in steady state.
86.75 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
This represents the initial amount of offenders that have 
been reconvicted in the prison to start the model in steady 
state.
260.25 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Time to Adjus 
Maximum Program 
Cost
Time delay to change the maximum program costs. 1 Months Author Defined
Investor Discount 
Rate
This represents the discount rate for investors as an 
alternate investment rate of return.
5% DMNL Author Defined
MOJ Discount Rate
This represents the discount rate for the MOJ as an 
alternate investment rate of return.
3% DMNL Author Defined
Fraction of Surplus 
Returned
This represents the fraction of budget surplus between the 
expected and actual expenses that is returned to the MOJ.
50% DMNL Author Defined
Time Program has to 
Pay
The time interval across which payments are made to the 
investors of Social Impact Partnership
3 Months Author Defined
Time MOJ Backlog 
Payments
This represents the time delay used by the MOJ to pay the 
savings of the program for program operations.
12 Months Author Defined
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and eventually reversing the progress and causing an increase in prison population when 
SIB funds have been depleted (months 60-75). After the completion of the program 
funded by the SIB the rehabilitation program is continued by the MOJ (consistent with 
van Glahn and Whistler, 2011), initially using the savings generated by the SIB funded 
program. This causes the prison population to reduce again, approaching a steady state at 
its maximum which is controlled by a minimum recidivism (months 75-200). The 
potential dangers of the temporary increase in prison population and use the model to 
investigate the causes and a possible solution are described later. 
 
 
Figure 9: Typical Model Behavior-HMP Peterborough Prison Population 
Reduction 
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The primary performance measure of the SIB investors is their return, reflected 
in the internal rate of return. Figure 10 shows the internal rate of return (IRR) for the SIB 
investors for the calibrated model case.  
 
 
Figure 10: Typical Model Behavior-HMP Peterborough SIB Internal Rate of 
Return 
 
The SIB-funded program starts in month 20, paying startup and operating costs. 
Until returns are paid to the investors the IRR is -100%.  The success or failure of the 
first cohort occurs after the first assessment period, when (for the calibrated case) 
success reduces recidivism and creates savings. This initiates the first payment by the 
MOJ to the SIB investors (month 57), consistent with Cave et al. (2012) and Mulgan et 
al. (2011). Similarly, the second and third successful cohorts are paid starting in months 
75 and 92, each increasing the IRR. In the actual Peterborough case and the calibrated 
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model used for the calibrated case the IRR is limited to 8.25% (months 100-200). Model 
analysis results are used later to investigate performance without this limit. 
Model Validation 
 The model contains a total of 141 variables consisting of 23 basic stocks, 24 
flows (with five arrays), and 29 exogenous variables.  The model generated reasonable 
behavior when each of the 29 exogenous variables were set to extreme values.  More 
specifically, each exogenous variable was tested for its impact on several outcome 
variables, including SIB investor IRR, offender release rate, and the reconviction 
fraction. For example, when the Normal Recidivism Discovery Time (average time to 
discover that a released offender has re-offended) was set to a relatively high value 
(twelve months) the SIB investor IRR decreases because there are fewer reconvictions 
for every unrehabilitated offender and therefore less savings and reduction in recidivism. 
See the supporting documents in Appendix I for details on the extreme conditions testing 
and results. 
The Peterborough SIB has not progressed adequately to provide actual behavior 
data for use in model validation.  However, the literature describes the expected behavior 
for the case, including Disely et al. (2011) reviewing the expectations for both how 
investors earn money as well as how the SIB financially functions, Cave et al. (2012) 
describes how the third party assessor of performance defines the limits among the 
different cohorts and determines cohort success, Langan and Levin (2002) describes how 
the prison system creates a perpetual cycle of offences, and Mulgan et al. (2011) 
describes the transfer of risk, cost savings to the MOJ, and flows of capital between key 
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stakeholders. The model’s behavior is consistent with the expected behavior for financial 
and other performance measures. For example, Disely et al. (2012) describes the 
increase in investor returns due to either a decrease in reconvictions, or an increase in the 
investors’ share of the total savings. By varying these two parameters the model also 
simulates this increase in returns (Figure 11), building confidence in the ability to 
generate “the right behavior for the right reasons”. 
 
 
Figure 11: Behavior Validation Test of SIB Return Based on Recidivism Reduction 
 
As another example of model behavior validation the model successfully reflects 
the expectation that the government would continue a successful program, as described 
by Glahn and Whistler (2011).  The model’s behavior is consistent with what would be 
expected in the operation of the actual SIB at HMP Peterborough. 
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Based on these model validation tests the Peterborough SIB model is considered 
valid for investigating the impacts of SIB design parameters on system behavior and 
performance. 
Model Analysis 
The model analysis was conducted in two steps to identify and describe the high 
leverage parameters for the key stakeholders.  First statistical screening (Taylor, Ford, 
and Ford, 2010; Ford and Flynn, 2005) was used to identify high leverage parameters for 
one performance measure for the MOJ (prison population reduction) and for one 
performance measure for SIB investors (IRR). Statistical screening is a simple, 
structured, and user-friendly means of identifying high leverage model parameters based 
on model behavior. Statistical screening quantifies parameter influence throughout 
simulation, thereby describing the evolution of exogenous impacts on behavior. In 
addition, statistical screening provides modelers with the objective model analysis 
results required to generate clear behavior distinctions. Consistent with the application of 
statistical screening (Taylor et al., 2010), the time frame after the SIB is completed 
(months 100-165) was chosen as the focus of the analysis. The results of the statistical 
screening analysis were used to identify two of the highest leverage parameters that 
could be influenced by SIB designers. These were then described with univariate 
sensitivity analysis. See the model analysis supporting documentation for details on 
these analyses. 
The four most influential exogenous variables that impact the prison population 
reduction are shown in the results of the statistical screening analysis (Figure 12).  The 
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analysis results show the relative influence of the four exogenous parameters with the 
most impact on the prison population reduction. Correlation coefficient values farther 
from zero indicate more influence. Positive values indicate movement in the same 
direction and vice versa. The results indicate that, after the SIB is over, the reduction in 
recidivism, maximum cohort size, reference (pre-program) recidivism fraction, and unit 
program cost (per participant) are most influential on the prison population reduction (in 
decreasing order of influence). The reduction in recidivism after the SIB is particularly 
important because it is a metric of program effectiveness, something that SIB designers 
can influence through their choice, design, and management of the rehabilitation 
program. Similarly, the unit program cost can also be influenced by SIB designers and 
managers. 
 
Figure 12: Statistical Screening Model Analysis Results—Prison Population 
Reduction 
 
  
59 
Figure 13 shows the results of the statistical screening analysis for the four most 
influential exogenous variables that impact the SIB investor IRR. The analysis results 
show that, in decreasing order of influence, the relative influence of the four exogenous 
parameters with the most impact on the SIB investor internal rate of return. The results 
indicate that, after the SIB is over, the reduction in recidivism, unit program cost, unit 
cost of conviction, and investor discount rate are most influential on SIB investor IRR. 
 
 
Figure 13: Statistical Screening Model Analysis Results—SIB Investor Internal 
Rate of Return 
 
The results of the two statistical screening analyses indicate that reduction in 
recidivism and unit program cost are two of the highest leverage parameters for both the 
MOJ and SIB investors that SIB designers can influence.  Consistent with model 
analysis using statistical screening (Taylor et al., 2010), the model structure is used to 
link these parameters to potential drivers of system behavior and performance (e.g. 
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feedback loops, delays, accumulations). Both variables have a direct impact on the 
strength of core feedback loops in the Peterborough SIB. Increasing the program 
effectiveness and thereby the reduction in recidivism (Figure 5, left side) reduces 
reconvictions, prison population (a MOJ performance metric), operating costs, and 
thereby savings that generate return for SIB investors (Figure 5, Paid-from-Success 
rehabilitation loop R2). As described above, strengthening this loop drives the Social 
Impact Bond loop (Figure 5, loop R1) that allows the MOJ to operate the rehabilitation 
program on a self-sustaining basis. This demonstrates the critical role of understanding 
and managing these two feedback loops. 
However, knowing what system parameters and feedback loops have the most 
influence does not provide operational recommendations to system designers and 
managers because the amount of benefits derived from changes, limits of change, 
difficulty of change, cost of change, and other factors impact the attractiveness of change 
alternatives.  Knowing the relative amounts of leverage that each of these parameters 
have on performance can facilitate SIB design. Therefore, univariate sensitivity analysis, 
initially using the calibrated model as a case, was performed to better describe their 
impacts. Figure 14 shows the relative impacts of these two variables on prison 
population reduction. These results indicate that the reduction in recidivism has an equal 
or larger impact on prison population than the unit program cost and that reducing the 
unit cost below a specific value (40% above the calibrated case cost in these simulations) 
does not reduce the prison population. This latter lack of impact is due to the program 
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having achieved the maximum possible reduction in recidivism (Figure 5, Balancing 
loop 1). 
 
Figure 14: Results of Univariate Sensitivity Analysis with Calibrated Case - Prison 
Population Reduction 
 
Figure 15 shows the results of the univariate sensitivity analysis for the impacts 
of the reduction in recidivism and unit program cost on the SIB investor internal rate of 
return. 
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Figure 15: Univariate Sensitivity Analysis Results with Calibrated Case - SIB 
Investor Internal Rate of Return 
 
SIB investor IRR increases as the final recidivism reduction increases from a loss 
of all invested funds if recidivism reductions are not adequate and no cohorts are 
successful to the calibrated reduction values, after which they remain constant at 8.25% 
(Figure 15, top).  This limit is because the Peterborough SIB and the model include a 
maximum return regardless of performance. Similarly, SIB investor IRR increases as the 
program cost per participant decreases from 2.27% when costs are double the 
Peterborough costs (Figure 15, lower right) to a return of 8.25% at the calibrated costs 
(Figure 15, upper left). Returns fall to -100% because there are no successful cohorts if 
there is inadequate reduction in recidivism (Figure 15, lower left) or 2.37%, the 
minimum return for successful cohorts in the SIB, if unit costs are very high (Figure 15, 
lower right). As shown by similar slopes in Figure 15 near the calibrated case conditions, 
reductions in recidivism and unit program cost have similar amounts of leverage near the 
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calibrated case conditions and less influence with increased variance from calibrated 
case conditions. To better understand performance for other possible SIB designs the 
model was altered to remove the 8.25% maximum allowed return and 2.37% minimum 
return on successful cohorts. The univariate sensitivity analysis was repeated and the 
results are shown in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16: Univariate Sensitivity Analysis Results with Unlimited Return - SIB 
Investor Internal Rate of Return 
 
Note, there are different vertical scales between Figure 16 and Figure 15. Results 
indicate that a reduction in recidivism that is twice as large as the base case (i.e. if the 
program is very effective) can generate much larger returns when returns are unrestricted 
(23.49% vs. 8.25%). Similarly, returns can increase from 8.25% to 11.61% if program 
costs are cut to at least 80% of the calibrated costs if returns are not limited. However, 
  
64 
unconstrained returns can fall to (-12.1%), well below the minimum return of 2.37% 
(Figure 16) with high costs. This illustrates how the SIB investor traded away the 
opportunity for a higher reward if the program was very successful to gain some 
protection with a minimum return if case costs were high. 
Base Case Changes 
 The base case is changed from the calibrated case to observe the effects of a SIB 
without the constraints imposed for investor security.  The following changes were 
implemented to alter the model from a calibrated case: 
1. Removal of minimum and maximum returns for success allowing the model to 
show real values for the investors’ and owner’s benefits and costs.  These 
constraints were imposed as a means of reducing the investors’ risk while this 
study is not concerned about addressing the investors’ risks, but the owners.  
Leaving these constraints in would affect the value of the return for the investors.  
The investors trade the possibility of overly successful funds for the risk of a less 
than successful circumstance.   This explains how excluding these constraints, 
the model, looks at the impact of a SIB structure instead of the securities 
provided in an insured SIB. 
2. Removal of Deflation Rates allowing consistent value for actions in the present 
and future.  The value of borrowing capital is still accounted through interest 
rates, but the inclusion of a deflation rate would assume a greater cost for current 
generation goods and services than for future generations.  Therefore, the 
deflation rate is assumed zero to negligible because the cost of present and future 
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generations for goods and services is assumed equal (Pearce & Warford, 1993).  
This explains why the capital and goods that are not borrowed do not use an 
inflation or deflation rate. 
Conclusion 
A system dynamics model of the only known operating Social Impact Bond (SIB 
to fund a prisoner rehabilitation program at the Peterborough prison in the United 
Kingdom was developed and validated. The model was analyzed using statistical 
screening to identify high leverage parameters for one important performance metric for 
both the owner and investors. Univariate sensitivity analysis was then used to describe 
the impacts of the two highest leverage parameters that can be used in SIB design. The 
analysis results were used to investigate two SIB design issues.   
The highest leverage parameters for the final reduction in the prison population 
(MOJ performance metric), in decreasing order of influence, were found to be the 
fractional reduction in recidivism, maximum cohort size, reference (pre-program) 
recidivism fraction, and unit program cost (per participant). The highest leverage 
parameters for final SIB investor returns were found to be the fractional reduction in 
recidivism, unit program cost, unit cost of conviction, and investor discount rate. These 
high leverage parameters influence the strength of the feedback loops that control the 
prison population and savings captured by the MOJ and partially paid to investors. To 
maximize SIB performance designers and managers must understand and influence the 
strength of this feedback loop.  
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The two parameters shared by the performance measures identified with 
statistical screening analysis are also two parts of the system that SIB designers can 
influence: program effectiveness (reduction in recidivism) and unit program cost.  The 
univariate analysis revealed that the constraints built into the SIB agreement controlled 
the relative effectiveness of these parameters on performance, particularly return limits 
on investor performance. Univariate analysis without those constraints indicate that 
program effectiveness has equal or more influence on MOJ performance (prison 
population) and investor performance (IRR) than unit program cost. This suggests that 
SIB designers should focus on developing and selecting highly effective interventions, 
with less regard for costs (which also might decline over time due to learning curve 
effects).  
The work also identified two potentially fatal characteristics of the Peterborough 
SIB design. First, the delay between the end of investments in the program and 
information feedback to investors (through the first returns) about performance could 
prevent the program from becoming self-sustaining by creating a temporary increase in 
the prison population. Reducing the delay by having the MOJ start funding the program 
before the testing of the SIB is a counterintuitive policy that can address this challenge. 
Second, ending investor funding before they receive feedback on SIB financial 
performance may prevent the SIB investors from being active participants by effectively 
influencing the system intervention for improved performance and higher returns. This 
challenge can be addressed in future SIB-funded programs with longer SIB-investor 
funding and should improve as a track record of performance is established.  
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The current work can be extended with additional analysis of SIB design 
principles using the model.  It can also be used as the basis for modeling other planned 
and operational application of the SIB approach. Finally, the model can be used to model 
the application of SIBs to other systems that generate savings from improvements, such 
as sustainability improvements to built infrastructure projects. This illustrates the case 
and model for the existing SIB at HMP Peterborough prison. 
More information on the analysis and usefulness of the SIB model and the “Dip” 
may be found in Appendix II. 
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CHAPTER V  
BUILT INFRASTRUCTURE SUSTAINABILITY CASE AND MODEL1 
 
This chapter describes and defines the TAMU project study, a Built 
Infrastructure Sustainability (BIS) case, and how it qualifies for comparison with the 
Peterborough SIB case for three reasons: 
1. Validity of Study- The case has already been studied and the model already 
developed.  This provides documented and citable analysis that can be used 
to support any similarities or differences. 
2. Common Financing Strategy- At first glance, the TAMU project, like the 
Peterborough project reduces an expense to the owner organization and uses 
the savings as repayment for an investment.  These common traits provide a 
basis to compare the two projects. 
3. Transitivity between Industry- Universities exist in both a public and private 
industry.  As a public institution, TAMU has access to funds that private 
universities would not (Combs, 2013).  Even though TAMU uses a loan, a 
similar university in the private sector might not have access to the interest 
rate.  The higher interest rates would increase the cost for improvement and 
deter project consideration (the same argument made in chapter 1).  
                                                 
1 This chapter references Kim, A., Hessami, A., Faghihi, V., & Ford, D. 2012. “Design Perpetual 
Sustainability Improvement Programs for Built Infrastructure,” in proceedings of the 2012 International 
System Dynamics Conference, St. Gallen, Switzerland, System Dynamics Society unless otherwise noted.  
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Therefore, a private university may consider a SIB for the same 
improvements. 
The validity of the BIS study provides a means of comparison and the common 
financing strategy aligns the case of the study while the transitivity between industries 
provides justification for a possible real world application.  This explains why the 
TAMU project is the ideal candidate for comparison.  Therefore, the TAMU SIB case is 
a well-defined model that shares similar model development traits to the Peterborough 
case and provides an ideal case for comparison. 
Problem Articulation 
Built infrastructure sustainability (BIS) is the alteration of existing structures to 
improve the quality of living and reduce the consumption of goods and services for built 
infrastructure projects (Kats, 2010).  These improvements are often referred to as 
“green” or “sustainable” construction.  In a BIS project, an owner undertakes to improve 
an existing facility or group of facilities.   
Sustainable construction has textbook examples of externalities from goods and 
services and their negative impacts on society (Daly & Farley, 2011; Gruber, Public 
Finance and Public Policy, 2011).  Pollutants and wastes create an unnecessary hardship 
on economic circumstances that produce a deadweight loss and cause either over or 
under consumption of goods or services (Daly & Farley, 2011; Gruber, Public Finance 
and Public Policy, 2011).  The over and/ under consumption of goods and services from 
these externalities create a gap between society and the Pareto optimal equilibrium, a 
case where everyone is better off without making anyone worse off (Daly & Farley, 
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2011; Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy, 2011).  Greg Kats (2010) and Charles 
Kibert (2008) have both published books pertaining to improving built infrastructure and 
how different organizations could approach the benefits of green construction, while the 
U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) works to study paid from savings reinvestment 
strategies (Van Der Like & Meehan, 2009).  There are still conflicting thoughts toward 
sustainable design as the average overhead expected represents a value nine times larger 
than what research has found (Kats, 2010).  This explains the development of research to 
improve financial options for owners and investors in BIS projects. 
New construction projects are beginning to incorporate more efficient systems as 
they are developed.  The U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) established the 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification in the United 
States as a standard for sustainable construction (USGBC, 2013).  LEED certifications 
were first launched in 1998 and have continued to alter and improve their rating systems 
(Richards, 2012).  Designing a building from a sustainable platform allows the owner to 
maximize the benefits of new systems and technologies that reduce consumption and 
improve working environments (Kats, 2010).  This explains the growing trend among 
designers for sustainable construction. 
However, existing infrastructure has met more resistance than new construction.  
The LEED certifications took 7 years to develop and incorporating existing building 
structures in the certification process (Richards, 2012).  Furthermore, building space 
with owner-tenant relations do not share common goals or interests.  Funding sustainable 
improvement for existing structures often requires funds that an owner does not have 
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readily available.  Therefore, building owners and managers have an interest in financial 
options that would change the effectiveness of programs’ profitably. 
Figure 17 shows a portion of the feedback structure of a BIS system program. 
When operating as a vicious cycle of decay reinforcing loop 1 (R1) degrades BIS system 
performance by reducing sustainable improvements and thereby increasing energy 
consumption as budgets are reduced, relative to what they would have been otherwise, 
which increases energy costs, thereby reducing funds for BIS programs farther. These 
effects can be seen as nickel and diming employees or as delaying maintenance and 
replacement of assets (Osborne & Hutchinson, 2004).  Figure 17 also illustrates how the 
challenge of initiating changes if the total prison budget (Figure 17, right) can be 
constrained by borrowing capital for improvements.  A reduction in the total budget of a 
building energy use system operating in a steady state can reduce the discretionary 
budget enough to initiate the vicious cycle of decay.   
 
Figure 17: Designing Perpetual Sustainability Improvement Programs for Built 
Infrastructure" CLD after Kim et al. (2012)  
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Legend of Loops: Figure 17 
R1: Savings Growth- As savings from improvements increase, investments in energy 
reductions increase savings by reducing consumption. 
B1: Building Savings Limit- As energy reduction cost savings increases, the captured 
savings from the building increases which reduces the unclaimed savings. 
B2: Sustainable Development Limit- As the sustainability fund increases; more funds 
can be spent on improvements which reduces the sustainability fund. 
B3: Loan Repayment Limit-  As the sustainability fund increases, more of the loan can 
be repaid which decreases the sustainability fund. 
 
However, reinforcing loop 1 (R1) in Figure 17 also describes a potential solution 
if the reinforcing loop operates as a virtuous cycle of improvement instead of a vicious 
cycle of decay. In this behavior mode loop R1 depicts the use of a paid-from-savings 
approach in which a sustainability improvement program reduces energy consumption 
thereby reducing operating costs. This increases operating savings, which can be used to 
continue to fund the sustainability improvement program.  These improvements are 
limited by the available energy savings that the sustainability improvement programs can 
create (Figure 17, loop B1).  In the TAMU case, the primary object of the loan is to 
change the behavior mode of this reinforcing loop into a virtuous cycle of improvement 
for energy reduction.  The state of Texas has an allotment of capital for public schools to 
borrow in order to initiate these changes (Figure 17, Loan) (Combs, 2013). Thus a 
investment in sustainability can change the energy budget dynamics from tradeoffs 
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(Figure 17, loop B2) among alternative uses or a vicious cycle of decay to the use of 
savings from reduced energy consumption to a more efficient system of built 
infrastructure components.  After the loan is paid off, the owner continues to collect 
savings from the program in perpetuity.  With this share of the savings generated by the 
loan-funded portion of the program, the owner has a self-funding option for further 
improvement and added future savings.  See the Kim et al. (2011) for more information 
on the Texas State program, Combs (2013) for application and requirements, and Kats 
(2006) for the benefits of greening public schools. 
Model Structure 
 The TAMU model has two sectors depicting the performance measurement and 
energy savings/ finance.  The performance measurement sector estimates the energy 
savings of various sustainable improvements. The energy savings/ finance sector use the 
performance assessment to simulate the costs and savings for the sustainable 
improvements. 
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Figure 18: Built Infrastructure Sustainability Model Sector Diagram 
 
 The performance management sector estimates the amount of energy saved with 
the cost of energy. These estimates are based off laboratory tests for different building 
improvements.  These values can be tested and compared during system operations using 
modeling software such as DOE2 (Norford, Socolow, Hsieh, & Spadaro, 1994; Carriere, 
Schoenau, & Besant, 1999), but for purpose of the TAMU model do not need to be 
verified.  The energy savings is measured using two sets of units for three forms of 
measurement seen in Figure 18 below.   The Excel file alters the energy use based on the 
sustainability funds spent for improvement and the improvement types.  This explains 
how the excel file operates as the performance measurement sector. 
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 The energy savings/ finance sector uses the assessments of success from the 
performance measurement sector to simulate the accumulation of savings in the 
sustainability fund.   The sustainability fund, originally initiated by borrowing from the 
state, is used to invest in sustainable improvements.  As the fund accumulates savings, 
the loan is repaid from the same account.  This explains how the energy savings/ finance 
sector effect the performance measurement sector. 
Model Documentation 
 The model documentation may be found in Appendix III and provides the 
following information: variable names, descriptions, citations, applicable equations, and 
the excel file used in conjecture with the model. 
Model Calibrations 
 The model calibrated case uses data from the TAMU case via the school’s utility 
records, contracts and meetings with the representatives of TAMU project.  The base 
case alters the model values as listed in Chapter III of the Research Methods.  The 
differences can be seen in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Calibrated and Base Case Values 
  
 
 
Figure 19: TAMU Base Case verses Study Calibrated Case 
 
Base Case Calibrated
Funding Portion 50% 100%
Behavior Modification 
(BM) Strategy
12% 12%
Install BM cost per 
building
4833 4833
BM Monthly Maintenance 
Cost
41.67 41.67
Buildings used (excludes 
Garages)
12 12
Interest rate for negative 
funds
2% 2%
Fraction of Savings to 
Sustainability Fund
50% 100%
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The Behavior Modification (BM) values listed in Table 3 are the values selected 
for both the base case and calibrated case.  A comparison between the sustainability 
fund, the performance measure used in the TAMU models case study, is shown below in 
Figure 19. 
Typical Model Behavior 
 Typical model behavior is illustrated using the sustainability fund for the TAMU 
project. This stock measures the available capital for reinvestment in sustainability 
projects, other projects at the owner’s discretion, and the repayment of the loan.  Although 
cost savings are used as the performance measure for the Siemen’s contract, the primary 
performance measure for TAMU is the energy reduction. Figure 20 shows the simulated 
behavior over time of this variable for the calibrated model.  
 
 
Figure 20: Typical Model Behavior—TAMU Sustainability Fund 
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The model starts when the loan is taken and the program begins and as 
improvements are made, the energy reduction is increased for the TAMU system until all 
beneficial options have been funded (a LTG constraint) (months 10-130). After the 
completion of the program funded by the loan the sustainability improvement program is 
continued by TAMU through the accrued savings (consistent with van Van Der Like, 
2009), initiated by the loan (months 130-480). This causes the energy reduction to remain 
at the reduced values, a steady state at its maximum, which is controlled by a minimum 
energy use (months 10-480). Reducing or eliminating the funds would cause either a 
penalty for default.    
Model Validation 
 The model contains a total of 76 variables consisting of 7 basic stocks, 10 flows 
(with two arrays), 7 exogenous variables, and 9 switches for simulation control.  The 
model closely resembles the structural design of the Harvard Green Campus Initiative 
Environmental Loan, because of the models ability to repay, reinvest and share savings 
with the university.  Unlike Harvard, the TAMU case focuses on built infrastructure 
improvement excluding transportation and purchasing costs/ savings.  For example, as 
the sustainability fund increases, more projects are enacted thereby reducing the energy 
consumption and increasing the energy savings. See the supporting documents in 
Appendix III for details structural assessment of the TAMU model. 
The TAMU case has not progressed adequately to provide the actual behavior 
data for use in model validation.  However, the contract documents and other literature 
sources on sustainable improvements describe the financial behavior and other 
  
79 
performance measures that were used to validate the model.   Figure 20 above, shows the 
base case used in the model study.  The entirety of the budget ($3.4 million) is spent on 
the improvements; however, the account never drops below zero because the 
improvements generate immediate savings.  This illustrates the models ability to 
respond. 
 
 
Figure 21: Behavior Validation Test of TAMU Total Energy Reduction 
Model Analysis 
 
As another example of model behavior validation the model successfully reflects 
the expectation that the funds invested in sustainable improvements would upfront 
  
80 
increase the Energy Savings and then level off  as shown in Figure 21 (Invested funds 
occur in the beginning and results level off during the simulation) while the benefits to 
the owner are received throughout the life of the project (Owner funds steadily increase 
through the simulation shown in Figure 22).  This illustrates the model’s ability to 
produce expected behavior.  The “Owner’s Fund” is used in the validation test showing 
the satisfaction of the owner (this is not adequately displayed in the sustainability fund). 
Based on these model validation tests the TAMU BIS model is considered valid 
for investigating the impacts of BIS case design parameters on system behavior and 
performance. 
  
 
Figure 22: Behavior Validation Test of TAMU Owner Fund 
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The model analysis was conducted in two steps to identify and describe the high 
leverage parameters for the key stakeholders.  First statistical screening (Taylor, Ford, 
and Ford, 2010; Ford and Flynn, 2005) was used to identify high leverage parameters 
one performance measure for the owner (TAMU) and another representing an investor 
(the SECO).  The original model analysis was conducted to test the benefit of different 
prioritization for building improvement options; however, the model can also be used to 
determine the impact of different exogenous variables on the performance measures.  
The sustainability funds balance after the loan was repaid, at month 200 was used to 
compare the different prioritization methods.  The sustainability fund represents the 
available capital for reinvestment and for ulterior uses by the owner.  To separate the 
owner’s actions from their goals, the owner’s (TAMU’s) satisfaction will be measured 
by the magnitude of a separate account (Owner’s Fund).  The ‘Total Energy Saved’ was 
chosen as the investor performance measure as it reflects the goals and mission of the 
SECO.  Statistical screening is a simple, structured, and user-friendly means of 
identifying high leverage model parameters based on model behavior. Statistical 
screening quantifies parameter influence throughout simulation, thereby describing the 
evolution of exogenous impacts on behavior. In addition, statistical screening provides 
modelers with the objective model analysis results required to generate clear behavior 
distinctions. Consistent with the application of statistical screening (Taylor et al., 2010), 
the time frame after the loan is repaid (beyond month 200) was chosen as the focus of 
the analysis. The results of the statistical screening analysis were used to identify two of 
the highest leverage parameters that could influence key stakeholders in policy designs. 
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These were then described with univariate sensitivity analysis. See the model analysis 
supporting documentation for details on these analyses. 
Figure 23 shows the results of the statistical screening analysis for the most 
influential exogenous variables that impact the owner’s fund.  The analysis results show 
the relative influence of the four exogenous parameters with the most impact on the 
owner’s fund. Correlation coefficient values farther from zero indicate more influence.  
Positive values indicate movement in the same direction and vice versa. The results 
indicate that, after the repayment, the fraction of savings sent to the sustainability fund 
(verses the owners pockets), Cost of Energy (regardless of type), and the percent 
reduction of electricity and hot water heating (or program effectiveness) are most 
influential on the owner’s fund (in decreasing order of influence). The fraction of 
savings replenishing the sustainability fund is particularly important because its inverse 
replenishes the owner’s funds.  Similarly, the unit energy cost is very influential to the 
program because it directly impacts the amount of savings. 
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Figure 23: Statistical Screening Model Analysis Results: Owner’s Fund 
 
Figure 24 shows the results of the statistical screening analysis for the three most 
influential exogenous variables that impact the SECO total energy reduction.  The 
analysis results show that energy reduction, in decreasing order, after the loan is paid off 
is influenced by chilled water cooling, hot water heating, and electricity (program 
effectiveness variables). The results indicate that, for the SECO, the system should work 
to be more effective. 
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Figure 24: Statistical Screening Model Analysis Results: Total Energy Reduction 
 
The results of the two statistical screening analyses indicate that energy reduction 
(program effectiveness) contributes two of the highest leverage parameters for both 
TAMU and the SECO.  Consistent with model analysis using statistical screening 
(Taylor et al., 2010), the model structure is used to link these parameters to potential 
drivers of system behavior and performance (e.g. feedback loops, delays, 
accumulations).  Program effectiveness variables have a direct impact on the strength of 
core feedback loops in the TAMU case.  Increasing the program effectiveness and 
thereby the reduction in energy use (Figure 25, left side B1) reduces demand for energy 
and the operating costs, and thereby creating a savings that generates a return the owner 
repay the investor with (Figure 25, Paid-from-Success rehabilitation loop R2).  As 
described above, strengthening this loop drives the savings (Figure 25, loop R1) that 
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allows TAMU to operate the energy reduction program on a self-sustaining basis. This 
demonstrates the critical role of understanding and managing these two feedback loops. 
 
 
Figure 25: TAMU-Siemens Project Demand Side  
 
Legend of Loops: Figure 25 
R1- Savings Growth Loop- As savings from improvements increase, investments in 
energy reductions increase savings by reducing consumption. 
R2- Investor Incentive Loop- As investors increase their investment, the program 
outcomes increase and increase the investor group’s return. 
B1- Energy Savings Limit- As energy reduction cost savings increases, the captured 
savings from the building increases which reduces the unclaimed savings. 
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B2- Savings Return Limit- As the sustainability fund increases, more of the loan can be 
repaid which decreases the sustainability fund. 
However, knowing what system parameters and feedback loops have the most 
influence does not provide operational recommendations to system designers and 
managers because the amount of benefits derived from changes, limits of change, 
difficulty of change, cost of change, and other factors impact the attractiveness of change 
alternatives.  Knowing the relative amounts of leverage that each of these parameters 
have on performance can facilitate project design variables. Therefore, univariate 
sensitivity analysis, initially using the calibrated model as a case, was performed to 
better describe their impacts.  Figure 10 shows the relative impact the fraction of savings 
that is used to restore the sustainability fund (closing R1 in Figure 25)  has on the 
performance variables (owner’s fund and total energy saved) after the completion of the 
loan (month 200). These results indicate that increasing the fraction to the sustainability 
fund reduces the owner’s ability to capture savings, but increases the total energy 
reduction.  This increase in owner’s fund by reducing the fraction illustrates B1 in Figure 
26. 
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Figure 26: Univaiate Sensitivity Analysis for Fraction of Savings used to restore 
Sustainability Fund 
 
Figure 27 shows the results of the univariate sensitivity analysis for the impacts of 
changing the reduction in electricity (one of the program effectiveness variables). The 
other program effectiveness variables may be seen in Appendix III.  
Satisfaction for the TAMU and SECO increase as the total energy reduction 
increases; however, the scales of benefits are marginal in comparison with TAMU’s 
benefits of altering the sustainability fund’s replenishment fraction (Figure 26).  This 
presents an issue of incentives between TAMU and SECO.  The SECO would be 
benefited by maintaining oversight or requiring TAMU to set aside the savings. 
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Figure 27: Univariate Sensitivity Analysis for Program Effectiveness (Electricity) 
Conclusion 
 
A system dynamics model of the TAMU built infrastructure sustainability 
improvement case was developed and validated by Kim et al. (2012). The model was 
analyzed using statistical screening to identify high leverage parameters for one 
important performance metric for both the owner (TAMU) and investor (SECO). 
Univariate sensitivity analysis was then used to describe the impacts of the high leverage 
parameters that can be used in project design. The analysis results were used to identify 
a difference of incentives between TAMU and the SECO.   
The highest leverage parameters for the TAMU and SECO shared program 
effectiveness variables (reduction in electricity, heating hot water, and chilled water). 
These parameters showed incentives for increasing their effectiveness, but were less 
potent for TAMU than the available change offered from recapturing savings for ulterior 
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purposes. The fraction of savings returned to the sustainability fund is a high leverage 
parameter that influences the strength of the feedback loops that control the savings 
captured by TAMU and the continuance of sustainable development in built 
infrastructure. To maximize sustainable development built infrastructure owners and 
managers must understand and influence the strength of this feedback loop.  
The current work has been extended from the initial analysis of the TAMU case 
using the model developed by Kim et al. (2012).  It is used to understand the TAMU 
built infrastructure sustainability case.  Finally, the model can be compared with the 
application of a SIB model to test the applicability of a SIB for a sustainability 
improvement project inbuilt infrastructure.  
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CHAPTER VI  
ASSESSMENT OF THE SIB APPLICABILITY TO A BIS CASE 
 
This chapter compares the TAMU and Peterborough cases by assessing how they 
meet the seven criteria outlined by the Young Foundation.  First, the two models were 
compared between their characteristics, structures and results.  Then the comparison was 
used to define how the projects either satisfy, void, or fail the seven criteria associated 
with the determination of a SIB financial tool’s application from Mulgan et al. (2011) 
(See Table 4).  This provides the basis for an assessment of the applicability of a SIB to 
the TAMU case. 
 
Table 4: SIB Criteria (after Mulgan et al. 2011) 
 
 
 
Criteria Description
1 Preventative intervention
The intervention is preventive in nature and sufficient funding for the intervention is 
currently unavailable
2
Improves wellbeing in an 
area of high social need
The intervention improves social wellbeing and prevents or ameliorates a poor 
outcome
3 Evidence of efficacy
The intervention is supported by evidence of its efficacy and impact, giving funders 
confidence in the scheme’s likely success
4 Measureable impact
Whether it is possible to measure the impact of the intervention accurately enough to 
give all parties confidence of the intervention’s effect, including a sufficiently large 
5 Aligns incentives
A specific government stakeholder achieves savings or lower costs as a result of 
actions undertaken by others. These savings need to be cash releasing and provide an 
6 Savings greater than costs
The savings for the specific government stakeholder are relatively immediate and 
much greater than the cost of the intervention and transaction costs. This provides 
7
Government preference for 
a SIB
Government policy for the specific agenda is keen on or at least open to the use of a 
SIB
  
91 
Assessment Methods 
 The study first used four case descriptors to compare the TAMU and 
Peterborough cases for similarities and differences:  Key stakeholders, project 
characteristics, model structures and model results.  The key stakeholders and their roles 
and responsibilities help gain insight to the scoping for the alignment of incentives and 
the characteristics of the intervention.  Shifting to the project characteristics helps 
understand the values between the projects that determine the success and failure as well 
as the relationship between efficacy and savings.  Finally, the model structure and results 
provide more definitive conclusions about case results and policy actions.  Therefore, 
these four descriptors were used to provide context to how each case satisfies, voids, or 
fails the criteria.   
Model Assessment 
Key Stakeholders 
The comparison of the cases started with identifying and categorizing the 
similarities and differences between the Key stakeholder roles and responsibilities.  
Table 5 below summarizes the primary roles and responsibilities of the key stakeholders 
between the Peterborough and TAMU cases.   
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Table 5: Key Stakeholder Roles and Responsibilities 
 
 
There are three major differences to the key stakeholders roles and 
responsibilities for the owner, investors, and the third party assessors.  In the 
Peterborough case the owner (the MOJ) is not liable for payment until the programs 
have proven success.  In the TAMU project, TAMU (the owner) borrows the money and 
contracts Siemens with a guarantee to reduce their liability.  One difference between the 
pay for performance contract and a guarantee is that Siemens is not an investor, but a 
contractor.  Another is that a SIB should void the owner of risk from the project1; 
however, ESCOs (similar to Siemens) may provide the funding in lieu of a guarantee.  
Under these circumstances, the SIB investors (or the investing ESCO) assume the risk 
                                                 
1 This assumes that the contract is properly written as described by Mulgan et al. (2011). 
Key 
Stakeholders
Case in Peterborough Case in TAMU Assessment (TAMU)
Owner
Commits to repay investors and 
reinvest in successful programs
Commits funds to the programs 
and continues to fund programs 
if successful. 
Owner pays upfront for 
intervention.
Investor
Provides funding and carries the 
risk of program success thus 
providing oversight in the 
project implementation
Provides funding based on the 
projects projected success, 
receives repayment regardless 
of results.
Loss of oversight through the 
program by the Investor. Owner 
is responsible to the investor 
for repayment.
Contractor/ 
Service 
Provider
Influence the target population 
and promote confidence in the 
investors.
Influence the target system and 
promote confidence in the 
owner through guarantee.
Promotes confidence in owner, 
instead of investor, via 
guarantee.
Third Party 
Assessor
Determine success and failure 
of program.  If successful, then 
determines value of return from 
success.
Determine whether or not 
guarantee pays (Value only 
assessed in failure)
Specific measurement only 
occurs in failure instead of 
success.
Target 
Population/ 
systems
Receives the intervention that 
has measurable impact on their 
life.
Receives the intervention that 
has measurable impact on their 
life cycle costs.
People to systems.
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for the owner providing an incentive for the investors to get involved with the service 
providers and increase their returns.  This explains how the key stakeholders’ roles and 
responsibilities vary between the TAMU and Peterborough cases as a result of the 
guarantee.  Therefore, TAMU would not benefit from the reduced risk because the 
ESCO has already reduced the owners risk by using a guarantee; however, a SIB could 
benefit the ESCO by creating a market opportunity for investors to share in the risk and 
rewards of the project.  
Model Structures 
 After comparing the key stakeholders, the study compares the key structures 
between the Peterborough and TAMU cases.  The two models are compared similar to a 
face validation with the major difference being the models are compared to each other 
instead of the real system.  The six steps used to define the differences and similarities 
between the TAMU and Peterborough models are defined in the research methodology.  
These steps identify similarities and differences in both the causal feedback structure and 
the formal model structures, which can then be used to define the differences in model 
behavior.   
 Table 6 below the relevant differences in the case characteristics: 
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Table 6: Characteristics between TAMU and HMP Peterborough 
 
 
Although the cases have similar characteristics, their differences are crucial in defining 
the use and scale for the success of SIBs in sustainability projects.  There are three 
primary characteristic differences between the two cases.  First, the TAMU case used 
three energy reduction methods, which use two different units to measure energy, while 
the Peterborough case specifies a reconviction rate.  Reconvictions and Energy 
consumption create an interesting difference in that energy consumption may go below 
zero (energy production), but the reconviction rate cannot.  Second, the ratio between the 
annual system costs and intervention costs for the Peterborough case are nearly three 
times the values for the TAMU case.  This change in budget to intervention ratio 
presents an issue of scale that directly relates to the fastest timing for the project to pay 
back barrowed money.  Third, the expected savings between the two cases is greatly 
despaired while the investments are similar, including a delay in savings for the 
Peterborough case (~8 years).  Therefore, the difference in intervention costs and 
Item Peterborough TAMU
Investment amount 5m£ $3.4m
Total Intervention Cost 7.7m£ $6.7m
Percent of Intervention Funded ~65% ~50%
Targetted flow rate (Units) New Offenders/ month GWh/month and Gbtu/month
Targetted flow rate (Quantities) 57.8 2.55 and 18.0 (respectively)
Expected Percent Reduction 30% 21% and 23% (respectively)
Real Annual Cost (without intervention) 19.5M£/year 6.7M$/year
Expected Real Annual Savings 4.4M£/year 686k$/year
Real Annual Percent of Costs Savings ~22.6% ~10.2%
Delay to Maximum Savings 8 years <1 year
Expected Duration of Investment 8 years 10 years
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available savings would increase the expected duration for investment in the TAMU 
case, while the increased delay in results would increase the expected duration for 
investment in the Peterborough case (ceteris paribus). 
In Table 6, the BIS case has a longer expected duration for investment than the 
prison case due to a longer delay to a steady state.  In the prison case offenders are 
released and enter a rehabilitation program, and in the BIS case the building systems are 
upgraded.  The length in delay for the prison case comes because unlike the BIS system, 
installing the programs does not immediately reduce the recidivism.  It takes 8-10 years 
for the prison program to reach a new steady state when the program is implemented.  
The BIS improvements have a more efficient means of enacting savings, and a smaller 
portion, 20% to 10% of the annual cost.  This illustrates the difference in delays between 
a prison improvement program and a BIS program. 
Defining the System Archetype 
 Various sources were consulted when looking for the proper archetype defining 
this structure. The Limits to Growth (LTG) system archetype (shown below in Figure 
28) is a basic archetype that was first introduced in the 1970s (Braun, 2002).  In LTG 
systems growth can be just as dangerous as decay (Braun, 2002).  Both the Peterborough 
and TAMU cases display a growing and slowing action in the system improvement.  As 
a result both systems are constrained by the limits of their respective improvements.  
Therefore, the LTG archetype was selected as the most similar, for more on system 
archetypes please refer to Senge (1990), Braun (2002), and Wolstenholme (2003). 
  
96 
 
Figure 28: Limits to Growth System Archetype (after Senge 1990) 
 
The comparison uses a new archetype that extends beyond the traditional limits 
to growth (LTG) (seen in Figure 28).  In the new archetype, the reinforcing loop is 
constrained by more than just the limits of the programs improvement, but also by the 
ability of the program to maintain the savings in an account for future funds.  The 
reinvestment of funds starts the reinforcing loop by improving the program and reducing 
costs.  As costs decrease the program accumulates savings which increases the amount a 
reinvestment option could fund.  The two balancing loops then constrain the reinforcing 
loop, one on program performance and the other on program savings.  The constraint on 
program performance completes the traditional LTG.  As the program improves the 
available improvements diminish which reduces the options for investment.  This covers 
the cost/ quality trade off by promoting the most beneficial programs.  The second 
balancing loop is caused by a repurposing of funds, a captured savings that is filtered to 
another program or other investments.  This explains the use of the new system 
archetype shown below. 
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Figure 29: Constrained Limits to Growth (General SIB [Top], BIS [Bottom]) 
 
Legend of Loops: Figure 29 
R1- Preventative Intervention- As savings from improvements increase, investments 
in improvements increase savings by reducing costs. 
B1- Program Efficiency- As improvements are funded, the remaining improvement 
available diminishes. 
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B2&3- Program Cost Constraint- As savings increase, sources remove funds from the 
system decreasing the available spending. 
Casual Loop Diagram Comparison 
The causal loop diagram (CLD) maps the relationship between the variables to 
explain how the system operates.  CLDs are defined into different system archetypes to 
generalize common system attributes.  Both the Peterborough and TAMU cases fit the 
overall system operations for a constrained LTG archetype.  Table 7 below identifies the 
similarities and differences between the two projects’ CLD: 
 
Table 7: CLD Comparison between TAMU and HMP Peterborough 
 
 
Table 7 was used to assess two characteristic differences between the Peterborough and 
TAMU cases. 
Item Peterborough Specific TAMU Specific Similarities
Overall 
Structure
Single solution program and 
activities
Two solution program and activities Limits to growth structures
Reinforcing 
Program Loop
Focuses on Prison population
Focuses on the energy consumption 
and demand
Both loops are driving reduction of 
system in virtuous and driving 
growth in vicious.
Program Limit 
Balancing
Performance variable measured as 
Reconvictions
Performance variable measured as 
energy reduction
Increasing effectiveness decreases 
the gap between actual and ideal thus 
reducing the growth of the primary 
reinforcing loop
Investor 
Reinforcing 
loop
Peterborough SIB project set to 
operate through one (1) iteration 
and then owner takes over
TAMU theorizes a revolving loan 
that could be paid off and reinvested 
in.  Assumed that investments paid 
off are not borrowed from again.
Both programs involve investors 
that could have long term interests 
in the programs.
Owner 
Balancing loop
Purpose of the SIB is to save money 
making this loop inevitible
The TAMU case could have an 
unintended consequence of owner 
captured savings used for alternative 
purposes.
Both loops are driven by the amount 
of savings that the owner wants to 
capture from the system
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First, the characteristics of the performance measures, prison population and 
energy consumption, operate differently.  Prison population cannot go negative, but 
energy consumption can go negative.  As previously mentioned, when energy 
consumption goes negative it is referred to as energy production.  This issue of 
transitivity presents the option for energy reduction cases to provide both supply and 
demand side solutions opposed to the supply side solutions of the Peterborough case.  
Therefore, the application of a SIB in the TAMU case could include revenue production 
with the cost savings. 
Second, the SIB is purposed for establishing savings that the owner can capture 
while the TAMU case was part of a program, run by the SECO, intent on reducing 
public schools’ energy consumption.  The SECO funds the programs for public schools, 
like TAMU, that create perpetual savings captured for ulterior projects and purposes; 
however, the common variables in both models used the same settings to reduce the 
associated impacts in the results.  Therefore, the use of a SIB would expand the investor 
options of sustainability programs beyond agencies with specific goals in energy 
reduction. 
 Model Structure Comparison 
The next step for comparison is to identify the similarities and differences of the 
formal model structure.  This comparison categorizes the structure and components that 
distinguish between the Peterborough model and the TAMU model.   Table 8 below lists 
the similarities and differences of the formal modeling structure.  Repeat line items were 
omitted. 
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Table 8, above, is used to identify additional characteristics between the TAMU 
and Peterborough case.  The TAMU model uses an excel file because sustainable 
upgrades are look at as projects with defined beginnings and endings while the 
Peterborough case uses a program that does not necessarily have a defined start and end 
date.  However, each released offender could also be viewed as a project with a defined 
beginning (release from prison) and ending (graduation from the program).  Therefore, 
the TAMU case’s program success is hinged on a smaller population of projects with a 
larger impact.  Sustainability SIB programs could then incorporate projects across 
different owners to increase the total value of the SIB. 
 
Table 8: Formal Model structure Comparison between TAMU and HMP 
Peterborough 
 
 
 
Item Peterborough Specific TAMU Specific Similarities
Existing 
Program 
Structure
Project Management Rework 
structure limits the programs 
effectiveness by the flow of 
offenders
Reference Table exogenously 
impacts the reduction and forces a 
limited impact.
Reductions in performance are 
measured based on the cost of 
funding the intervention
Degradation of 
program 
effectiveness
Assumes that new offenders are a 
constant value and thereby need 
constant intervention.
The efficiency loop operates under 
an assumption of limited 
improvement where an intervention 
is a one time investment.
The conservation portion of TAMU 
is similar to Peterborough with an 
inflow of new material 
(offenders/users)
Performance 
Measurement 
Structure
Stock flows representing 
occurences in separate systems.
Exogenous inputs referenced by an 
excel file
Both systems measure the savings 
or a reduction in use by the 
intervention.
Repayment of 
Investment
Accumulation as a portion of the 
savings from the performance 
measurement structure
exogenous value driven by 
contractual terms.
Both systems draw repayment from 
an accumulated savings account.
Financial 
Structure
Program payments occur after 
measurements can be confirmed 
from the program performance
Program payments are guaranteed 
and exogenously applied
Payments are based on either actual 
or projected savings
Debt 
accumulation
Debt is accounted to the owner 
when success is measured
Debt is accounted to the owner 
before the program proceeds.
Both models account for program 
degredation due to insuficient funds.
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Model Results Comparison 
Last, the study compares the similarities and differences of the model results 
from the statistical screening analysis.  This comparison shows the rank order of the four 
most influential variables for the investors and owners in both projects. 
Table 9, above, identifies three similarities/ differences from the model analysis 
resultants: program effectiveness, Unit Use Cost, and unit program cost.  In both projects 
the owner and investors have highly correlated coefficients for program effectiveness.  
The TAMU owner and the Peterborough Investor have highly correlated values for the 
Unit Use Cost (Unit Conviction Cost and Cost of Energy—they are the unit cost that the 
owner expends in their use of the system).  Both the owner and investor have 
significantly correlated values for the unit program cost.  The common variable(s), 
program effectiveness, exists in the TAMU case because investor directly seeks to 
improve/ reduce the energy consumption for state agencies; however, the Peterborough 
case uses generic investors and is able to align their goals for both program effectiveness 
and cost.  Therefore, a SIB could have provided the investment for the TAMU case in 
lieu of the SECO without altering the design to reduce energy costs. 
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Table 9: Model Results Comparison between TAMU and HMP Peterborough 
 
 
Fitting the SIB Criteria 
 In this portion both the TAMU and Peterborough cases are aligned with the 
seven SIB criteria outlined by the Young Foundation. 
Preventative Interventions 
 Preventative intervention means the system has excess waste that could be 
avoided if funding were available.  Mulgan et al. (2011) site an example of an adult 
reoffending case—similar to Peterborough—where the charitable sector is capable of 
providing services to released offenders; however, the charitable sector is dependent on 
the generosity of donors.   This explains why a LTG structure can be identified in the 
CLD without a SIB. 
Rank Order Owner Investor Owner Investor
First
Fraction of 
Savings
Program 
Effectiveness 
[Electricity]
Program 
Effectiveness
Program 
Effectiveness
Program 
Effectiveness
Second
Cost of 
Energy
Program 
Effectiveness 
[Cold Water]
Maximum 
Cohort Size
Unit Program 
Cost
Unit Use Cost
Third
Program 
Effectiveness 
[Electricity]
Program 
Effectiveness 
[Hot Water]
Normal 
Recidivism 
Fraction
Unit 
Conviction 
Cost
Unit Program 
Cost
Fourth
Program 
Effectiveness 
[Hot Water]
None 
Significant
Unit Program 
Cost
Investor 
Discount Rate
TAMU Peterborough
KEY
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Row 1: Peterborough and TAMU Criteria 1 for a SIB 
 
Both the Peterborough and TAMU case target actions or system uses that can be 
prevented or holistically reduced.  In Peterborough case, One Service (the conglomerate 
of NGOs) works with offenders after their release to prevent or reduce their likelihood of 
recidivating.  In the TAMU case, contractors install energy efficient equipment to reduce 
energy consumption.  The constrained LTG CLD for both the Peterborough and TAMU 
cases explains the preventative nature and insufficient funds for both of the 
improvements (See Figure 29 and summary of CLD in Table 7). 
Discussion: Pass 
Both the TAMU and Peterborough cases are trying to reduce consumption due to 
waste.  In the Peterborough case, the NGOs are funded to work with released offenders 
to reduce their recidivism.  In the TAMU case, the systems are upgraded to reduce the 
consumption of energy.  Therefore, both cases provide a means of generating savings 
that could reduce expenses to the owner. 
Improves Wellbeing in an Area of High Social Need 
 Improving wellbeing in an area of high social need means the target population 
exists below the national median and mean and is economically better off after the 
intervention.  The example offered in Mulgan et al. (2011) provides similar statutory 
support as the Peterborough case by targeting young adult offenders with high 
Criteria Description Peterborough TAMU Adult Reoffending (Example)
1
Preventative 
intervention
The intervention is preventive in 
nature and sufficient funding for 
the intervention is currently 
unavailable
The charitable sector has 
programs that reduce the 
reoffending, but have no incentive 
to invest beyond donations.
New technology provides a means 
of reducing consumption, but the 
benefits of new technology are 
often balanced with their costs.
The charitable sector is well 
equipped to provide support 
services to reduce reoffending.
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recidivism due to their environment.  This illustrates a characteristic need in both cases 
to provide social benefit. 
Row 2: Peterborough and TAMU Criteria 2 for a SIB 
   
 Both TAMU and Peterborough provide social benefits to society; however, the 
benefits of TAMU’s sustainable improvement are non-discriminatory of socio-economic 
status.  The Peterborough case targets short term offenders who benefit from offending 
and create a social cost; conversely, TAMU provides the benefits of lower energy use 
leading to better air quality and lower energy cost.  As energy consumption is lowered, 
the TAMU utility cost is lowered by the consumption, and the cost of alternative supply 
side solutions is also decreased; however the TAMU sustainability case has a significant 
quality that other sustainability cases may not contain.  The greatest fiscal beneficiaries 
in the TAMU project are the students whose fees do not need to cover a growing 
demand for energy.  In other cases these primary benefits may target private sector 
holdings.  This explains how both cases improve the wellbeing of low socio economic 
groups; however, it also explains how sustainability projects like TAMU affect the 
financial wellness of students and the environmental quality surrounding the projects. 
Discussion: Pass 
The TAMU case was selected for its application in the education industry for 
both public and private sectors.  As a university, the primary consumers are students.  In 
Criteria Description Peterborough TAMU Adult Reoffending (Example)
2
Improves 
wellbeing in 
an area of 
high social 
need
The intervention improves social 
wellbeing and prevents or 
ameliorates a poor outcome
The programs provide 
accountability, loans, and 
assistance in finding housing for 
released offenders.
The TAMU interventions have a 
broad social impact that is not 
confined to specific social groups.
The prison population stands at 
85,276 (15th October 2010).  
Short term offenders who serve a 
sentence of 12 months or less are 
not provided statutory support, and 
frequently return to a life of crime
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July of 2013 the Huffington post reported that the average student loan debt would 
eclipse the median annual income within the next 10 years (Fairchild, 2013).  Not all 
sustainability project target universities or organizations directly impacting a low socio-
economic group.  While general sustainability projects do not target specific social 
hierarchies, they still provide a social good—improved air quality, aesthetically 
appeasing, reduced energy demand (Kibert, 2008; Kats, 2010).  Therefore, a SIB may 
generalize its impact on low socio-economic groups for sustainability projects because 
sustainability projects do not discriminate by socio-economic status. 
Evidence of Efficacy 
 Evidence of Efficacy means the intervention has shown success in similar or 
comparable cases.  The Peterborough case sites 30 years of work showing the benefit a 
proactive approach.  The benefits of the case are well documented, See Mulgan et al. 
(2011).  This explains the need for formal documentation on the workings of the 
preventative interventions.  The TAMU used established tests from the US Green 
Building Council (USGBC) (Van Der Like & Meehan, 2009). 
Row 3: Peterborough and TAMU Criteria 3 for a SIB 
 
Both the TAMU and Peterborough cases use successful intervention/alterations that led 
to a cost savings.  The Peterborough case estimates an average of 20% reduction in 
recidivism for short-term offenders (Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011). The 
Criteria Description Peterborough TAMU Adult Reoffending (Example)
Evidence of 
efficacy
The intervention is supported by 
evidence of its efficacy and 
impact, giving funders confidence 
in the scheme’s likely success
Studies show an average change 
in recidivism of (-20%) when 
charitable organizations are 
involved.
Studies have shown how green 
(sustainable) improvements 
reduce energy consumption.
Review of the last 30 years shows 
consistency and strong results for 
the success of intervention 
programs (Lipsey & Cullen, 2007)
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TAMU case, backed by Siemens, uses different sustainable improvement projects to 
reduce energy consumption, see Kats (2008) and Van der Like and Meehan (2009) for 
more on the cost savings for sustainable projects.  This explains how both TAMU and 
Peterborough meet the third SIB criteria for evidence of efficacy (see Table 10 for 
sources and values). 
 
Table 10: Example Program Types and Effectiveness 
 
 
Discussion: Pass 
 While both studies use historical data to display evidence of effectiveness, the 
sustainable improvements in the TAMU case have received a lot more attention than 
prison rehabilitation due to decrease in delay between outcomes.  In the Peterborough 
case the SIB is used to establish a new steady state for the prison system operations 
while the TAMU case realizes most of the risk early on in the program.  The TAMU 
project is still subject to the volatility of the energy markets and additional maintenance 
Program Name Program Type Reduction Value Source
St. Giles Trust Prison Rehabilitation 20% Mulgan et al. (2011)
Bridges to Life Prison Rehabilitation >50% BTL (2011)
Solar Hot 
Water Heater
Hot Water Energy 
Reduction
70-90% EnergyStar(2006)
Conservation 
Promotion 
Program
Reduce Demand on 
Energy needs
12% Kim et al. (2012)
TAMU Case Electricity Reduction 12% Kim et al. (2012)
TAMU Case
Water Heating and 
Cooling Reduction
19% Kim et al. (2012)
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costs (Vine, 2005); however, the benefits of many sustainable projects are almost 
instantaneous.  Therefore, if TAMU were to use a SIB, then the payments could be more 
periodic when successful. 
Measureable Impact 
 Measurable Impact means the outcomes of the system can be measured.  The 
example descriptor by Mulgan et al. (2011) uses the national computer base to look at 
the reconviction of released offenders.  The system provides the information for both the 
target group and its comparison.  This explains how SIB impact is expected to be 
measured. 
Row 4: Peterborough and TAMU Criteria 4 for a SIB 
 
 The Peterborough and TAMU cases both provide means of measuring the 
success of the programs.  The Peterborough case uses the reduction of recidivism that 
can be obtained by acquisitioning data from the police national data bases.  TAMU uses 
the savings of energy confirmed by the use of calibrated models such as DOE2.  This 
explains how both the TAMU and Peterborough cases satisfy the fourth criteria for a 
SIB. 
 
 
Criteria Description Peterborough TAMU Adult Reoffending (Example)
4
Measureable 
impact
Whether it is possible to measure 
the impact of the intervention 
accurately enough to give all 
parties confidence of the 
intervention’s effect, including a 
sufficiently large sample size, 
appropriate timescales and 
impacts that closely related to the 
savings and relatively easy to 
measure
National data bases provide 
information on sentencing and 
release.  Recidivism is measured 
for three years.
Historical data records prior to the 
improvements are compared to 
the current values after the 
improvements.
Data on reoffending and 
sentencing outcomes are held by 
the Police National Computer. 
Most reoffending occurs in the 
first two years after release, and 
is typically measured at one and 
two years.
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Discussion: Pass 
The Peterborough case is able to use a two model method for comparing prisoner 
recidivism, but the TAMU case must rely on historical data models to verify savings in 
energy costs.  A SIB does not resolve problems or issues in measuring the success of 
sustainability projects.  However, the USGBC has shown that owners and investors can 
successfully agree on realized benefit measurements (Van Der Like & Meehan, 2009). 
Therefore, the paid from savings structure that exists in a SIB already has precedents in 
sustainability projects. 
Aligns Incentives 
 Aligning incentives means the use of a SIB creates a symbiotic relationship 
between the key stakeholders. The example from Mulgan et al. (2011) describes this as 
the alignment of funds allowing the charitable sector to continue their interventions.  In a 
traditional use-it-or-lose-it budget setting, the MOJ would return all savings from their 
prison systems.  Donors with altruistic tendencies would donate to the program, but only 
what they felt it was worth the donation.  The public nature of recidivism reduction 
leaves the programs underfunded; however, with a SIB, altruistic donors become 
incentivized to increase their donations because successful programs receive returns.  A 
successful program yields returns that can then be reinvested and eliminate the siphoning 
of savings that would otherwise be removed from the prison budget (see Figure 5 R2).  
This explains how alignment of incentives can be defined in a SIB. 
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Row 5: Peterborough and TAMU Criteria 5 for a SIB 
 
   The TAMU and Peterborough cases have similar variables in their statistical 
screening rankings (see Table 9).  Program Effectiveness is a significant variable for the 
owners and investors in both cases.  The measurement reduction’s cost is also a 
significant variable in both cases; however, the variable is significant to the owner of the 
TAMU case and the investor of the Peterborough case.  In the Peterborough case, where 
the SIB is used, the unit program cost is also a significant variable.  This explains how 
the Peterborough and TAMU case match with the fifth criteria for a SIB. 
Discussion: Pass 
The TAMU case uses an investor whose interest is rooted in the reduction of 
energy for state agencies (Combs, 2013); however, the Peterborough case does not 
discriminate against risk neutral investors.  Despite TAMU’s beneficial investors, the 
Peterborough case was able to align investor and owner concerns about the program 
costs and effectiveness. Therefore, the use of a SIB for a sustainability project, such as 
TAMU, could be used to aligning the incentives of the investor and the owner by 
targeting specific investors with knowledge and experience in sustainability. 
Savings Greater than Costs 
 A savings greater than the costs of intervention means the system and the 
evidence of efficacy must be profitable.  Mulgan’s et al. (2011) example calculates the 
Criteria Description Peterborough TAMU Adult Reoffending (Example)
5
Aligns 
incentives
A specific government 
stakeholder achieves savings or 
lower costs as a result of actions 
undertaken by others. These 
savings need to be cash releasing 
and provide an actual saving to 
government stakeholders
The MOJ and the Investors take 
interest in program effectiveness 
and costs. 
In the calibrated case, TAMU is 
concerned about savings leaving 
their investment options for 
sustainable finance to investors 
with a stake in the energy 
reduction.
A SIB realigns the incentives for 
private sector intervention to 
encourage greater preventative 
action.  The money saved, as a 
result of reduced offending, by the 
central government can be used to 
repay investments.
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average cost and benefit for someone entering the program at a success rate of 10%.  
Mulgan et al. (2011) cite an immediate savings, within 3 to 4 years of investment, 
greater than 1.5 times the value of the investment; however, the modeled savings show 
that the perpetual savings, once a new steady state has been achieved, to be equal to 4-6 
years of the program operating costs, at a 20% success rate.  This illustrates the finite 
means for a successful SIB to calculate the costs and savings opposed to the savings that 
would be captured into perpetuity. 
Row 6: Peterborough and TAMU Criteria 6 for a SIB 
 
 Figure 30 shows both the TAMU and Peterborough cases result in savings that 
are greater than their costs.  While the savings from the Peterborough case eventually 
reach over 80% of the payback in a single year, the accumulated savings from the 
program, as it progresses, reduce the reconviction rate and cover the cost of prison 
holdings when investor returns are due.  The TAMU case has less delay and provides 
less of a return (just over 10% per year).  The savings captured in real time are more 
sensitive to the fraction of savings reclaimed by the owner agency.  This explains how 
both the TAMU and Peterborough cases meet the finite requirements for the sixth SIB 
criteria that savings exceed costs. 
 
Criteria Description Peterborough TAMU Adult Reoffending (Example)
6
Savings 
greater than 
costs
The savings for the specific 
government stakeholder are 
relatively immediate and much 
greater than the cost of the 
intervention and transaction costs. 
This provides investors with 
enough return to absorb the risks 
inherent in the scheme, and can 
provide significant funds for social 
investment
The calibrated case shows that 
the investors and owner are better 
off at the minimum program 
effectiveness value.
The yearly savings from the model 
results in a value above 10% of 
the intervention cost.  The delay 
for sustainable options is less than 
a year (1 month).
The model shows that once the 
program has entered a steady 
state the savings is equal to 4-6 
years of intervention costs. The 
delay to reach those values is 
about 8 years. The immediate 
estimated cost per person is 
£1,500 and result in an estimated 
benefit of £2,300 per person.
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Figure 30: Peterborough and TAMU Cases Costs and Benefits over Time 
   
Discussion: Pass 
The Peterborough case has a significantly longer delay to their steady-state 
savings, and also has a larger portion of savings to intervention cost ratio compared to 
the TAMU case.  Once at a steady-state, savings from the Peterborough case snowball in 
a virtuous cycle.  The calibrated case for Peterborough used upper and lower limits to 
hedge the delayed savings effect for investors (Cave, Williams, Jolliffe, & Hedderman, 
2012).  Conversely, the TAMU case reaches a steady-state more quickly, but has a 
smaller savings to intervention ratio.  Therefore, sustainability SIBs may have a longer 
life than short-term offender intervention program SIBs. 
Government Preference for a SIB 
 The final criteria listed in Mulgan et al. (2011) establishes the prerequisite laws 
and regulations for a SIB to operate by setting the governing preferences for a SIB.  In 
Mulgan’s et al. (2011) example the government is committed to reducing offending rates 
through proactive programs; however, in conjunction with the first criteria, funds within 
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the budget of the MOJ do not exist for the interventions.  Therefore, the government 
must allow for the influenced agencies to capture the savings from the programs.  
Row 7: Peterborough and TAMU Criteria 7 for a SIB 
 
 Both the Peterborough and TAMU cases make allowances for repayment; 
however, the ESCO uses a guarantee instead of funding the improvements.  The MOJ 
commits to repaying the investors for a successful program in the Peterborough case by 
allowing the prison system to accumulate savings from their normal budget, without the 
intervention. The TAMU case makes similar provisions to repay the SECO; however, if 
the program is unsuccessful, then Siemens, the ESCO, repays the loan.  Therefore, in 
both cases the owner agency establishes two critical policies: first an agreed upon 
measure between stakeholders that relates the success of the programs to financial 
savings, and second an allowance for an accumulation of those savings that results in a 
return to the investor/ lender.  This explains how both cases satisfy the seventh criteria 
from Mulgan et al. (2011). 
Discussion: Void 
 Both the TAMU and Peterborough case use a “sole proprietor” assumption that 
SIBs can only be operated by governing agencies or public organizations.  While SIBs 
target social benefit that are underfunded and result in inflated government budgets 
addressing symptoms instead of causes, the nature of a SIB resemble the outsourcing of 
R&D. Government organizations are paying private investors to find successfully 
Criteria Description Peterborough TAMU Adult Reoffending (Example)
7
Government 
preference 
for a SIB
Government policy for the 
specific agenda is keen on or at 
least open to the use of a SIB
MOJ commits to pay savings from 
the programs' ability to reduce 
recidivism.
Guarantee is used, but in some 
cases the ESCO funds the 
programs under promise of 
payment from savings.
The Government is committed to a 
'Rehabilitation Revolution', that 
would fund up-front activities 
designed to reduce later offending 
rates.
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innovative social practices.  Sustainability not only transcends social hierarchy, but 
public and private domain as well. Therefore, “Government” may be substituted with 
“The influenced organization” as the beneficiary/owner(s) may not be under government 
provisioning. 
Summary of Assessment 
 In summary the seven criteria outlined by Mulgan et al. (2011) was used to 
compare the TAMU and Peterborough case in the determination of sustainable project 
satisfying, failing or nullifying the criteria.  The assessment was broken into two 
categories where the first established the characteristics of the model and case for both 
Peterborough and TAMU and the second aligned those characteristics with the criteria 
from Mulgan et al. (2011).  Table 11 below, lists the summary assessment for the 
TAMU case, Peterborough case and one of Mulgan’s examples compared with the seven 
criteria. 
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Table 11: SIB Criteria for Peterborough and TAMU 
 
 
From the seven criteria the TAMU project shows that sustainability projects have 
the potential to meet all seven criteria; however, the final criteria may be voided.  In the 
Criteria Description Peterborough TAMU Adult Reoffending (Example)
1
Preventative 
intervention
The intervention is preventive in 
nature and sufficient funding for 
the intervention is currently 
unavailable
The charitable sector has 
programs that reduce the 
reoffending, but have no incentive 
to invest beyond donations.
New technology provides a means 
of reducing consumption, but the 
benefits of new technology are 
often balanced with their costs.
The charitable sector is well 
equipped to provide support 
services to reduce reoffending.
2
Improves 
wellbeing in 
an area of 
high social 
need
The intervention improves social 
wellbeing and prevents or 
ameliorates a poor outcome
The programs provide 
accountability, loans, and 
assistance in finding housing for 
released offenders.
The TAMU interventions have a 
broad social impact that is not 
confined to specific social groups.
The prison population stands at 
85,276 (15th October 2010).  
Short term offenders who serve a 
sentence of 12 months or less are 
not provided statutory support, and 
frequently return to a life of crime
3
Evidence of 
efficacy
The intervention is supported by 
evidence of its efficacy and 
impact, giving funders confidence 
in the scheme’s likely success
Studies show an average change 
in recidivism of (-20%) when 
charitable organizations are 
involved.
Studies have shown how green 
(sustainable) improvements 
reduce energy consumption.
Review of the last 30 years shows 
consistency and strong results for 
the success of intervention 
programs (Lipsey & Cullen, 2007)
4
Measureable 
impact
Whether it is possible to measure 
the impact of the intervention 
accurately enough to give all 
parties confidence of the 
intervention’s effect, including a 
sufficiently large sample size, 
appropriate timescales and 
impacts that closely related to the 
savings and relatively easy to 
measure
National data bases provide 
information on sentencing and 
release.  Recidivism is measured 
for three years.
Historical data records prior to the 
improvements are compared to 
the current values after the 
improvements.
Data on reoffending and 
sentencing outcomes are held by 
the Police National Computer. 
Most reoffending occurs in the 
first two years after release, and 
is typically measured at one and 
two years.
5
Aligns 
incentives
A specific government 
stakeholder achieves savings or 
lower costs as a result of actions 
undertaken by others. These 
savings need to be cash releasing 
and provide an actual saving to 
government stakeholders
The MOJ and the Investors take 
interest in program effectiveness 
and costs. 
In the calibrated case, TAMU is 
concerned about savings leaving 
their investment options for 
sustainable finance to investors 
with a stake in the energy 
reduction.
A SIB realigns the incentives for 
private sector intervention to 
encourage greater preventative 
action.  The money saved, as a 
result of reduced offending, by the 
central government can be used to 
repay investments.
6
Savings 
greater than 
costs
The savings for the specific 
government stakeholder are 
relatively immediate and much 
greater than the cost of the 
intervention and transaction costs. 
This provides investors with 
enough return to absorb the risks 
inherent in the scheme, and can 
provide significant funds for social 
investment
The calibrated case shows that 
the investors and owner are better 
off at the minimum program 
effectiveness value.
The yearly savings from the model 
results in a value above 10% of 
the intervention cost.  The delay 
for sustainable options is less than 
a year (1 month).
The model shows that once the 
program has entered a steady 
state the savings is equal to 4-6 
years of intervention costs. The 
delay to reach those values is 
about 8 years. The immediate 
estimated cost per person is 
£1,500 and result in an estimated 
benefit of £2,300 per person.
7
Government 
preference 
for a SIB
Government policy for the 
specific agenda is keen on or at 
least open to the use of a SIB
MOJ commits to pay savings from 
the programs' ability to reduce 
recidivism.
Guarantee is used, but in some 
cases the ESCO funds the 
programs under promise of 
payment from savings.
The Government is committed to a 
'Rehabilitation Revolution', that 
would fund up-front activities 
designed to reduce later offending 
rates.
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TAMU case the owner is a public school; however, “Government” may be substituted 
with “The influenced organization” as the beneficiary/owner(s) may not be under 
government provisioning for sustainability projects.  Both the TAMU and Peterborough 
cases provide a means of generating savings that could reduce expenses to the owner.  
Conditionally, in a sustainability project, a SIB may generalize its impact on low socio-
economic groups; however sustainability projects do not discriminate by socio-economic 
status.  Furthermore, the more instantaneous success of sustainability projects like the 
TAMU case would provide more periodic payments when successful.  Even though the 
resultants may be measured faster, these sustainability projects may have a longer life 
than short-term offender intervention programs due to smaller savings capacity.  The 
paid from savings structure that exists in a SIB already has precedents in sustainability 
projects and the use of a SIB for a sustainability project, such as TAMU, could align the 
incentives for the investor with owners desires by specifying the pay for success 
structure to investor returns.  Therefore, a SIB could be used for a sustainable 
improvement project like TAMU. 
Conditionally, a SIB-like financial structure could be used for sustainability 
projects; furthermore, under the right conditions ESCOs may already implement a SIB-
like structure.  The LTG archetype was selected as the most similar.  A SIB could have 
provided the investment for the TAMU case in lieu of the SECO without altering the 
design to reduce energy costs.  TAMU would not benefit from the shifting of risk 
because the ESCO has already assumed the owner’s risk by using a guarantee; however, 
a SIB could benefit the ESCO by creating a market opportunity for investors to share in 
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the risk and rewards of the project.  The TAMU case’s program success is hinged on a 
smaller population of projects with a larger impact.  Sustainability SIB programs could 
then incorporate projects across different owners to increase the total value of the SIB.  
Both the TAMU and Peterborough cases require multi-year investment commitments.  
The difference in intervention costs and available savings increases the expected 
duration for investment in the TAMU case, while the increased delay in results increases 
the expected duration for investment in the Peterborough case (ceteris paribus).  The 
application of a SIB in the TAMU case could include revenue production with the cost 
savings because some sustainable improvements incorporate energy production and 
energy reduction options.  The use of a SIB could expand the investor options of 
sustainability programs beyond agencies with specific goals in energy reduction.  
Therefore, if an ESCO were to establish a pay from savings contract with investors for 
sustainability improvement and provide funding for the improvement to an owner in an 
area that would enforce the proper contractual obligations, then an ESCO would be 
using a SIB-like structure for a sustainability project. 
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CHAPTER VII  
CONCLUSION 
 
Summary 
 SIBs are a new financial tool to improve social issues including environmental 
and health issues.   The Peterborough case examines the application of SIBs for social 
issues 
The seven criteria outlined by Mulgan et al. (2011) were used to compare the 
TAMU and Peterborough cases to determine if the sustainable project satisfies, fails or 
nullifies the criteria.  The assessment was broken into two categories where the first 
established the characteristics of the model and case for both Peterborough and TAMU 
and the second aligned those characteristics with the criteria from Mulgan et al. (2011).  
Table 11 listed the summary assessment for the TAMU case, Peterborough case, and one 
of Mulgan’s examples used to define the seven criteria. 
The TAMU case shows that sustainability projects have the potential to meet all 
seven criteria; however, the final criteria may be voided.  In the TAMU case the owner 
is a public school.  If TAMU was not a public school, and a SIB were used, then the 
owner would be a private entity.  Therefore, “Government” may be substituted with 
“The influenced organization” as the beneficiary/owner(s) may not be a government 
organization for sustainability projects.   
Conditionally, a SIB generalizes its impact on low socio-economic groups when 
the projects are associated with an organization whose clientele is primarily or 
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significantly made of that grouping.  In the Peterborough prison system, a significant 
portion of the short term offenders fit the criteria as low socio economic.   Similarly in 
the TAMU system, a majority of students may be classified as low socio economic.  
Therefore sustainability projects’ benefits do not discriminate by socio-economic status 
because the benefits (aside from the reduced energy bill) are shared across all of society. 
The comparison identified two impacts on the payback period for a SIB, the 
delay to savings and the impact of the intervention.  The budget for the Peterborough 
Prison system is 3 times the energy cost in the TAMU system which reduces the 
available returns for a sustainability program.  Conversely, the TAMU case, a 
sustainability program, has more instantaneous success while the Peterborough case, a 
short term offender rehabilitation program, has a longer delay to savings.  The delay in 
savings reduces the immediate returns of the Peterborough case.  This illustrates why the 
TAMU and the Peterborough cases have a relatively similar payback period (8-10 
years). 
Both the TAMU and Peterborough cases provide a means of generating savings 
that could reduce expenses to the owner.  The paid from savings structure that exists in a 
SIB already has precedents in sustainability projects and the use of a SIB for a 
sustainability project, such as TAMU, could align the incentives for the investor with the 
owner’s desires by specifying the pay for success structure to the investor returns.  
Therefore, the comparison supports a hypothesis that a SIB could be used for a 
sustainable improvement project like TAMU. 
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Conclusions 
Conditionally, a SIB-like financial structure could be used for sustainability 
projects if an ESCO seeks external funds from private investors using a high risk 
performance bond. The possibility exists that ESCOs may have already implemented a 
SIB-like structure.  Sustainability projects use the same LTG archetype constrained by 
program improvements and the available savings as a SIB program.  A SIB could have 
provided the investment for the TAMU case in lieu of the SECO without altering the 
design of reduce energy costs.  In a sustainability project, a SIB would shift the risk of 
new technology from the owner to the investors.  Even though TAMU would not benefit 
from the shifting of risk because the ESCO has already assumed the owner’s risk by 
using a guarantee, a SIB could benefit the ESCO by creating a market opportunity for 
investors to share in the risk and rewards of the project.  Therefore, SIBs shift the risk 
from the owner, like a guarantee, and also provide an additional source for funding via 
outside investors that can be used by sustainability improvement programs; however, 
unlike a guarantee, a SIB would shift the risk to the investors instead of the ESCO. 
The pay from savings structure separates the guarantee in the TAMU case from 
the SIB structure in the Peterborough Case.  Both the TAMU and Peterborough cases 
require multi-year investment commitments.  The TAMU case’s program success is 
hinged on a smaller population of projects each with a larger impact.  Sustainability SIB 
programs could then incorporate projects across different owners to increase the total 
value of the SIB.  The difference in intervention costs and available savings increases the 
expected duration for investment in the TAMU case, while the increased delay in results 
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increases the expected duration for investment in the Peterborough case (ceteris paribus).  
The application of a SIB in the TAMU case could include revenue production with the 
cost savings because some sustainable improvements incorporate energy production and 
energy reduction options.  The use of a SIB could expand the investor options of 
sustainability programs beyond agencies with specific goals in energy reduction.  
Therefore, in an area that would enforce the proper contractual obligations, an ESCO 
could consider the use of a SIB-like structure for sustainability projects. 
SIBs present a familiar strategy to ESCOs as a possible strategy for funding 
sustainable improvement projects where the owner struggles with uncertainty of the 
sustainable improvements and is unable to acquire the capital for such projects.  Both the 
TAMU and Peterborough cases show the similarity between the program characteristics 
in sustainability projects and social improvement programs.  The TAMU case is capable 
of passing the seven criteria outlined by Mulgan et al. (2011) for determining whether a 
SIB is applicable.  Therefore, the results of the study find that SIBs are a plausible 
financial structure for sustainable improvements. 
Contributions 
This paper has six major contributions to practice and research: 
1. Usefully models the Peterborough SIB case: 
The SIB model is useful for determining the impact different policies 
have on system outcomes for a SIB in the Peterborough case.  This 
provides practitioners with a useful means of testing different scenarios 
for SIB success/ failure. 
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2. Identifies a possible BIS case for SIB application: 
The TAMU case and other sustainability improvement projects for 
universities make ideal candidates for the use of a SIB structure. 
3. Identifies existing structures in BIS case for SIB functions: 
The structures required for a SIB (pay for performance, pay from savings, 
investors, third party assessors, special purpose vehicles, etc.) are already 
used through ESCOs for sustainability projects.  
4. Compares the structures and outcomes of the SIB and BIS cases. 
The BIS case is able to return practical savings faster, and the social SIB 
is able to return a greater savings in the long run.  Both projects present a 
preventative intervention through energy saving improvements or social 
programs.  While both projects are able to align the incentives of program 
effectiveness, the SIB is also able to align the unit program cost. 
5. Establishes an example of how a BIS case fulfills the SIB criteria. 
BIS is a preventative intervention, with measureable outcomes that 
benefit a broad range in society.  This shows how BIS cases can extend 
the definition of “socio-economic” and alter the requirements for 
government sponsorship. 
6. Establishes the foundations for SIB application in a BIS project. 
Furthermore, a SIB presents a viable opportunity for TAMU project if the 
funds from the State were not available. 
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Implications for Practice 
The contributions of this study can be separated into two categories based on 
their implications for practice.  These define the application and structure of a SIB in 
sustainability: 
1. The study assesses how sustainability projects align with the seven criteria 
outlined by Mulgan et al. (2011) and 
2. Identifies the precedents in industry for the proper establishment of a 
sustainability SIB. 
Therefore, this study has direct value to practitioners interested in implementing SIBs in 
their own field of practice.   
SIBs are a new financial tool without a lot of information describing their 
application in different fields.  From this study practitioners and researchers find the 
practical application of a SIB-like structure for sustainability projects.  The TAMU 
project is an example case where SIBs could be used to fund sustainability projects.  
Sustainability projects fit with the constrained LTG archetype.  Facility managers and 
owners may not wish to assume risk of new technology for sustainable development, yet 
there are substantial savings in support of sustainability projects with measurable results.  
This illustrates the applicability SIBs could have on sustainability projects by aligning 
with the seven criteria outlined by Mulgan et al. (2011). 
Additionally, the study found similar processes required in a SIB that are used by 
ESCOs.  For a SIB to work it requires measurable performance outcomes like the 
contractual measures used by ESCOs for their guarantees.  One alternative to a 
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guarantee is for the ESCO to fund the improvements and then share in the savings as a 
return.  A significant added benefit that a SIB provides over the current ESCO structures 
is that a SIB is a tradable commodity.  This illustrates the existing structures established 
by ESCOs that align with the operation of SIBs. 
Therefore, the study expands on the current body of knowledge for SIBs and 
ESCOs by defining key synergy between the two tools.  Sustainability projects have 
similar project structures as SIB programs and meet the requirements for SIB 
application.  ESCOs have established business process required for SIB implantation and 
SIBs provide an additional source of funding for more sustainability projects.  This 
summarizes the contribution that the project makes by identifying the use of SIBs for 
ESCOs in funding sustainability projects. 
Implications for Research 
  This study identifies the challenges with SIB-like structures being implemented 
in the TAMU case.  As the first assessment of SIB application in a sustainability 
program research must look at the strengths and weaknesses of both the assessment—
using Mulgan’s et al. (2011) criteria—and conclusions drawn for further validation of 
the environment a SIB induces—the changes in behavior through the alteration of 
incentives and more.  The next step would be to include a SIB-like structure into a 
sustainability project using the information found in the modeling and comparison 
sections of this study.  Then research on this topic should move toward answers to the 
question of what makes a SIB successful for sustainability projects. 
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According to this study, a SIB-like structure could be an effective means of 
funding sustainable improvements when funds are otherwise not available for profitable 
projects.  There are significant characteristic similarities between the TAMU and 
Peterborough cases that provide evidence to support the TAMU case’s ability to meet all 
of the SIB criteria outlined by Mulgan et al. (2011).  The primary concern for 
practitioners wanting to enact a SIB like structure for sustainability projects is the legal 
obligations and structures allowing for a pay from savings bond.  In areas where these 
structures exist, ESCOs could establish funds for improving the sustainability of an area.  
The development of sustainability SIBs for large urban or metropolitan areas could then 
improve the quality of life and environment around them.  Therefore, researchers should 
look to state and local governments to establish the laws and regulations that would 
allow SIBs to measure, capture, and return savings from sustainability programs. 
 Additionally, SIB-like structures for sustainability projects may already be in use 
by ESCOs.  Some ESCOs already provide the project financing for a portion of their 
projects with returns in the form of pay-from-success payments.  The last step would be 
for the ESCO to establish a performance bond for the project and allow investors to 
carry equal rates of risk and reward from the project.  ESCOs already work with state 
and local governments to capitalize on sustainability improvement, by selling these 
bonds to citizens that want to improve the quality of their communities the funds would 
be directed toward the areas with the greatest returns. 
 Therefore, the study expands the current knowledge of SIBs by modeling their 
structures and expanding their uses to a new area of social improvement.  This study is 
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the first to assess the application of a SIB for sustainability projects and establishes a 
basis for other studies to move forward. This summarizes the contribution of this study 
to expand research in the development of SIB by providing a first look at SIB 
application in sustainable development financing. 
Assessment of the Research 
This research project closest resembles the pre-experimental design of static-
group comparison (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).  It is the first assessment for 
applicability of a SIB toward sustainability projects and is the first to compare between 
two cases, one representing a known SIB program and the other representing a known 
sustainability improvement program.  The SIB program is known to meet all SIB 
requirements and the BIS case is tested in comparison with the SIB requirements. 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) note the strengths of this study in four areas of 
internal validity: history, testing, instrumentation, and regression.  They also define four 
weaknesses (3 for internal validity and 1 for external validity) in: selection bias, 
experimental mortality, selection-maturation interaction, and the interaction effects of 
selection bias.  These weaknesses are seen in the two points of the study: 
1. The SIB is able to align investor incentives while TAMU uses investors whose 
mission is to reduce energy consumption.  The investor in the TAMU case, the 
SECO, was established to reduce energy consumption by the state.  The 
endogeneity of an investor whose goals align with sustainability projects impact 
the investors’ satisfaction when generalized.  An obvious selection bias for the 
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TAMU case where the effects of a SIB will be influenced by investors with an 
external effect. 
2. SIBs shift the technology risk (or the basis risk) on the investors while the 
TAMU case shifts the risk onto the ESCO by using a guarantee.  The guarantee 
presents another bias in the TAMU case where the owner’s use of a SIB to 
diminish the impact of their losses may be influenced by the presence of a 
guarantee in the TAMU case. 
  This explains both the strengths and weaknesses of the study as a static group 
comparison. 
Future Research 
 There are five major points of research that could be expanded from this project.  
The first two address weaknesses of the study by expands on the decision making 
process for ESCOs as well as owners deciding whether or not to contract an ESCO and 
the development of the model for both Peterborough and TAMU to provide further 
application and even the integration of the different financial structures.  The third 
addresses the issues that could be identified under the continuous testing of the model 
structures.  The fourth addresses a survey of general legal allowances and how the 
requirements for a SIB compare to their current standings.  The fifth addresses the 
performance evaluation and integration of sustainability measures in a balanced score 
card.  These five topics would expand on this research topic by providing more answers 
to questions about endogeneity, limitations of externalities, historical application from 
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the ESCO’s perspective, as well as the practical application of sustainable pay from 
success measures. 
On a similar note, SIBs in sustainability provide an opportunity to study the 
effectiveness of different program options in a variety of locations.  The enactment of 
SIBs for sustainability projects would provide researchers with an abundance of data for 
analysis by creating measurable standards that are tracked with lists of what and when 
improvements were made.  The use of SIBs for sustainability would allow researchers to 
more effectively study the impact of various sustainable interventions and identify the 
weakness of current sustainable improvement programs.  These weaknesses could 
provide key insight into where researchers could find future developments that further 
reduce the consumption or waste from the built infrastructure industry. 
The TAMU-Peterborough case is used in the comparison as a sustainability case 
to assess the similarities and differences with a known SIB program.  The study finds 
that the program of the Peterborough case and the projects in the TAMU case share 
common ground in criteria for the SIB.  Since the ESCO industry is not surveyed and the 
results of Vine (2005), Hansen, Langlois, and Bertoldi (2009) does not carry the decision 
tree for ESCO funding options, the study can only piece together possible scenarios 
where an ESCO would establish a SIB-like structure for a sustainability project.  
Therefore, the study lacks support from the practical use or application by ESCOs 
because there is no predecessor requesting or pointing to the lack of knowledge. 
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Closing 
 The research has assessed the usefulness of SIBs for sustainability programs and 
has found that the structures needed for SIBs to work in sustainability projects already 
exist.  The results and conclusion support the continued research and development of 
SIBs as an innovative financing method and tool for social issues. 
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APPENDIX I     
  PETERBOROUGH MODEL SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS 
 This appendix details the supporting documents for the Peterborough Model 
including the Equations, Stock Flow Diagrams, Exogenous Variable Values, Extreme 
Conditions Testing, values used for Statistical Screening Analysis, and additional testing 
results. 
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Equation List 
Legend 
Variable Name 
Equation or Value 
Units 
Description 
Equations 
 
Accumulated Reconvictions Prevented Percent [Cohorts] = 
ZIDZ ((Number of Reconviction [Cohorts, Comparison]/Offender Multiplier between 
Prison Systems [Comparison]-Number of Reconviction [Cohorts, 
Peterborough]/Offender Multiplier between Prison Systems [Peterborough]), (Number 
of Reconviction [Cohorts, Comparison]/Offender Multiplier between Prison Systems 
[Comparison]))*100 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents the accumulated percent of prisoners kept out of prison. 
 
Actual Cohort Closing Times [Cohorts] = 
INTEG (Cohort Time [Cohorts], 0) 
Units: Month 
This represents the ending time of the cohorts based on the rules of Cave et al. (2012). 
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Actual Cohort Start Times [Cohorts] = 
INTEG (Cohort Time Delay Rate [Cohorts], 0) 
Units: Month 
This is the actual start time of the project. The time is accumulated to account for the 
rules set forth by Cave et al. (2012). 
 
Amount Investors are willing to Invest= 
INTEG (-Investing, Expected Program Investment amount) 
Units: k£ 
This represents the amount of capital that the Investors are have set aside to invest in the 
program. This stock is located in both Social Finance (2011) and Glahn & Whistler 
(2011). 
 
Available Capacity= 
XIDZ (Funds Available for the Program, Program Cost per Member, 99999) 
Units: People 
This represents the estimated number of people that can be admitted into the program 
and is an author defined variable based on the fund available for all the cohorts. 
 
Average Prisoner Incarceration Rate for Peterborough= 
57.8333 
Units: People/Month 
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This represents the maximum number of new people that can be placed in the prison 
system; all other prisoners must go to a different prison system. 57.83333 is the average 
for 2008 according to Cave et al (2012). 
 
Average Time between Release and Reconviction [Prison Systems] = 
Normal Recidivism Discovery Time 
Units: Month 
The average amount of time it takes to convict a resent release from the Peterborough 
group of a new crime. This takes Disely et al. (2012) value from the analysis and 
introduces a change from the programs operations. 
 
Budget Excess=  
INTEG (Budget Surplus-Budget Excess Recovered-MOJ SIB Savings Rate-"Post-SIB 
Program Payments", 0) 
Units: k£ 
This represents the accumulated budget surplus for Peterborough Prison. This is an 
Author Defined Variable. 
 
Budget Excess Recovered= 
"Surplus Returned?"* (Budget Excess/MOJ Surplus return check*Fraction of Surplus 
Returned-MOJ SIB Savings Rate) 
Units: k£/Month 
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This is an author defined variable used to measure the amount of budget excess returned 
to the upper echelons of government each month. 
 
Budget Peterborough= 
(Total Prison Population [Comparison]*monthly cost+ Conviction Cost*SUM (Repeat 
Offender Arrest Rate [Overall, Comparison, Release Program!]))/Offender Multiplier 
between Prison Systems [Comparison] 
Units: k£/Month 
This is the expected payment rate that is allocated to MOJ for the Peterborough Prison 
System. This is an author derived equation set so that the MOJ receives funds under the 
expectation that business is operating as usual. The values are discounted from the start 
of the program to consider with deflation from projection. 
 
Budget Surplus= 
Budget Peterborough-Peterborough Operations Costs 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the budget surplus of the Peterborough case. This is an author defined 
equation. 
 
Cash Flow= 
Investor Return Rate-Investment Rate 
Units: k£/Month 
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This represents the net cash flow for the investor in PV dollars to the start of the 
program. 
 
Change in Max Program Costs= 
Max (0, Program Costs-Max Program Costs)/Time to Adjust Maximum Program Cost 
Units: k£/Month/Month 
This represents the rate of change in the Maximum Program Costs. This is an Author 
defined variable. 
 
"Cohort Active?"[Overall]= 
1 
 
"Cohort Active?"[Cohort 1]= 
IF THEN ELSE (Actual Cohort Start Times [Cohort 1] <Time, IF THEN ELSE (Actual 
Cohort Closing Times [Cohort 1]>=Time, 1, 0), 0) 
 
"Cohort Active?"[Cohort 2]= 
IF THEN ELSE(MIN(Actual Cohort Closing Times[Cohort 1],Actual Cohort Start 
Times[Cohort 2])<Time, IF THEN ELSE(Actual Cohort Closing Times[Cohort 
2]>=Time,1,0),0) 
 
"Cohort Active?"[Cohort 3]= 
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IF THEN ELSE(MIN(Actual Cohort Closing Times[Cohort 2],Actual Cohort Start 
Times[Cohort 3])<Time, IF THEN ELSE(Actual Cohort Closing Times[Cohort 
3]>=Time,1,0),0) 
 
"Cohort Active?"[Cohort 4]= 
IF THEN ELSE (Actual Cohort Start Times [Cohort 4] <Time, IF THEN ELSE (Actual 
Cohort Closing Times [Cohort 4]>=Time, 1, 0), 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
This turns on the flow of new incarcerations between each cohort group. The definitions 
are laid out in Cave's et al. (2012) description of cohort groupings. 
 
Cohort Addition of New Offenders [Cohorts, Prison Systems] = 
SUM (("Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohorts, Prison Systems, 
Release Program!]+"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohorts, 
Prison Systems, Release Program!]))* "Cohort Active?"[Cohorts] 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the rate people enter the Peterborough Cohorts as per Cave et al. (2012) 
study. 
 
Cohort Collection of New Offenders [Cohorts, Prison Systems] = 
INTEG (Cohort Addition of New Offenders [Cohorts, Prison Systems], 0) 
Units: People 
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This represents the accumulation of people in collected in the different cohorts for the 
Peterborough group based on Cave et al. (2012). 
 
Cohort Expense Rate= 
Program Costs 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents how the funds are allocated. This is an author defined variable. 
 
Cohort initiate switch [Overall] = 
1 
 
Cohort initiate switch [Cohort 1] = 
IF THEN ELSE(Cohort Collection of New Offenders[Cohort 1,Peterborough]<= Max 
People in Cohort[Cohort 1] , IF THEN ELSE((Actual Cohort Start Times[Cohort 
1]+Max Cohort Length[Cohort 1]) >Time,1,0),0) 
 
Cohort initiate switch [Cohort 2] = 
IF THEN ELSE(Cohort Collection of New Offenders[Cohort 2,Peterborough]<= Max 
People in Cohort[Cohort 2] , IF THEN ELSE((Actual Cohort Start Times[Cohort 
2]+Max Cohort Length[Cohort 2]) >Time,1,0),0) 
 
Cohort initiate switch [Cohort 3] = 
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IF THEN ELSE(Cohort Collection of New Offenders[Cohort 3,Peterborough]<= Max 
People in Cohort[Cohort 3] , IF THEN ELSE((Actual Cohort Start Times[Cohort 
3]+Max Cohort Length[Cohort 3]) >Time,1,0),0) 
 
Cohort initiate switch [Cohort 4] = 
IF THEN ELSE(Cohort Collection of New Offenders[Cohort 3,Peterborough]<=Max 
People in Cohort [Cohort 3], IF THEN ELSE(Actual Cohort Start Times[Cohort 
4]+3*Max Cohort Length[Cohort 4]>Time,1,0),0) 
Units: Dmnl 
This determines whether the cohorts have started in accordance with the rules set forth 
from Cave et al. (2012) primarily that the maximum time cannot be exceeded and the 
cohorts must switch before if the maximum number is met or exceeded. 
 
Cohort Investment switch [Cohorts] = 
IF THEN ELSE (Actual Cohort Start Times [Cohorts] <Time, IF THEN ELSE 
(Investment Finalization Time [Cohorts]>=Time, 1, 0), 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents when investors are investing in different cohorts. This is an author 
derived variable from Cave et al. (2012). 
 
Cohort Payment Time [Overall] = 
0 
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Cohort Payment Time [Cohort 1] = 
Actual Cohort Closing Times [Cohort 1] +Time after Cohort for Reconviction 
Collection+ Time for System Update  
 
Cohort Payment Time [Cohort 2] = 
Actual Cohort Closing Times [Cohort 2] +Time after Cohort for Reconviction 
Collection+ Time for System Update 
 
Cohort Payment Time [Cohort 3] = 
Actual Cohort Closing Times [Cohort 3] +Time after Cohort for Reconviction 
Collection+ Time for System Update 
 
Cohort Payment Time [Cohort 4] = 
Actual Cohort Closing Times [Cohort 4] +Time after Cohort for Reconviction 
Collection+ Time for System Update+ Time Program has to Pay 
Units: Month 
This represents the time at which the program is measured as a  success or as a 
failure. RT Time and System Update Time (18 months) are added on to the 
accumulation time as per Cave et al. (2012) to show the time between cohort collection 
finishing and the data results being collected. 
 
Cohort Time [Cohorts] = 
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Cohort initiate switch [Cohorts] 
Units: Month/Month 
This represents the time that the cohorts are collecting people for comparison. This is 
determined by Cave et al. (2012) using the Cohort initiate switch. 
 
Cohort Time Delay Rate [Overall] = 
0 
 
Cohort Time Delay Rate [Cohort 1] = 
IF THEN ELSE (Max People in Cohort [Cohort 1]>Cohort Collection of New Offenders 
[Cohort 1, Peterborough], IF THEN ELSE (Latest Cohort Start Times [Cohort 1]>Time, 
1, 0), 0)*Cohort initiate switch [Cohort 1] 
 
Cohort Time Delay Rate [Cohort 2] = 
IF THEN ELSE(Max People in Cohort[Cohort 2]>Cohort Collection of New 
Offenders[Cohort 2, Peterborough],IF THEN ELSE(Latest Cohort Start Times[Cohort 
2]>Time,1,0),0)*Cohort initiate switch[Cohort 1] 
 
Cohort Time Delay Rate [Cohort 3] = 
IF THEN ELSE (Max People in Cohort [Cohort 3]>Cohort Collection of New Offenders 
[Cohort 3, Peterborough], IF THEN ELSE (Latest Cohort Start Times [Cohort 3]>Time, 
1, 0), 0)*Cohort initiate switch [Cohort 2] 
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Cohort Time Delay Rate [Cohort 4] = 
IF THEN ELSE (Max People in Cohort [Cohort 4]>Cohort Collection of New Offenders 
[Cohort 4, Peterborough], IF THEN ELSE (Latest Cohort Start Times [Cohort 4]>Time, 
1, 0), 0) 
 Units: Month/Month 
This is an Author derived control to increase time according to the rules set in Cave et al. 
(2012). 
 
Conviction Cost= 
2.853 
Units: k£/People 
This represents the legal costs per conviction based on the data from SEU (2002) [May 
also be found in Mulgan 2011]. There is some discrepancy among the literature about 
how much a conviction costs. Strickland notes a value closer to 40k£. 
 
Cost per Participant per month= 
Program Cost per Member/Defined Year 
Units: k£/ (Month*People) 
This represents the cost for one person to be in the program for one month as per Mulgan 
et al. (2011) page 30. 
 
Cumulative Investor Returns=  
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INTEG (Owner Success Payment, No Initial Worth) 
Units: k£ 
This represents the amount of money the investors have during the program cycle. This 
stock is pulled from Social Finance Limited (2011). 
 
Cumulative Program Cost=  
INTEG (Program Costs, No Initial Worth) 
Units: k£ 
This represents how much money has been paid into the program. This is an Author 
defined variable operating as a performance measure for total cost. 
 
Defined Year= 
12 
Units: Month 
Within this model a year is estimated at 12 months. Author defined. 
 
Desired Payment Value [Cohorts] = 
Unpaid Investor Earned Returns [Cohorts]*"Payment Consideration?"[Cohorts]* 
"Successful Program?"[Cohorts] 
Units: k£ 
This represents the value of the payments to investors based on the information provided 
by Cave et al. (2012). The value for a successful payment is the "Investor Earned" if it is 
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between the maximum and minimum return values, or the values of the maximum (if the 
IE is greater) or minimum (if smaller) return. Cohort 4 is only viable if an investment 
opportunity was missed by any of the Cohorts not meeting their hurdle value. 
 
Earned Investor Return payments [Cohorts] = 
"Investors Cohorts Paid? Amount"[Cohorts] 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the amount of payment to the investors from the program reducing the 
amount of payment to the investors in future. This is an Author defined equation. 
 
Expected Program Investment amount= 
5000 
Units: k£ 
This represents the minimum required investment from the investors (Strickland 2010). 
 
Fraction for Investor share= 
0.5 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents the percentage share that the investors receive of the savings (assuming a 
successful project). This value is not presented in the literature for confidentiality 
(Disely 2011). Modeler estimate. 
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Fraction of Surplus Returned= 
0.5 
Units: Dmnl 
This is an author defined variable that represents the fraction of budget surplus between 
the expected budget and the actual expenses that is deducted from the actual budget. The 
value 0.5 was selected for the base case because the program pays the investors 50% of 
the savings. If the investors return is met by 50% of the savings, then the MOJ should be 
able to run the program with 50% of the savings. 
 
Funds Available for the Program=  
INTEG (MOJ Payments-Cohort Expense Rate, Expected Program Investment amount) 
Units: k£ 
This represents the amount of funds remaining for the program activities. This is an 
Author defined stock. 
 
Funds Earned by SIB=  
INTEG (MOJ SIB Savings Rate-MOJ SIB Payment Rate, 0) 
Units: k£ 
This represents the amount Funds set aside by the MOJ to pay for the SIB. 
 
Initial First time Offender Prisoner Holding= 
86.75 
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Units: People 
This is the tuned value for the initial prisoners to meet Cave et al. (2012) values. It starts 
the model off in steady state. 
 
Initial Reconvicted Prisoner Holding= 
260.25 
Units: People 
This represents the initial amount of people that have been reconvicted under the 
program and is tuned to Cave et al. (2012). This starts the model off in a steady state. 
 
Initial Undiscovered Reoffenders= 
1041 
Units: People 
This represents the number of people awaiting reconviction discovery and is tuned to 
555 people as per Cave et al. (2012). This starts the model off in steady state. 
 
Interval time between Cohort completion and Payment Time [Overall] = 
0 
 
Interval time between Cohort completion and Payment Time [Cohort 1] = 
Time after Cohort for Reconviction Collection+ Time for System Update+ Time 
Program has to Pay 
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Interval time between Cohort completion and Payment Time [Cohort 2] = 
Time after Cohort for Reconviction Collection+ Time for System Update+ Time 
Program has to Pay 
 
Interval time between Cohort completion and Payment Time [Cohort 3] = 
Time after Cohort for Reconviction Collection+ Time for System Update+ Time 
Program has to Pay 
 
Interval time between Cohort completion and Payment Time [Cohort 4] = 
Time Program has to Pay 
Units: Month 
This represents the time at which payment will be made if the program is successful. 18 
months is added on to the accumulation time as per Cave et al. (2012) shows for time 
between cohort collection finishing and the results being tabulated. Cohort 4 is tabulated 
after the Cohort 3 has been given a chance to process. 
 
 
INV IRR= 
IF THEN ELSE (Investment Starts=0, 0, IF THEN ELSE (Investment Return starts=0,-1, 
IRR)) 
Units: Dmnl 
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This represents the IRR of the investors throughout the program life.  The value starts at 
0.  IRR moves to (-1) after an investment occurs and before a return is made.  Then the 
automated function is used to calculate the value. 
 
Invested Amount=  
INTEG (Investment Rate, 0) 
Units: k£ 
This represents the accumulation of investment by the investors into the program as 
valued at the start of the program. 
 
Investing= 
PULSE( Actual Cohort Start Times[Cohort 1]+1,1)*Investment Payment per Cohort+ 
PULSE(Actual Cohort Start Times[Cohort 2]+1,1)*Investment Payment per Cohort+ 
PULSE(Actual Cohort Start Times[Cohort 3]+1,1)*Investment Payment per Cohort 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the steady flow of investor funds into the system. It is an Author derived 
variable equivalent to the amount of the investment divided by the total duration of the 
project and comes from Social Finance Limited (2011). 
 
Investment Finalization Time [Overall] = 
Actual Cohort Closing Times [Overall] 
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Investment Finalization Time [Cohort 1] = 
Actual Cohort Closing Times [Cohort 1] 
 
Investment Finalization Time [Cohort 2] = 
Actual Cohort Closing Times [Cohort 2] 
 
Investment Finalization Time [Cohort 3] = 
Actual Cohort Closing Times [Cohort 3] 
 
Investment Finalization Time [Cohort 4] = 
Cohort Payment Time [Cohort 4] +Interval time between Cohort completion and 
Payment Time [Cohort 4] 
Units: Month 
This represents when the investment is finalized and ready for repayment as per the 
timeline in Cave et al. (2012). 
 
Investment Payment per Cohort= 
Expected Program Investment amount/number of payments 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the payment amount from the investors while the cohorts are collecting 
as per Strickland (2010) and Mulgan et al. (2011). 
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Investment Rate= 
(Investing) 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the Present value of investments at the start of the project for investors 
by using the discount factor. This is an Author defined flow. 
 
Investment Return starts= 
IF THEN ELSE (Cumulative Investor Returns>0, 1, 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
This switch turns on the investors returns. 
 
Investment Starts= 
IF THEN ELSE (Invested Amount>0, 1, 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
This value is used for the INV IRR variable to mark when the investors start investing. 
 
Investor Account=  
INTEG (Investor Return Rate-Investment Rate, 0) 
Units: k£ 
This represents the value of the investor account at the time of program initiation, but 
does not include initial funds because the discount rate represents an alternate 
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investment option. This allows the final value of the investors account to be compared 
with the stock for the investment amount. This is an Author Defined stock. 
 
Investor Balance= 
Cumulative Investor Returns+ Amount Investors are willing to Invest 
Units: k£ 
This represents the current balance of the investors’ accounts with both what they have 
set for investing along with the returns for a successful program. This is an Author 
defined performance variable that may be considered in the tests. 
 
Investor Earned [Cohorts] = 
(Savings from Reduced Reconvictions [Cohorts])*Fraction for Investor share 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the value of savings determined in the contracts without the limits. The 
Investor share value is kept anonymous to the public. According to Cave et al. (2012) 
and Disely et al. (2011). The value is determined by multiplying the number of 
reconvictions that should have been based on the comparison group results (Cave et. al. 
2012). 
 
Investor Earned Return Accumulation [Cohorts] = 
Investor Earned [Cohorts]*Cohort Investment switch [Cohorts] 
Units: k£/Month 
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This represents the accumulation of investor earnings based on Cave et al. (2012). 
 
Investor Return Rate= 
Owner Success Payment 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the present value at the time of the initial project for payments from the 
owner to the investor by using the discount factor. It is author defined using the value of 
the payment times a discount factor from the initiation of the program. 
 
IRR= 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (Cash Flow, Defined Year, 0, 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
This is the average annual Rate of Return for the investors. 
 
"Investors Cohorts Paid? Amount"[Cohorts] = 
Owner Success Payment*"Payment Consideration?"[Cohorts] 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the payment rate to the investors when they are paid within their 
investment. This is an Author derived equation. 
 
Latest Cohort Start Times [Cohorts] = 
-0.5, 20,44,68,20 
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Units: Month 
This represents the latest time for a cohort to start (Cave et al. 2012). 
 
Max Cohort Length [Overall] = 
0 
 
Max Cohort Length [Cohort 1] = 
Standard Cohort Length 
 
Max Cohort Length [Cohort 2] = 
Standard Cohort Length 
 
Max Cohort Length [Cohort 3] = 
Standard Cohort Length 
 
Max Cohort Length [Cohort 4] = 
Max Cohort Length [Cohort 1] +Max Cohort Length [Cohort 2] +Max Cohort Length 
[Cohort 3] 
Units: Month 
This represents the maximum length of an individual Cohort (1-3) or 1/3 of the 
maximum time for the final cumulative cohort as outlined by Cave et al. (2012). 
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Max People in Cohort [Overall] = 
1e+015 
 
Max People in Cohort [Cohort 1] = 
Standard People in Cohort 
 
Max People in Cohort [Cohort 2] = 
Standard People in Cohort 
 
Max People in Cohort [Cohort 3] = 
Standard People in Cohort 
 
Max People in Cohort [Cohort 4] = 
Max People in Cohort [Cohort 1] +Max People in Cohort [Cohort 2] +Max People in 
Cohort [Cohort 3] 
Units: People 
This is the maximum number of people allowed in the cohort (Cave et. al. 2012). 
 
Max Program Costs=  
INTEG (Change in Max Program Costs, 0) 
Units: k£/Month 
  
161 
This represents the maximum program costs or the expected payment value, for the 
program, by the MOJ, after the SIB is complete. This is an Author defined variable. 
 
Maximum Payment Accumulation [Cohorts] = 
IF THEN ELSE(Cohort Payment Time[Cohorts]<Time, IF THEN ELSE(Desired 
Payment Value[Cohorts]> Maximum Successful Program Payment 
Value[Cohorts],Desired Payment Value[Cohorts]-Maximum Successful Program 
Payment Value[Cohorts],0)/TIME STEP,0) 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the accumulation for the maximum payment value. This is an Author 
defined equation to ensure investors are paid the amount they are due. 
 
Maximum Successful Program Payment Value [Cohorts] = 
INTEG ( Maximum Payment Accumulation [Cohorts], 0) 
Units: k£ 
This represents the maximum value for payment. This is Author defined to ensure a 
complete payment to investors. 
 
Minimum Change in Reconvictions [Cohorts] = 
1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.075 
Units: Dmnl 
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This represents the minimum change in reconvictions for the program to be considered a 
success (Strickland 2010, Mulgan et al. 2011, and Cave et al. 2012). 
 
MOJ Account=  
INTEG (Budget Peterborough-Budget Surplus-Peterborough Operations Costs, 0) 
Units: k£ 
This represents the amount of money in the MOJ and BLF account. The structure of this 
account to investors is pulled from Social Finance Limited (2011). 
 
MOJ Payments= 
Owner Program Payments 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the rate of MOJ replenishment before the program ends. This is an 
Author defined variable. 
 
MOJ SIB Payment Rate= 
Owner Success Payment 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the rate at which MOJ pays the investors back from their investment. 
Also see "Investor Return Rate" and "Owner Success Payment". 
 
MOJ SIB Savings Rate= 
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Investor Earned Return Accumulation [Cohort 4] 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the MOJ's accumulation of savings for the SIB. This is an Author 
Defined variable (See "Investor Earned Return Accumulation"). 
 
MOJ Starts Paying= 
73 
Units: Month 
This represents the Time that the ministry of Justice starts paying. This is an Author 
Defined Variable. 
 
MOJ Surplus return check= 
1 
Units: Month 
This is the amount of time that the MOJ waits to check for a budget surplus. This is an 
Author defined variable. 
 
Monthly Cost= 
Yearly Cost of Incarceration/Defined Year 
Units: k£/Month/People 
This represents the monthly cost of incarcerating a prisoner. Derived from Loder et al. 
(2010). 
  
164 
New Offender Incarceration Rate [Peterborough] = 
Average Prisoner Incarceration Rate for Peterborough*Offender Multiplier between 
Prison Systems [Peterborough] 
 
New Offender Incarceration Rate [Comparison] = 
Offender Multiplier between Prison Systems [Comparison]*New Offender Incarceration 
Rate [Peterborough] 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the flow of first time offenders into the prison system that fit the criteria 
for the program as outlined in Strickland (2010). The inflow of new prisoners is the 
difference between the number of prisoners that can be accepted on a monthly basis and 
the recidivism rate of prisoners from the overall cohort. This is one of the variations 
from the Lyneis and Ford (2007) model. 
 
No Initial Worth= 
0 
Units: k£ 
This represents a zero (0) initial value for any stock that has no starting value. Use the 
uses tree to see what values do not have an initial value. Author defined. 
 
"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohorts, Prison 
Systems, Release Program] = 
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Program Entry Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release Program]*Program Recidivism 
Fraction [Release Program] 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the rate of people released from their first conviction that will recommit 
a crime. This is an Author derived variable. 
 
Normal Recidivism Fraction= 
0.75 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents the normal quality of the system without having the project in play. 
Value pulled from Strickland (2010), Loder et al. (2010), and Mulgan et al. (2011). 
 
Number of payments= 
3 
Units: Month 
This represents the number of payments that are made by the investors. The number is 
derived based on the number of primary cohorts identified in both Disely et al. (2012) 
and Cave et al. (2012). There are three primary cohorts (the fourth is an overall 
grouping). 
 
Number of Reconviction [Cohorts, Prison Systems] = 
INTEG (Rate of Reconviction [Cohorts, Prison Systems], 0) 
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Units: People 
This represents the accumulation of reconvicted people in the cohort for the comparison 
group as per Cave et al. (2012) 
 
Offenders entering Program [Cohorts] = 
"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohorts, Peterborough, SIB] 
+"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat Offence"[Cohorts, Peterborough, 
SIB] +"Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohorts, Peterborough, 
SIB] +"Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate-Repeat Offence"[Cohorts, Peterborough, 
SIB] 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the flow of released offenders into the program. This is an author defined 
variable that may be used to measure the outcome of the program size. 
 
Offender Multiplier between Prison Systems [Prison Systems] = 
1, 10 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents the ratio of people needed in each grouping to have an appropriate power 
level in accordance with Cave et al. (2012) 
 
Offender Release Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release Program] = 
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"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohorts, Prison Systems, 
Release Program] +"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat 
Offence"[Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release Program] +"Rehabilitated Prisoner Release 
Rate- First Offence"[Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release Program] +"Rehabilitated 
Prisoner Release Rate-Repeat Offence"[Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release Program] 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the total number of prisoners released by prison system and cohort. This 
is an author defined variable. 
 
Offenders' willing to enter program Fraction= 
0.7 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents the percentage of prisoners that elect to go through the program and can 
be changed to tune for different levels of participation between 0 and 1. Disely et al. 
(2012) note a 70% acceptance. 
 
One Service= 
INTEG (Program Payments from SIP-Program Costs, No Initial Worth) 
Units: k£ 
The amount of built up capital that the conglomerate of NGOs have in their system. This 
is representative of the Social Finance Limited (2011). 
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Owner Program Payments= 
Max (IF THEN ELSE (MOJ Starts Paying<Time, (Program Payment Rate+0*Program 
Payments from SIP) * ("Successful Program?"[Cohort 4]), 0), 0) 
Units: k£/Month 
In the event of a successful program the owner would want to assume the payments for 
the program. This is represented by using a switch ("Program Off?") and the value of the 
payments. This is an Author derived flow based on Glahn and Whistler (2011). 
 
Owner Success Payment= 
(Payment for Cohort 1+Payment for Cohort 2+Payment for Cohort 3+Payment for 
Cohort 4)/Time Program has to Pay 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents when and how much the investors are paid. This relationship is made 
from the Social Finance Limited (2011). 
 
Paying Early= 
IF THEN ELSE (Actual Cohort Closing Times [Cohort 4] <Time, 0, MOJ Payments) 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the rate of early payments by the MOJ. This is an author defined policy 
solution for the MOJ to improve the effect of the program. 
 
Payment for Cohort 1= 
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Maximum Successful Program Payment Value [Cohort 1]*"Payment 
Consideration?"[Cohort 1] 
Units: k£ 
This represents the value of the payment for Cohort 1. Author defined from Mulgan et 
al. (2011) and Cave et al. (2012). 
 
Payment for Cohort 2= 
Maximum Successful Program Payment Value [Cohort 2]*"Payment 
Consideration?"[Cohort 2] 
Units: k£ 
This represents the payment value for Cohort 2. Author defined from Mulgan et al. 
(2011) and Cave et al. (2012). 
 
Payment for Cohort 3= 
Maximum Successful Program Payment Value [Cohort 3]*"Payment 
Consideration?"[Cohort 3] 
Units: k£ 
This represents the payment for Cohort 3. Author defined from Mulgan et al. (2011) and 
Cave et al. (2012). 
 
Payment for Cohort 4= 
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Maximum Successful Program Payment Value [Cohort 4]*"Payment 
Consideration?"[Cohort 4] 
Units: k£ 
This represents the payment value for the entire project. Author defined from Mulgan et 
al. (2011) and Cave et al. (2012). 
 
"Payment Consideration?"[Overall]= 
1 
 
"Payment Consideration?"[Cohort 1]= 
IF THEN ELSE (Cohort Payment Time [Cohort 1] <=Time, IF THEN ELSE (Cohort 
Payment Time [Cohort 1] +Time Program has to Pay>=Time, 1, 0), 0) 
 
"Payment Consideration?"[Cohort 2]= 
IF THEN ELSE (Cohort Payment Time [Cohort 2] <=Time, IF THEN ELSE (Cohort 
Payment Time [Cohort 2] +Time Program has to Pay>=Time, 1, 0), 0) 
 
"Payment Consideration?"[Cohort 3]= 
IF THEN ELSE (Cohort Payment Time [Cohort 3] <=Time, IF THEN ELSE (Cohort 
Payment Time [Cohort 3] +Time Program has to Pay>=Time, 1, 0), 0) 
 
"Payment Consideration?"[Cohort 4]= 
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IF THEN ELSE (Cohort Payment Time [Cohort 1] <=Time, IF THEN ELSE (Cohort 
Payment Time [Cohort 4] +Time Program has to Pay>=Time, 1, 0), 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
This marks the time that a payment is considered in the project (Cave et. al. 2012). 
Payment cannot be considered before the completion of cohort collection plus the time 
interval for data occurrence, collection and analysis. 
 
Peterborough Operations Costs= 
Total Prison Population [Peterborough]*monthly cost+ SUM (Repeat Offender Arrest 
Rate [Overall, Peterborough, Release Program!])*Conviction Cost 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the actual expenses for the Peterborough prison system using the costs of 
reconvictions found in Strickland (2010). (Reconviction cost times the number of 
reconvictions from Peterborough Released prisoners. This is an Author derived equation 
of the actual expenses and is deflated to maintain consistent projection value. 
 
Population in Program [Cohorts] = 
Rehabilitated Offenders [Cohorts, Peterborough, SIB] +Undiscovered Reoffenders 
[Cohorts, Peterborough, SIB] 
Units: People 
This represents the number of people that are in the program at any point in time. This is 
an Author defined variable used to calculate the monthly program costs. 
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"Post-SIB Program Payments"= 
Owner Program Payments 
Units: k£/Month 
This is an Author defined variable representing the payments from the MOJ to the SIB 
after the program (see "Owner Program Payments"). 
 
"Prison Holding-First Offence"[Prison Systems] = 
INTEG (New Offender Incarceration Rate [Prison Systems]-SUM ("Rehabilitated 
Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Overall, Prison Systems, Release Program!])-
SUM ("Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Overall, Prison 
Systems, Release Program!]), Initial First time Offender Prisoner Holding*Offender 
Multiplier between Prison Systems [Prison Systems]) 
Units: People 
This represents the amount of first time offenders in prison holding after their first 
conviction. {70 people tunes the model to Cave et al (2012).} Similar to Ford and Lyneis 
(2008). 
 
"Prison Holding-Repeat Offence"[Overall, Prison Systems] =  
INTEG (SUM (Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Overall, Prison Systems, Release 
Program!]-"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat Offence"[Overall, Prison 
Systems, Release Program!]-"Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate-Repeat 
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Offence"[Overall, Prison Systems, Release Program!]), Initial Reconvicted Prisoner 
Holding*Offender Multiplier between Prison Systems [Prison Systems]) 
 
"Prison Holding-Repeat Offence"[Cohort 1, Prison Systems] = 
INTEG (SUM (Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Cohort 1, Prison Systems, Release 
Program!]-"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat Offence"[Cohort 1, 
Prison Systems, Release Program!]-"Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate-Repeat 
Offence"[Cohort 1, Prison Systems, Release Program!]), 0) 
 
"Prison Holding-Repeat Offence"[Cohort 2, Prison Systems] =   
INTEG (SUM (Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Cohort 2, Prison Systems, Release 
Program!]-"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat Offence"[Cohort 2, 
Prison Systems, Release Program!]-"Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate-Repeat 
Offence"[Cohort 2, Prison Systems, Release Program!]), 0) 
 
"Prison Holding-Repeat Offence"[Cohort 3, Prison Systems] = 
INTEG (SUM (Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Cohort 3, Prison Systems, Release 
Program!]-"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat Offence"[Cohort 3, 
Prison Systems, Release Program!]-"Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate-Repeat 
Offence"[Cohort 3, Prison Systems, Release Program!]), 0) 
 
"Prison Holding-Repeat Offence"[Cohort 4, Prison Systems] = 
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INTEG (SUM (Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Cohort 4, Prison Systems, Release 
Program!]-"Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate-Repeat Offence"[Cohort 4, Prison 
Systems, Release Program!]-"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat 
Offence"[Cohort 4, Prison Systems, Release Program!]), 0) 
Units: People 
This represents the stock of reconvicted persons in prison at any point in time during the 
life of the measures. {168.75 people tunes the model to Cave et al (2012).} Similar in 
structure to Ford and Lyneis (2008). 
 
Prison Population Percent Reduction= 
(1-(Total Prison Population [Peterborough]/Offender Multiplier between Prison Systems 
[Peterborough])/ (Total Prison Population [Comparison]/Offender Multiplier between 
Prison Systems[Comparison]))*100 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents the fraction of prisoners from the Peterborough population that has been 
reduced as a result of the program. 
 
Probationary Period Length= 
12 
Units: Month 
This represents how long the rehabilitation program lasts (Mulgan et al. 2011, Cave et al. 
2012). 
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"Program Continues?"= 
Max ("Cohort Active?"[Cohort 4], "Successful Program?"[Cohort 4]) 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents whether or not the program continues after investment based on the 
success of the program and the investment time being met. This is an Author Defined 
variable in accordance with Glahn and Whistler (2011). 
 
Program Cost per Member= 
1.5 
Units: k£/People 
This is the average cost per member for the program. This value is pulled from Mulgan 
et al. (2011). 
 
Program Costs= 
Population in Program [Overall]*Cost per Participant per month 
Units: k£/Month 
This represents the rate of expense by the conglomerate when adding people to the 
program. This is an Author derived flow from the Social Finance Limited (2011). 
 
Program Entry Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, SIB] = 
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MIN ("Prison Holding-First Offence"[Prison Systems]*Offenders' Willing to enter 
program Fraction, max (Space Available in Program, 0))/Time spent in prison for a 
Conviction*"Cohort Active?"[Cohorts]*Program Switch [Prison Systems] 
 
Program Entry Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Normal] = 
"Prison Holding-First Offence"[Prison Systems]/Time spent in prison for a 
Conviction*"Cohort Active?"[Cohorts]-Program Entry Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, 
SIB] 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the rate of people that enter either the SIB program or the Normal 
program. 
 
Program Recidivism Fraction [SIB] = 
Normal Recidivism Fraction-Recidivism Reduction Fraction*Normal Recidivism 
Fraction*"Program Continues?" 
 
Program Recidivism Fraction [Normal] = 
Normal Recidivism Fraction 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents the estimated quality of the program in terms of the number of 
satisfactory outcomes divided by unsatisfactory outcomes. The change in recidivism is 
subtracted because of its representation in Loder et al. (2010) and Mulgan et al. (2011). 
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This relates to the Mission portion of the Balanced Scorecard for the conglomerate of 
NGOs. 
 
Program Payment Rate= 
MIN (Budget Excess/Time MOJ Backlog Payments, Max Program Costs) 
Units: k£/Month 
This is an author defined variable that represents the amount of payment made for the 
new program initiated by the SIB. 
 
Program Payments from SIP= 
Program Costs 
Units: k£/Month 
The amount that SIP pays the conglomerate per month. This is based on the expected 
budgeted expenses and the lacking funds of the NGOs. This flow represents the flow 
from One* Service to the conglomerate of NGOs in Social Finance Limited (2011). 
 
Program Switch [Peterborough] = 
IF THEN ELSE (Time>=20, 1, 0) 
 
Program Switch [Comparison] = 
0 
Units: Dmnl 
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This is an on/off switch to control whether or not the project is in operation. Author 
defined. 
 
Program Savings Collected by Government=  
INTEG (Budget Excess Recovered, 0) 
Units: k£ 
This is an Author defined performance variable showing the accumulated savings by the 
government. 
 
Rate of Offenders Coming off of Probation [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release 
Program] = 
Rehabilitated Offenders [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release Program]/Probationary 
Period Length 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the rate at which people that will not be convicted leave the program. 
 
Rate of Reconviction [Cohorts, Prison Systems] = 
SUM (Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release 
Program!])*Reconviction Termination [Cohorts] 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the rate of reconvicted people for the comparison group by summing the 
Recidivism Exclusion Rate and Recidivism Rate as per Cave et al. (2012). 
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Recidivism Reduction Fraction= 
0.25 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents the change in recidivism that occurs from the program. Based on Mulgan 
et al. (2011) and Loder et al. (2010) average difference recidivism is 20% (75%*0.3 
=20%). 
 
Reconviction Change [Cohorts] = 
1-XIDZ (Reconviction Fraction [Cohorts, Peterborough], Reconviction Fraction 
[Cohorts, Comparison], 1) 
Units: Dmnl 
Percent of change between the comparison group and the Peterborough group. The 
equation is derived from Cave et al. (2012) explanation of the program measures. 
 
Reconviction Fraction [Cohorts, Prison Systems] = 
ZIDZ (Number of Reconviction [Cohorts, Prison Systems], Cohort Collection of New 
Offenders [Cohorts, Prison Systems]) 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents the rate of reconviction for people in the Peterborough group as 
prescribed by Cave et al. (2012). 
 
Reconviction Termination [Cohorts] = 
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IF THEN ELSE (Actual Cohort Closing Times [Cohorts] +Time after Cohort for 
Reconviction Collection< Time, 0, 1) 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents when the reconviction counts for the project stop being collected as per 
Cave et al. (2012). RT Time is (12 months) added as the time when reconvictions will be 
measured. 
 
Reconvictions Prevented [Cohorts] = 
Rate of Reconviction [Cohorts, Comparison]/Offender Multiplier between Prison 
Systems [Comparison]-Rate of Reconviction [Cohorts, Peterborough]/Offender 
Multiplier between Prison Systems [Peterborough] 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the number of reconvictions that the program saved the government from 
having to go through. This is an Author derived equation. 
 
Rehabilitated Offenders [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release Program] =  
INTEG ("Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohorts, Prison Systems, 
Release Program] +"Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate-Repeat Offence"[Cohorts, 
Prison Systems, Release Program]-Rate of Offenders Coming off of Probation [Cohorts, 
Prison Systems, Release Program], 0) 
Units: People 
This represents the people in the program that are in the program. 
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"Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohorts, Prison Systems, 
Release Program] = 
Program Entry Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release Program]*(1-Program 
Recidivism Fraction [Release Program]) 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the number of people released from prison every month to provide. 
 
"Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate-Repeat Offence"[Cohorts, Prison Systems, 
Release Program] = 
Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release Program] *(1-
Program Recidivism Fraction [Release Program]) 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the rate people are released from repeat offences, but will not recommit. 
This is an Author Derived Equation. 
 
Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release Program] = 
(Undiscovered Reoffenders [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Release Program])/Average Time 
between Release and Reconviction [Prison Systems] 
Units: People/Month 
This is the rate of discovery for people who recommit crimes. The flow is averaged from 
the backlog and the time found in Cox (2006). 
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Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate [Overall, Prison Systems, SIB] = 
MIN("Prison Holding-Repeat Offence"[Overall, Prison Systems]*Offenders' Willing to 
enter program Fraction/Time spent in prison for a Conviction, max(Space Available in 
Program,0)/Time spent in prison for a Conviction-Program Entry Rate[Overall, Prison 
Systems, SIB] -Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate[Cohort 4,Prison Systems, 
SIB])*Program Switch[Prison Systems] 
 
Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate [Cohort 1, Prison Systems, SIB] = 
MIN("Prison Holding-Repeat Offence"[Cohort 1,Prison Systems]*Offenders' Willing to 
enter program Fraction/Time spent in prison for a Conviction, max(Space Available in 
Program,0)/Time spent in prison for a Conviction-Program Entry Rate[Cohort 1,Prison 
Systems, SIB])*Program Switch[Prison Systems] 
 
Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate [Cohort 2, Prison Systems, SIB] = 
MIN("Prison Holding-Repeat Offence"[Cohort 2,Prison Systems]*Offenders' Willing to 
enter program Fraction/Time spent in prison for a Conviction, max(Space Available in 
Program,0)/Time spent in prison for a Conviction -Program Entry Rate[Cohort 
2,Prison Systems, SIB]-Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate [Cohort 1,Prison Systems, 
SIB])*Program Switch[Prison Systems] 
 
Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate [Cohort 3, Prison Systems, SIB] = 
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MIN("Prison Holding-Repeat Offence"[Cohort 3,Prison Systems]*Offenders' Willing to 
enter program Fraction/Time spent in prison for a Conviction, max(Space Available in 
Program,0)/Time spent in prison for a Conviction -Program Entry Rate[Cohort 
3,Prison Systems, SIB]-Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate[Cohort 1,Prison Systems, 
SIB]-Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate[Cohort 2,Prison Systems, SIB])*Program 
Switch[Prison Systems] 
 
Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate [Cohort 4, Prison Systems, SIB] = 
(Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate[Cohort 1,Prison Systems, SIB]+Repeat Offender 
Program Entry Rate[Cohort 2,Prison Systems, SIB]+Repeat Offender Program Entry 
Rate[Cohort 3,Prison Systems, SIB])*Program Switch [Prison Systems] 
 
Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, Normal] = 
"Prison Holding-Repeat Offence"[Cohorts, Prison Systems]/Time spent in prison for a 
Conviction-Repeat Offender Program Entry Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, SIB] 
Units: People/Month 
This represents the rate at which repeat offenders enter either the SIB program or the 
Normal program. 
 
Savings from Reduced Reconvictions [Cohorts] = 
Total Cost of Incarceration *(Reconvictions Prevented [Cohorts]) 
Units: k£/Month 
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This represents the total savings from the reconvictions that remain short term 
convictions. This is an Author Derived equation. 
 
Social Impact Partnership= 
INTEG (Investing+ Owner Program Payments-Program Payments from SIP, No Initial 
Worth) 
Units: k£ 
This represents the funds available for the One* Service (i.e. SGT and Other NGOs) to 
operate in the Peterborough Prison. This comes from Social Finance Limited (2011). 
 
Space Available in Program= 
Available Capacity-Population in Program [Overall] 
Units: People 
This represents the number of people that could enter the program based on the available 
space. 
Standard Cohort Length= 
24 
Units: Month 
This is the standard time length of a cohort based on Cave et al. (2012). 
 
Standard People in Cohort= 
1000 
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Units: People 
This is an Author defined variable based on information provided in Cave et al. (2012). 
It represents how many new incarceration releases are needed to finish a standard cohort. 
 
"Successful Program?"[Overall]= 
IF THEN ELSE (Reconviction Change [Overall]>=Minimum Change in Reconvictions 
[Overall], 1, 0) 
 
"Successful Program?"[Cohort 1]= 
 IF THEN ELSE (Reconviction Change [Cohort 1]>=Minimum Change in 
Reconvictions [Cohort 1], 1, 0) 
 
"Successful Program?"[Cohort 2]= 
IF THEN ELSE (Reconviction Change [Cohort 2]>=Minimum Change in Reconvictions 
[Cohort 2], 1, 0) 
 
"Successful Program?"[Cohort 3]= 
IF THEN ELSE (Reconviction Change [Cohort 3]>=Minimum Change in Reconvictions 
[Cohort 3], 1, 0) 
 
"Successful Program?"[Cohort 4]= 
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IF THEN ELSE (Reconviction Change [Cohort 4]>=Minimum Change in Reconvictions 
[Cohort 4], 1, 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
This variable measures whether or not the program successfully pays out as described by 
Cave et al. (2012). 
 
"Surplus Returned?"= 
IF THEN ELSE (Investment Finalization Time [Cohort 4] <Time, 1, 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
This is an author defined variable used to switch when the upper echelon of the MOJ 
starts to retrieve surplus payments beyond the legal obligation to repay investors. 
 
Time after Cohort for Reconviction Collection= 
12 
Units: Month 
This represents the time from when cohort collection ends and the reconviction 
collection ends. It is set at 12 months as per Cave et al. (2012) 
 
Time for System Update= 
6 
Units: Month 
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This represents the time taken for systems to update any information change in the 
system. This includes both the recording of reconvictions and Budget surpluses. This 
value is pulled from Cave et.al. (2012) 
 
Time MOJ Backlog Payments= 
12 
Units: Month 
This is an author defined variable that represents the amount of time spent paying out the 
savings of the program. 
 
Time Program has to Pay= 
3 
Units: Month 
The time interval across which that payments are made to the investors of Social Impact 
Partnership (SIP). This is an Author defined variable since the payment timing and 
methods are confidential. 
 
Time spent in prison for a Conviction= 
1.5 
Units: Month 
The average time a short-term offender remains in prison per visit according to Cave et 
al. (2012). {1.5= 43/30}. 
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Time to Adjust Maximum Program Cost= 
1 
Units: Month 
This is an Author defined Variable representing the time delay to change the maximum 
program costs. 
 
Total Cost of Incarceration= 
Monthly cost*Time spent in prison for a Conviction+ Conviction Cost 
Units: k£/People 
This represents the cost for each reconviction by the British government per person. It is 
a combination of both the legal action and the time spent in prison. This is an Author 
derived equation from Mulgan et al. 2012). 
 
Total Prison Population [Prison Systems] = 
"Prison Holding-First Offence"[Prison Systems] +"Prison Holding-Repeat 
Offence"[Overall, Prison Systems] 
Units: People 
The percentage of system use. 
 
Total Program Participants [Cohorts] = 
INTEG (Offenders entering Program [Cohorts], 0) 
Units: People 
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This represents the accumulated number of people to enter the program. 
 
Undiscovered Reoffenders [Overall, Prison Systems, Normal] =  
INTEG ("Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Overall, Prison 
Systems, Normal] +"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat 
Offence"[Overall, Prison Systems, Normal]-Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Overall, 
Prison Systems, Normal], Initial Undiscovered Reoffenders*Offender Multiplier between 
Prison Systems [Prison Systems]) 
 
Undiscovered Reoffenders [Cohorts, Prison Systems, SIB] = 
INTEG ("Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohorts, Prison 
Systems, SIB] +"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat Offence"[Cohorts, 
Prison Systems, SIB]-Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Cohorts, Prison Systems, SIB], 0) 
 
Undiscovered Reoffenders [Cohort 1, Prison Systems, Normal] =  
INTEG ("Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohort 1, Prison 
Systems, Normal] + "Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat Offence"[Cohort 
1, Prison Systems, Normal]-Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Cohort 1, Prison Systems, 
Normal], 0) 
 
Undiscovered Reoffenders [Cohort 2, Prison Systems, Normal] = 
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 INTEG ("Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohort 2, Prison 
Systems, Normal] + "Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat Offence"[Cohort 
2, Prison Systems, Normal]-Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Cohort 2, Prison Systems, 
Normal], 0) 
 
Undiscovered Reoffenders [Cohort 3, Prison Systems, Normal] =  
INTEG ("Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohort 3, Prison 
Systems, Normal] +"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat Offence"[Cohort 
3, Prison Systems, Normal]-Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Cohort 3, Prison Systems, 
Normal], 0) 
 
Undiscovered Reoffenders [Cohort 4, Prison Systems, Normal] = 
INTEG ("Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- First Offence"[Cohort 4, Prison 
Systems, Normal] +"Non-Rehabilitated Prisoner Release Rate- Repeat Offence"[Cohort 
4, Prison Systems, Normal]-Repeat Offender Arrest Rate [Cohort 4, Prison Systems, 
Normal], 0) 
Units: People 
This represents the people that are in the program that eventually will recommit. 
 
Unpaid Investor Earned Returns [Cohorts] = 
INTEG (Investor Earned Return Accumulation [Cohorts]-Earned Investor Return 
payments [Cohorts], No Initial Worth) 
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Units: k£ 
This represents the accumulation of investor earnings through payment based on Cave et 
al. (2012) 
 
Value Paid Early=  
INTEG (paying early, 0) 
Units: k£ 
This represents the amount of money that the MOJ paid for the program before the final 
cohort closed. This is an Author defined variable. 
 
Yearly Cost of Incarceration= 
39 
Units: k£/People 
This represents the annum cost for each incarceration by the British government per 
person that is in prison as per Loder et al. (2010). 
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Stock Flow Diagrams 
 
 
Figure 31: Prison System Model Sector and Variable Relationships 
 
 
Figure 32: PSM Model Sector and Variable Relationships 
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Figure 33: Prison Outcome Model Sector and Variable Relationships 
 
Total Prison
Population
<Prison Holding-First
Offence>
<Prison Holding-Repeat
Offence>
<Offender Multiplier
between Prison
Systems>
Prison Population
Percent Reduction
Total Program
Participants
Offenders
entering Program
<Rehabilitated Prisoner
Release Rate- First
Offence>
<Rehabilitated Prisoner
Release Rate-Repeat
Offence>
<Non-Rehabilitated
Prisoner Release Rate-
First Offence>
<Non-Rehabilitated
Prisoner Release Rate-
Repeat Offence>
Offender
Release Rate
<Non-Rehabilitated
Prisoner Release Rate-
First Offence>
<Non-Rehabilitated
Prisoner Release Rate-
Repeat Offence>
<Rehabilitated Prisoner
Release Rate- First
Offence>
<Rehabilitated Prisoner
Release Rate-Repeat
Offence>
  
194 
 
 
Figure 34: Time Boundaries Model Sector and Variable Relationships 
 
 
Figure 35: Program Availability Model Sector and Variable Relationships 
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Figure 36: SIB Program Model Sector and Variable Relationships 
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Figure 37: SIB Payment Model Sector and Variable Relationships 
 
 
Figure 38: Owner Finances Model Sector and Variable Relationships 
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Figure 39: Investor Finances Model Sector and Variable Relationships 
 
  
Investor
Account
Investment
Rate
Investor Return
Rate
<Owner Success
Payment>
Invested
Amount <Investing>
cashflow
IRR
Investment
Starts
INV IRR
<Investment
Return starts>
<Defined
Year>
  
198 
Table 12: Exogenous Variable Values (Peterborough) 
 
 
Exogenous Variable Description Calibration Units Source
Average Prisoner 
incarceration Rate for 
Peterborough
 This represents the maximum number of new people that can 
be placed in the prison system, all other prisoners must go to a 
different prison system. 
57.83 or 
694/12  
Offenders/ 
Month
Cave et al. (2012)
Minimum Change in 
Reconvictions
This represents the minimum change in reconvictions for the 
program to be considered a success.
10% (7.5%) DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Mulgan et 
al. 2011, Cave et al. 2012)
Normal Recidivism 
Fraction
The normal quality of the system without having the project in 
play.
75% DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Loder et al. 
2010, Mulgan et. al. 2011)
Offender Multiplier 
between Prison Systems
This represents the ratio of people needed in each grouping to 
have an appropriate power level.
10 DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Probationary Period 
Length
This represents how long the rehabilitation program lasts and 
how long prisoners are tracked for reconvictions.
12 Months
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Cave et 
al. 2012)
Program Cost per 
Member
This is the average cost per member for the program. 1.5
k£/ 
Offender
Mulgan et al. (2011)
Standard Cohort Length This is the standard time length of a cohort. 24 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Standard People in 
Cohort
It represents how many new incarceration releases are needed 
to finish a standard cohort.
1000
First-time 
Offenders
Cave et al. (2012)
Time for System Update
This represents the time taken for systems to update any 
information change in the sysem.  This includes both the 
recording of reconvictions and Budget surpluses.
6 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time after Cohort for 
Reconviction Collection
This represents the time from when cohort collection ends and 
the reconviction collection ends.
12 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time Spent in Prison for 
a Conviction
The average time a short-term offender remains in prison per 
visit.
1.5 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Yearly Cost of 
Incarceration
This represents the annum cost for each incarceration by the 
British government per person that is in prison.
39
k£/ 
Offender
Loder et al. (2010)
Conviction Cost
This represents the legal costs per conviction.  There is a 
discrepancy of conviction costs.
2.853
k£/ 
Offender
SEU (2002) & Mulgan et al. 
(2011)
Expected Program 
Investment amount
This represents the minimum required investment from the 
investors.
5000 k£ Strickland (2010)
Offenders' Willing to 
enter program Fraction
This represents the percentage of prisoners that elect to go 
through the program.
70% DMNL Disely et al. (2011)
Annual Interest Rate for 
Investment [Maximum]
This represents the maximum interest rate rate that investors 
can accrue from their investment for a successful case.
13% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Annual Interest Rate for 
Investment [Minimum]
This represents the minimum interest rate that investors can 
accrue from their invesment for a successful case.
7.5% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Recidivism Reduction 
Fraction
This represents the change in recidivism that occurs from the 
program.
0.3 DMNL
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Loder 
et al. 2010)
Fraction for Investor 
shares
This represents the percentage share of savings that the 
investors receive in a successful project.  The actual value is 
confidential and the value listed is estimated.
50% DMNL
Disely et al. (2011) and 
Author Defined
MOJ Starts Paying
This represents the time that the MOJ starts paying and is tuned 
to the end of offenders collecting in the SIB.
73 Months Model/ Author Defined
Normal Recidivism 
Discovery Time
The average amount of time it takes to convict a recently 
released offender of a new crime.
6 Months Cox (2006)
Initial Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
This represents the number of released offenders awaiting their 
discovery for reconviction that starts the model in steady state.
1041 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
This is the tunded value for the initial prisoners that starts the 
model in steady state.
86.75 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
This represents the initial amount of offenders that have been 
reconvicted in the prison to start the model in steady state.
260.25 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Time to Adjus Maximum 
Program Cost
Time delay to change the maximum program costs. 1 Months Author Defined
Investor Discount Rate
This represents the discount rate for investors as an alternate 
investment rate of return.
5% DMNL Author Defined
MOJ Discount Rate
This represents the discount rate for the MOJ as an alternate 
investment rate of return.
3% DMNL Author Defined
Fraction of Surplus 
Returned
This represents the fraction of budget surplus between the 
expected and actual expenses that is returned to the MOJ.
50% DMNL Author Defined
Time Program has to 
Pay
The time interval across which payments are made to the 
investors of Social Impact Partnership
3 Months Author Defined
Time MOJ Backlog 
Payments
This represents the time delay used by the MOJ to pay the 
savings of the program for program operations.
12 Months Author Defined
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Table 12: Continued 
 
  
Exogenous Variable Description Calibration Units Source
Average Prisoner 
incarceration Rate for 
Peterborough
 This represents the maximum number of new people that can 
be placed in the prison system, all other prisoners must go to a 
different prison system. 
57.83 or 
694/12  
Offenders/ 
Month
Cave et al. (2012)
Minimum Change in 
Reconvictions
This represents the minimum change in reconvictions for the 
program to be considered a success.
10% (7.5%) DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Mulgan et 
al. 2011, Cave et al. 2012)
Normal Recidivism 
Fraction
The normal quality of the system without having the project in 
play.
75% DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Loder et al. 
2010, Mulgan et. al. 2011)
Offender Multiplier 
between Prison Systems
This represents the ratio of people needed in each grouping to 
have an appropriate power level.
10 DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Probationary Period 
Length
This represents how long the rehabilitation program lasts and 
how long prisoners are tracked for reconvictions.
12 Months
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Cave et 
al. 2012)
Program Cost per 
Member
This is the average cost per member for the program. 1.5
k£/ 
Offender
Mulgan et al. (2011)
Standard Cohort Length This is the standard time length of a cohort. 24 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Standard People in 
Cohort
It represents how many new incarceration releases are needed 
to finish a standard cohort.
1000
First-time 
Offenders
Cave et al. (2012)
Time for System Update
This represents the time taken for systems to update any 
information change in the sysem.  This includes both the 
recording of reconvictions and Budget surpluses.
6 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time after Cohort for 
Reconviction Collection
This represents the time from when cohort collection ends and 
the reconviction collection ends.
12 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time Spent in Prison for 
a Conviction
The average time a short-term offender remains in prison per 
visit.
1.5 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Yearly Cost of 
Incarceration
This represents the annum cost for each incarceration by the 
British government per person that is in prison.
39
k£/ 
Offender
Loder et al. (2010)
Conviction Cost
This represents the legal costs per conviction.  There is a 
discrepancy of conviction costs.
2.853
k£/ 
Offender
SEU (2002) & Mulgan et al. 
(2011)
Expected Program 
Investment amount
This represents the minimum required investment from the 
investors.
5000 k£ Strickland (2010)
Offenders' Willing to 
enter program Fraction
This represents the percentage of prisoners that elect to go 
through the program.
70% DMNL Disely et al. (2011)
Annual Interest Rate for 
Investment [Maximum]
This represents the maximum interest rate rate that investors 
can accrue from their investment for a successful case.
13% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Annual Interest Rate for 
Investment [Minimum]
This represents the minimum interest rate that investors can 
accrue from their invesment for a successful case.
7.5% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Recidivism Reduction 
Fraction
This represents the change in recidivism that occurs from the 
program.
0.3 DMNL
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Loder 
et al. 2010)
Fraction for Investor 
shares
This represents the percentage share of savings that the 
investors receive in a successful project.  The actual value is 
confidential and the value listed is estimated.
50% DMNL
Disely et al. (2011) and 
Author Defined
MOJ Starts Paying
This represents the time that the MOJ starts paying and is tuned 
to the end of offenders collecting in the SIB.
73 Months Model/ Author Defined
Normal Recidivism 
Discovery Time
The average amount of time it takes to convict a recently 
released offender of a new crime.
6 Months Cox (2006)
Initial Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
This represents the number of released offenders awaiting their 
discovery for reconviction that starts the model in steady state.
1041 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
This is the tunded value for the initial prisoners that starts the 
model in steady state.
86.75 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
This represents the initial amount of offenders that have been 
reconvicted in the prison to start the model in steady state.
260.25 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Time to Adjus Maximum 
Program Cost
Time delay to change the maximum program costs. 1 Months Author Defined
Investor Discount Rate
This represents the discount rate for investors as an alternate 
investment rate of return.
5% DMNL Author Defined
MOJ Discount Rate
This represents the discount rate for the MOJ as an alternate 
investment rate of return.
3% DMNL Author Defined
Fraction of Surplus 
Returned
This represents the fraction of budget surplus between the 
expected and actual expenses that is returned to the MOJ.
50% DMNL Author Defined
Time Program has to 
Pay
The time interval across which payments are made to the 
investors of Social Impact Partnership
3 Months Author Defined
Time MOJ Backlog 
Payments
This represents the time delay used by the MOJ to pay the 
savings of the program for program operations.
12 Months Author Defined
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Exogenous Variable Description Calibration Units Source
Average Prisoner 
incarceration Rate for 
Peterborough
 This represents the maximum number of new people that can 
be placed in the prison system, all other prisoners must go to a 
different prison system. 
57.83 or 
694/12  
Offenders/ 
Month
Cave et al. (2012)
Minimum Change in 
Reconvictions
This represents the minimum change in reconvictions for the 
program to be considered a success.
10% (7.5%) DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Mulgan et 
al. 2011, Cave et al. 2012)
Normal Recidivism 
Fraction
The normal quality of the system without having the project in 
play.
75% DMNL
(Strickland 2010, Loder et al. 
2010, Mulgan et. al. 2011)
Offender Multiplier 
between Prison Systems
This represents the ratio of people needed in each grouping to 
have an appropriate power level.
10 DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Probationary Period 
Length
This represents how long the rehabilitation program lasts and 
how long prisoners are tracked for reconvictions.
12 Months
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Cave et 
al. 2012)
Program Cost per 
Member
This is the average cost per member for the program. 1.5
k£/ 
Offender
Mulgan et al. (2011)
Standard Cohort Length This is the standard time length of a cohort. 24 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Standard People in 
Cohort
It represents how many new incarceration releases are needed 
to finish a standard cohort.
1000
First-time 
Offenders
Cave et al. (2012)
Time for System Update
This represents the time taken for systems to update any 
information change in the sysem.  This includes both the 
recording of reconvictions and Budget surpluses.
6 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time after Cohort for 
Reconviction Collection
This represents the time from when cohort collection ends and 
the reconviction collection ends.
12 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Time Spent in Prison for 
a Conviction
The average time a short-term offender remains in prison per 
visit.
1.5 Months Cave et al. (2012)
Yearly Cost of 
Incarceration
This represents the annum cost for each incarceration by the 
British government per person that is in prison.
39
k£/ 
Offender
Loder et al. (2010)
Conviction Cost
This represents the legal costs per conviction.  There is a 
discrepancy of conviction costs.
2.853
k£/ 
Offender
SEU (2002) & Mulgan et al. 
(2011)
Expected Program 
Investment amount
This represents the minimum required investment from the 
investors.
5000 k£ Strickland (2010)
Offenders' Willing to 
enter program Fraction
This represents the percentage of prisoners that elect to go 
through the program.
70% DMNL Disely et al. (2011)
Annual Interest Rate for 
Investment [Maximum]
This represents the maximum interest rate rate that investors 
can accrue from their investment for a successful case.
13% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Annual Interest Rate for 
Investment [Minimum]
This represents the minimum interest rate that investors can 
accrue from their invesment for a successful case.
7.5% DMNL Cave et al. (2012)
Recidivism Reduction 
Fraction
This represents the change in recidivism that occurs from the 
program.
0.3 DMNL
(Mulgan et al. 2011, Loder 
et al. 2010)
Fraction for Investor 
shares
This represents the percentage share of savings that the 
investors receive in a successful project.  The actual value is 
confidential and the value listed is estimated.
50% DMNL
Disely et al. (2011) and 
Author Defined
MOJ Starts Paying
This represents the time that the MOJ starts paying and is tuned 
to the end of offenders collecting in the SIB.
73 Months Model/ Author Defined
Normal Recidivism 
Discovery Time
The average amount of time it takes to convict a recently 
released offender of a new crime.
6 Months Cox (2006)
Initial Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
This represents the number of released offenders awaiting their 
discovery for reconviction that starts the model in steady state.
1041 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
This is the tunded value for the initial prisoners that starts the 
model in steady state.
86.75 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Initial Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
This represents the initial amount of offenders that have been 
reconvicted in the prison to start the model in steady state.
260.25 Offenders Cave et al. (2012)
Time to Adjus Maximum 
Program Cost
Time delay to change the maximum program costs. 1 Months Author Defined
Investor Discount Rate
This represents the discount rate for investors as an alternate 
investment rate of return.
5% DMNL Author Defined
MOJ Discount Rate
This represents the discount rate for the MOJ as an alternate 
investment rate of return.
3% DMNL Author Defined
Fraction of Surplus 
Returned
This represents the fraction of budget surplus between the 
expected and actual expenses that is returned to the MOJ.
50% DMNL Author Defined
Time Program has to 
Pay
The time interval across which payments are made to the 
investors of Social Impact Partnership
3 Months Author Defined
Time MOJ Backlog 
Payments
This represents the time delay used by the MOJ to pay the 
savings of the program for program operations.
12 Months Author Defined
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Extreme Conditions Testing (ECT) 
Table 13: ECT Setup Peterborough 
 
Variable Name Description Normal Test type 1 Test type 2 Maximum Minimum
OD 1
MOJ Discount 
Rate
This is an interest rate describing the 
risk, or borrowing cost, for the owner 
agency.
3.00% Max Min 15% 0% IRR MOJ
ID 2
Investor Discount 
Rate
This is an interest rate describing the 
risk, or borrowing cost, for the 
investors.
5.00% Max Min 15% 0% IRR Investor
WR 3
Offenders' Willing 
to enter program 
Fraction
The percentage of prisoners willing to 
participate in the new release 
program.
70% Max Min 100% 0%
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
RDT 4
Normal 
Recidivism 
Discovery Time
This represents the average time that a 
released offender spends in society 
before reconviction.
6 mon Max Min 12 months 0.1 months
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
IS 5
Fraction for 
Investor Share
This represents the percentage of 
savings that the investor recieves.
0.5 Max Min 0% 100%
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
RCF 6
Recidivism 
Change Fraction
This represents the percentage that 
the recidivism is reduced from the 
program.
0.2 Max Min -33% 100%
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
IA 7
Expected Program 
Investment 
Amount
This represents the amount of money 
that the government asks the  private 
sector to finance the SIB or Bond with
5000k£ Max Min 500k£ 50000£
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
PSRP 8
Post-Program-
Savings-
Reinvestment 
Percent per 
month
In the event of a successful program, 
this represents the amount of savings 
that the government is willing to send 
back as a reinvestment each month.
0.833% Max Min 0% 100%
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
CC 9 Conviction Costs
This represents the cost for a 
conviction
2.853 k£ Max Min 0 25k£
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
PPT 10
Time Program has 
to Pay
The time allowed between 
determining the successs of the 
program and paying investors.
3 MAX MIN 0.1 6
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
MPIR 11
Average Prisoner 
Incarceration 
Rate for 
Peterborough
This represents how many people 
enter the prison system as new 
incarcerations.
57.83 Max Min 0 100
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
IPH 12
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
This represents the initial number of 
new incarcerations in prison at the 
start of the model.
86.75 Max Min 0 150
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
IUR 13
Initial 
Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
This represents the initial number of 
people in the undiscovered recidivism 
stock at the start of the model.
1041 Max Min 0 2000
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
IRPH 14
Initial 
Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
This represents the number of 
reconvicted prisoners in the prison 
system at the start of the model.
260.25 Max Min 0 500
Reconviction 
Rate
IRR 
(Variables)
Release 
Rate
Observed Variables
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Table 14: ECT Expectations Peterborough 
 
 
  
Variable Name Expectation 1 Expectation 2 Expectation 3
MOJ Discount 
Rate
As the Owner Discount Rate changes, the IRR Owner should 
also change.  The relationship should be inverse and 
exponential since the discount rate is an interest rate and the 
IRR is a percentage of net benefits.  As the Owner Discount 
Rate increases the IRR Owner should decrease exponentially.
Investor Discount 
Rate
As the Investor Discount Rate changes, the IRR Investor 
should also change.  The relationship should be exponential 
since the discount rate is an interest rate and the IRR is a 
percentage of net benefits.  As the Investor Discount Rate 
increases the IRR Investor should decrease exponentially.
Offenders' Willing 
to enter program 
Fraction
The willingness ratio should have a negative correlation with 
the Reconviction Rate.  As willingness ratio increases, 
Reconviction Rate should decrease.
willingness ratio should have a positive correlation with the 
IRRs.  As Program Choice is increased, the IRRs should 
increase or stay the same based on where the initial Investor 
payout occurs.
The willingness ratio should have a negative correlation with 
the release rates.
Normal 
Recidivism 
Discovery Time
Recidivism Discovery Time should negatively correlate to the 
Reconviction rate.
Recidivism Discovery Time should have an negative effect on 
the IRRs because more time between reconvictions means 
fewer reconvictions in the measured time.
Recidivism Discovery Time should have a negative on the 
release rate because the reconvictions happen less often.
Fraction for 
Investor Share
As the investor shares changes there should be no change in 
the reconviction rate.
As the investor share increases, the investors IRR shound 
increase, the Prisons IRR should not change, the MOJ IRR 
should decrease.
As the investor share there shold be no change in the release 
rate
Recidivism 
Change Fraction
There should be a negative correlation between the recidivism 
change fraction and the reconviction rate.
The IRRs will have a positive correlation with the recidivism 
change fraction.
The recidivism change fraction has a negative correlation with 
the release rate.
Expected Program 
Investment 
Amount
As the investment amount increases, the reconviction rate 
should decrease. If there is too little investment the 
reconviction rate will drop and then rise as funds are 
depleted.
The Investor IRR will drop off if the investment is too small, 
but after a certain threashold the IRR will not change, just the 
magnitude of the payout.  The MOJ IRR will decrease outside 
an optimal range of investment, because there will either be 
no benefit or the MOJ will be paying to much in return for the 
program.
As the investment amount increases, the release rates should 
decrease to a maximum level.
Post-Program-
Savings-
Reinvestment 
Percent per 
month
In a successful program, the reconviction rate will decrease as 
more funds are put in the system.
As more money is put into the system the IRR will increase for 
the MOJ; however, if too much money is reinvested then 
there will be waste at the SPV. Nothing should change with 
the Investors IRR.
As more money goes into the system the release rate should 
drop with the reconviction rate.
Conviction Costs
The cost per conviction should not have any change when 
increasing, but decreasing the cost per conviction would 
increase the reconviction rate as there would as much savings 
to continue the program.
As conviction costs increase from zero there will be a greater 
IRR for both investors and owner.
The release rate should follow the reconviction Rate
Time Program has 
to Pay
There should be no change in the reconviction rate due to the 
Program Pays Time.
As program pays time increases from near zero, the IRR for 
investors should decrease and the IRR for the owner should 
increase, because there is no interest collected after the 
program decision to pay is made.
There should be no impact from the Program Pays Time on 
the Release Rate.
Average Prisoner 
Incarceration 
Rate for 
Peterborough
The number of reconvictions should increase as the prisoner 
incarceration rate increases.
There should only be a small change in the IRRs as the stocks 
and flows try to adjust for the increased average inflow of 
new prisoners.
As the prisoner incarceration rate increases, the release rates 
will increase.
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
Increasing the intitial prisoner holding should cause an initial 
spike in the reconviction rate
Increasing the initial prisoner holding should cause very little 
effect on the IRRs.  There may be some noise as the model 
tries to stablize around average values.
As the initial prisoner holidng increases the release rates will 
also temporarily increase.
Initial 
Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
An increase in the initial undiscovered recidivism should cause 
an increase in the reconviction rate.
Increasing the initial undiscovered recidivism should cause 
very little effect on the IRRs.  There may be some noise as the 
model tries to stablize around average values.
as the initial undiscovered recidivism increases the release 
rates will temporarily increase.
Initial 
Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
An increase in the initital reconviction prisoner holding should 
cause the reconviction rate to increase.
Increasing the initial reconviction prisoner holding should 
cause very little effect on the IRRs.  There may be some noise 
as the model tries to stablize around average values.
as the initial reconviction prisoner holidng increases the 
release rate will also temporarily increase.
Key
Other Literature
Author Defined
Inconsistent
Steady State 
Calibration
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Table 15: ECT Results-Summary Peterborough 
 
 
Variable Name Reality 1 Reality 2 Reality 3 Reality 4
MOJ Discount 
Rate
A greater discount rate allows the MOJ to value the benefits 
and costs that occur early in the project at a greater rate than 
toward the end.
Investor Discount 
Rate
Decreasing the Investor Discount Rate causes the Investor IRR 
to increase.
Offenders' Willing 
to enter program 
Fraction
The lower willingness ratio instills a greater reconviction rate.
If no one is willing then the investors see no return on their 
investment, other than that there is very little change between 
Investor IRR and Willingness ratio
The MOJ looses nothing if the noone is willing to enter the 
program, but as the willingness increases, the MOJ's IRR 
increases.
As the Willingness ratio increases the release rate decreases.
Normal 
Recidivism 
Discovery Time
As the RDT decreases the Reconviction Rate increases.
As the Recidivism Discovery Time (RDT) increases, the initial 
Investor IRR decreases.  The maximum RDT is lower than the 
normal at the end because less funds are accumulating from 
convictions and the normal rests at the maximum.
As the RDT decrease the MOJ IRR increases.
Initially, as the RDT increases the Release Rate decreases, but 
the final time has an increase in release rate because the 
measure is captured from cohort 4.
Fraction for 
Investor Share
The IS has no effect on the reconviction rate because the 
investors are still seeing a return.
As the Investor Share (IS) increases, the Investor IRR increases. 
(Bound by max and min returns)
As the IS increases the MOJ IRR decreases. (Bound by max and 
minimum returns)
The IS has no effect on the release rate because the investors 
are still seeing a return.
Recidivism 
Change Fraction
As the RCF increases, the reconviction rate decreases.
The recidivism change fraction (RCF) only increases to the 
point of success and then has little effect on the Investor IRR.
As the RCF increases, the MOJ IRR increases. As the RCF increases, the release rate decreases.
Expected Program 
Investment 
Amount
As the IA increases, the reconviction rate decreases.
As the Investment Amount (IA) increases it reaches an optimal 
investment and then decreases to the minimum payback.
As the IA increases, it reaches an optimal MOJ IRR and then 
becomes too excessive.
As the IA increases, the Release rate decreases.
Post-Program-
Savings-
Reinvestment 
Percent per 
month
As the PSRP increases, the reconviction rate decreases.
The Program Savings Reinvestment Percent per month (PSRP) 
has no effect on the Investor IRR.
As the PSRP increases, the MOJ IRR decreases. As the PSRP increases, the release rate decreases.
Conviction Costs
There is very little change but decreasing CC increases the 
Reconviction Rate.
As the Conviction Costs increase (CC) the Investor IRR 
increases within the max and min returns for a successful 
project.
As the CC increases so does the MOJ IRR.
There is very little change but decreasing the CC increases the 
release rate
Time Program has 
to Pay
There is no change
As the program pays time (PPT) increases the investor IRR 
eventually increases.
As the PPT increases the MOJ IRR eventually decreases. There is no change
Average Prisoner 
Incarceration 
Rate for 
Peterborough
No min PIR for Reconviction rate, but the Max starts higher 
than the normal and ends lower.
As the Prisoner Incarceration Rate (PIR) increases, the Investor 
IRR increases to a point and then decreases.
As the PIR increases the MOJ IRR eventually increases.
No min PIR for Release rate, but the Max starts higher than the 
normal and ends lower.
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
IPH has a slight disturbance in the end of the Reconviction 
Rate
Initial Prisoner Holding (IPH) has no effect IPH has a slight disturbance in the middle of the MOJ IRR There is no change
Initial 
Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
As the IUR increases the Reconviction Rate increases
Increasing the Initial Undiscovered Recidivism (IUR) lowers the 
investor IRR.
As the IUR increases, the MOJ IRR increases As the IUR increases the Release Rate increases.
Initial 
Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
As the IRPH increases there is a slight increase in the 
reconviction rate
No change from Initial Reconviction Prisoner Holding (IRPH).
As the IRPH increases, the MOJ IRR increases, but ends in a 
decrease
As the IRPH increases there is a slight increase in the release 
rate.
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Table 15: Continued 
 
 
Variable Name Reality 1 Reality 2 Reality 3 Reality 4
MOJ Discount 
Rate
A greater discount rate allows the MOJ to value the benefits 
and costs that occur early in the project at a greater rate than 
toward the end.
Investor Discount 
Rate
Decreasing the Investor Discount Rate causes the Investor IRR 
to increase.
Offenders' Willing 
to enter program 
Fraction
The lower willingness ratio instills a greater reconviction rate.
If no one is willing then the investors see no return on their 
investment, other than that there is very little change between 
Investor IRR and Willingness ratio
The MOJ looses nothing if the noone is willing to enter the 
program, but as the willingness increases, the MOJ's IRR 
increases.
As the Willingness ratio increases the release rate decreases.
Normal 
Recidivism 
Discovery Time
As the RDT decreases the Reconviction Rate increases.
As the Recidivism Discovery Time (RDT) increases, the initial 
Investor IRR decreases.  The maximum RDT is lower than the 
normal at the end because less funds are accumulating from 
convictions and the normal rests at the maximum.
As the RDT decrease the MOJ IRR increases.
Initially, as the RDT increases the Release Rate decreases, but 
the final time has an increase in release rate because the 
measure is captured from cohort 4.
Fraction for 
Investor Share
The IS has no effect on the reconviction rate because the 
investors are still seeing a return.
As the Investor Share (IS) increases, the Investor IRR increases. 
(Bound by max and min returns)
As the IS increases the MOJ IRR decreases. (Bound by max and 
minimum returns)
The IS has no effect on the release rate because the investors 
are still seeing a return.
Recidivism 
Change Fraction
As the RCF increases, the reconviction rate decreases.
The recidivism change fraction (RCF) only increases to the 
point of success and then has little effect on the Investor IRR.
As the RCF increases, the MOJ IRR increases. As the RCF increases, the release rate decreases.
Expected Program 
Investment 
Amount
As the IA increases, the reconviction rate decreases.
As the Investment Amount (IA) increases it reaches an optimal 
investment and then decreases to the minimum payback.
As the IA increases, it reaches an optimal MOJ IRR and then 
becomes too excessive.
As the IA increases, the Release rate decreases.
Post-Program-
Savings-
Reinvestment 
Percent per 
month
As the PSRP increases, the reconviction rate decreases.
The Program Savings Reinvestment Percent per month (PSRP) 
has no effect on the Investor IRR.
As the PSRP increases, the MOJ IRR decreases. As the PSRP increases, the release rate decreases.
Conviction Costs
There is very little change but decreasing CC increases the 
Reconviction Rate.
As the Conviction Costs increase (CC) the Investor IRR 
increases within the max and min returns for a successful 
project.
As the CC increases so does the MOJ IRR.
There is very little change but decreasing the CC increases the 
release rate
Time Program has 
to Pay
There is no change
As the program pays time (PPT) increases the investor IRR 
eventually increases.
As the PPT increases the MOJ IRR eventually decreases. There is no change
Average Prisoner 
Incarceration 
Rate for 
Peterborough
No min PIR for Reconviction rate, but the Max starts higher 
than the normal and ends lower.
As the Prisoner Incarceration Rate (PIR) increases, the Investor 
IRR increases to a point and then decreases.
As the PIR increases the MOJ IRR eventually increases.
No min PIR for Release rate, but the Max starts higher than the 
normal and ends lower.
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
IPH has a slight disturbance in the end of the Reconviction 
Rate
Initial Prisoner Holding (IPH) has no effect IPH has a slight disturbance in the middle of the MOJ IRR There is no change
Initial 
Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
As the IUR increases the Reconviction Rate increases
Increasing the Initial Undiscovered Recidivism (IUR) lowers the 
investor IRR.
As the IUR increases, the MOJ IRR increases As the IUR increases the Release Rate increases.
Initial 
Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
As the IRPH increases there is a slight increase in the 
reconviction rate
No change from Initial Reconviction Prisoner Holding (IRPH).
As the IRPH increases, the MOJ IRR increases, but ends in a 
decrease
As the IRPH increases there is a slight increase in the release 
rate.
Variable Name Reality 1 Reality 2 Reality 3 Reality 4
MOJ Discount 
Rate
A greater discount rate allows the MOJ to value the benefits 
and costs that occur early in the project at a greater rate than 
toward the end.
Investor Discount 
Rate
Decreasing the Investor Discount Rate causes the Inve tor IRR 
to increase.
Offenders' Willing 
to enter program 
Fraction
The lower willingness ratio instills a greater reconviction rate.
If no one is willing then the investors see no r turn on their 
investment, other than that there is very little change between 
Investor IRR and Willingness ratio
The MOJ looses nothing if the noone is willing to enter the 
program, but as the willi gness increases, the MOJ's IRR 
increases.
As he Willingness ratio incr ase the release r te decreas s.
Normal 
Recidivism 
Discovery Time
As the RDT decreases the Reconviction Rate increases.
As the Recidivism Discovery Time (RDT) increases, the initial 
Investor IRR decreases.  The maximum RDT is lower than the 
normal at the end because less funds are accumulating from 
convictions and the normal rests at the maximum.
As the RDT d crease the MOJ IRR increases.
Initially, as the RDT increases the Release Rate decreases, but 
the final time has an increase in release rate because the 
measure is captured from cohort 4.
Fraction for 
Investor Share
The IS has no effect on the reconviction rate because the 
investors are still seeing a return.
As the Investor Share (IS) increases, the Investor IRR increases. 
(Bound by max and min returns)
As the IS increases the MOJ IRR decreases. (Bound by max and 
minimum r turns)
The IS ha  no effect on the release rate b cause the inve tors 
are still seeing a return.
Recidivism 
Change Fraction
As the RCF increases, the reconviction rate decreases.
The recidivism change fraction (RCF) only increases to the 
point of success and then has little effect on t e Investor IRR.
As the RCF increases, the MOJ IRR incr as s. As the RCF increases, the release rate decreases.
Expected Program 
Investment 
Amount
As the IA increases, the reconviction rate decreases.
As the Investment Amount (IA) increases it reaches an optimal 
investment and then decreases to the minimum payback.
As the IA increases, it reaches an optimal MOJ IRR and then 
becomes too excessive.
As the IA increases, the Release rate decreases.
Post-Program-
Savings-
Reinvestment 
Percent per 
month
As the PSRP increases, the reconviction rate decreases.
The Program Savings Reinvestment Percent per month (PSRP) 
has no effect on the Investor IRR.
As the PSRP increas s, the MOJ IRR d cr as s. As the PSRP increases, the release rate decreases.
Conviction Costs
There is very little change but decreasing CC increases the 
Reconviction Rate.
As the Conviction Costs increase (CC) the Investor IRR 
increases within the max and min returns f r a successful 
project.
As the CC increases so does the MOJ IRR.
There is very little change but decreasing the CC increases the 
release rate
Time Program has 
to Pay
There is no change
As the program pays time (PPT) increases the investor IRR 
eventually increases.
As the PPT increases the MOJ IRR eventually decreases. There is no change
Average Prisoner 
Incarceration 
Rate for 
Peterborough
No min PIR for Reconviction rate, but the Max starts higher 
than the normal and ends lower.
As the Prisoner Incarceration Rate (PIR) increases, the Investor 
IRR increases to a point and then decreases.
As the PIR increases the MOJ IRR eventually increases.
No min PIR for Release rate, but the Max st rts higher than the 
normal and e s lower.
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
IPH has a slight disturbance in the end of the Reconviction 
Rate
Initial Prisoner Holding (IPH) has no effect IPH has a slight disturbance in the middle of the MOJ IRR There is no change
Initial 
Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
As the IUR increases the Reconviction Rate increases
Increasing the Initial Undiscovered Recidivism (IUR) lowers the 
investor IRR.
As the IUR increases, the MOJ IR  increas s As the IUR increases the Release Rate increases.
Initial 
Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
As the IRPH increases there is a slight increase in the 
reconviction rate
No change from Initial Reconviction Prisoner Holdi g (IRPH).
As the IRPH increase , the MOJ IRR ncreases, but ends in a 
de rease
As the IRPH increases there is a slight increase in the release 
rate.
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Results-Graphs 
 
Figure 40: Key ECT Results Graphs Peterborough 
 
 
Figure 41: Offenders' Willingness to Enter Program ECT Results Graphs 
Peterborough 
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Figure 42: Normal Recidivism Discovery Time ECT Results Graphs Peterborough 
 
 
Figure 43: Fraction for Investor Share ECT Results Graphs Peterborough 
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Figure 44: Recidivism Change Fraction ECT Results Graphs Peterborough 
 
 
Figure 45: Expected Program Investment ECT Results Graphs Peterborough  
  
  
207 
 
Figure 46: Post-Program-Savings-Reinvestment Percent ECT Results Graphs 
Peterborough 
 
 
Figure 47: Conviction Cost ECT Results Graphs Peterborough 
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Figure 48: Time Program Has to Pay ECT Results Graphs Peterborough 
 
 
Figure 49: Average Prisoner Incarceration Rate ECT Results Graphs 
Peterborough 
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Figure 50: Initial First-time Offender Prison Holding ECT Results Graphs 
Peterborough 
 
 
Figure 51: Initial Undiscovered Reoffenders Reconviction Rate ECT Results 
Graphs Peterborough 
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Figure 52: Initial Reconvicted Prisoner Holding ECT Results Graphs Peterborough 
 
 
Figure 53: Investor Discount Rate ECT Results Graphs Peterborough 
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Figure 54: MOJ Discount Rate ECT Results Graphs Peterborough 
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Table 16: Statistical Screening Setup 
 
 
 
# Variable Name Expected Low High
Standard 
Deviation
Distribution Units
1 MOJ Starts Paying 76 46 76 Triangular percent
2
Fraction of Surplus 
Returned
50 25 100 50 normal percent
3
Offenders' Willing 
to enter program 
Fraction
70 0 100 10 normal percent
4
Normal Recidivism 
Discovery Time
6 1 24 6 normal skew right months
5
Fraction for 
Investor Share
50 25 100 uniform percent
6
Recidivism 
Reduction 
Fraction
30 0 50 Uniform percent
7
Expected Program 
Investment 
Amount
5000 2000 8000 1000 normal k£
8 Conviction Cost 2.853 0 39 uniform k£/conviction
9
Time Program has 
to Pay
3 1 6 uniform months
10
Average Prisoner 
Incarceration Rate 
for Peterborough
57.83 10 100 20 normal people/month
11
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
86.75 10 150 35 normal people
12
Initial 
Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
1041 100 2000 400 normal people
13
Initial Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
260.25 25 500 100 normal people
14
Standard Cohort 
Length
24 12 48 uniform months
15
Standard People in 
Cohort
1,000 500 2000 uniform people
16
Time for System 
Update
6 1 12 2 normal months
17
Time after Cohort 
for Reconviction 
Collection
12 6 24 4 uniform months
18
Program Cost per 
member
1.5 0.5 4.5 uniform k£/people
19
Yearly Cost of 
Incarceration
39 19.5 78 10 normal k£/person
20
Time spent in 
prison for a 
Conviction
1.5 0.5 6 1.5 normal months
21
Normal Recidivism 
Fraction
75 50 100 10 normal percent
22
Probationary 
Period Length
12 6 24 uniform months
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Table 16: Continued 
 
  
# Variable Name Expected Low High
Standard 
Deviation
Distribution Units
1 MOJ Starts Paying 76 46 76 Triangular percent
2
Fraction of Surplus 
Returned
50 25 100 50 normal percent
3
Offenders' Willing 
to enter program 
Fraction
70 0 100 10 normal percent
4
Normal Recidivism 
Discovery Time
6 1 24 6 normal skew right months
5
Fraction for 
Investor Share
50 25 100 uniform percent
6
Recidivism 
Reduction 
Fraction
30 0 50 Uniform percent
7
Expected Program 
Investment 
Amount
5000 2000 8000 1000 normal k£
8 Conviction Cost 2.853 0 39 uniform k£/conviction
9
Time Program has 
to Pay
3 1 6 uniform months
10
Average Prisoner 
Incarceration Rate 
for Peterborough
57.83 10 100 20 normal people/month
11
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
86.75 10 150 35 normal people
12
Initial 
Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
1041 100 2000 400 normal people
13
Initial Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
260.25 25 500 100 normal people
14
Standard Cohort 
Length
24 12 48 uniform months
15
Standard People in 
Cohort
1,000 500 2000 uniform people
16
Time for System 
Update
6 1 12 2 normal months
17
Time after Cohort 
for Reconviction 
Collection
12 6 24 4 uniform months
18
Program Cost per 
member
1.5 0.5 4.5 uniform k£/people
19
Yearly Cost of 
Incarceration
39 19.5 78 10 normal k£/person
20
Time spent in 
prison for a 
Conviction
1.5 0.5 6 1.5 normal months
21
Normal Recidivism 
Fraction
75 50 100 10 normal percent
22
Probationary 
Period Length
12 6 24 uniform months
# Variable Name Expected Low High
Standard 
Deviation
Distribution Units
1 MOJ Starts Paying 76 46 76 Triangular percent
2
Fraction of Surplus 
Returned
50 25 100 50 normal percent
3
Offenders' Willing 
to enter program 
Fraction
70 0 100 10 normal percent
4
Normal Recidivism 
Discovery Time
6 1 24 6 normal skew right months
5
Fraction for 
Investor Share
50 25 100 uniform percent
6
Recidivism 
Reduction 
Fraction
30 0 50 Uniform percent
7
Expected Program 
Investment 
Amount
5000 2000 8000 1000 normal k£
8 Conviction Cost 2.853 0 39 uniform k£/conviction
9
Time Program has 
to Pay
3 1 6 uniform months
10
Average Prisoner 
Incarceration Rate 
for Peterborough
57.83 10 100 20 normal people/month
11
Initial First time 
Offender Prisoner 
Holding
86.75 10 150 35 normal people
12
Initial 
Undiscovered 
Reoffenders
1041 100 2000 400 normal people
13
Initial Reconvicted 
Prisoner Holding
260.25 25 500 100 normal people
14
Standard Cohort 
Length
24 12 48 uniform months
15
Standard People in 
Cohort
1,000 500 2000 uniform people
16
Time for System 
Update
6 1 12 2 normal months
17
Time after Cohort 
for Reconviction 
Collection
12 6 24 4 uniform months
18
Program Cost per 
member
1.5 0.5 4.5 uniform k£/people
19
Yearly Cost of 
Incarceration
39 19.5 78 10 normal k£/person
20
Time spent in 
prison for a 
Conviction
1.5 0.5 6 1.5 normal months
21
Normal Recidivism 
Fraction
75 50 100 10 normal percent
22
Probationary 
Period Length
12 6 24 uniform months
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APPENDIX II    
 ADDITIONAL TEST RESULTS FOR PETERBOROUGH1 
 This appendix details additional testing results with the Peterborough model.  
First are the results of varying policy actions for funding the SIB program late in the 
simulation.  The second is an assessment of rescinding savings from the prison system. 
  
                                                 
1 This chapter contains content presented from White III, R. J., & Ford, D. N. (2013) “Dynamic Drivers of 
Successful Social Impact Bonds,” at the 2013 International System Dynamics Conference, Cambridge, MA, 
System Dynamics Society. 
(http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2013/proceed/papers/P1294.pdf) 
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Improving SIB performance through Policy 
This section explains the results and testing of the Peterborough Prison SIB 
model for the “Dip” in program effectiveness.  As the program is carried out, funds are 
diminished to a point where further funding is required for the program effectiveness to 
continue under the improve measures.  During the modeling of the Peterborough system, 
the dip was identified as a possible threat to funding under poor assumptions of system 
behavior.  Therefore, this section seeks to identify strategies for reducing the dip in 
program effectiveness. 
 Slides 1-4 show three policy solutions and the conclusion drawn from these 
policy actions. 
 
Slide 1: Owner Policy 
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Slide 2: Investor Policy 
 
 
Slide 3: Contractor Policy 
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Slide 4: Conclusion 
 
 
Discussion 
 In conclusion, not one policy satisfies or improves the system.  Increasing the 
investment amount will reduce the profitability of the program and deter investment.  
Similarly, if the MOJ starts paying early for the SIB program, the MOJ receives no 
benefit from increasing the reduction of recidivism, but does reduce the effects from the 
“Dip”.  Increasing the program effectiveness improves program outcomes, but the 
program effectiveness does not act to reduce the cost from a better program.  Therefore, 
if the dip presents a threat to program continuance, then a multi-policy solution should 
be considered.  
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SIBs and the Policy of the Goose that laid a Golden Egg 
Introduction: The Dip in the Peterborough SIB 
This section explains the results and testing of the Peterborough Prison SIB 
model for question of how much of the savings should the owner rescind.  As the 
program is carried out, funds are diminished to a point where further funding is required 
for the program effectiveness to continue under the improve measures.  The program is 
useless to the MOJ if it does not allow budget reductions.  Therefore, this section seeks 
to explain relationship between the percent of savings rescinded and the program 
effectiveness. 
The more funds rescinded, the more savings the MOJ sees, and less program 
availability in the future.  As the flow of offenders increases, the funds available from 
investors decrease.  As the available funds decrease, the program availability decreases.  
This illustrates the similarity between the loops (R1 and R2) as shown in Figure 57.  The 
cycle of prisoners in a prison system create a reinforcing loop between the budget and 
expenditures that spins in a vicious cycle.  As funds for a prison rehabilitation program 
are decreased, the program effectiveness will also decrease to reduce recidivism.  In 
time, higher recidivism increases the reconvicted prisoners in the prison population 
which consumes more money from the operating budget decreasing the discretionary 
budget.  A drop in the discretionary budget decreases the spending on rehabilitation 
programs (assuming rehabilitation programs are a normal good/ service).  Thus the 
vicious cycle of the prison system will try to dominate. 
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The same structure that results in a vicious cycle can be used to provide system 
managers with a virtuous cycle.  The prison system manager might consider decreasing 
the flow of first time offenders to the prison (a supply side solution), or appealing to the 
altruism of benevolent donors (a demand side solution).  Increasing the rehabilitation 
program’s funds would reduce the recidivism (and reconvictions at a later date), which 
decreases the prison population.  A smaller population means a smaller operating budget 
that increases the available funds for the program. 
 
 
Figure 55: Prison System Reinforcing Structure  
 
Unfortunately, for the virtuous cycle, there are two balancing loops that take 
precedence over the reinforcing structure.  The first of these balancing loops accounts 
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for the limits to program growth through the effectiveness of the program (Senge 1990).  
The second prevents a budgetary surplus from exceeding predetermined limits by 
returning the surplus to the upper echelons of government.  In a prison system reducing 
the recidivism would create a virtuous cycle of reduced offending, except that it is 
balanced by decreasing change in recidivism and a decreasing prison budget. 
 
 
Figure 56: Prison System Reinforcing Structure with Balancing Loops 
 
The Social Impact Bond (SIB) is a new financial tool that can be used for public 
goods, like prison rehabilitation programs.  A SIB initiates an additional virtuous 
reinforcing structure to improve the stasis of an existing system until the system can 
reconfigure the controlling balancing loops to account for the effects of the new policy.  
Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Peterborough is the first SIB and was initiated in 2010.  If 
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the program proves successful the Ministry Of Justice plans to take over the funding for 
the rehabilitation program.  The SIB does not change the structure of the constrained 
LTG system, as it provides an alternative route for fund availability seen below in Figure 
57: 
 
 
Figure 57: Prison System SIB Constrained LTG Diagram  
Legend of Loops: 
R1- Golden-Egg: Prison budget funds program which reduces population and generates 
savings which are used to pay for the program 
R2- Goose -Loop: SIB invests in rehabilitation program, reducing population and 
creating savings, part of which are paid to investors as returns  
B1- Rarity of a Golden: Decreased recidivism reduces improvement available, which 
limits the amount of future recidivism reduction 
B2- Farmer: Increases in budget surplus trigger increases in the returned budget from 
the prison, which limits the amount of future Operating Budgets 
Therefore, SIBs provide an alternative source of funding for preventative social issues. 
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Problem Description 
The Peterborough SIB was established as a solution to reduce the ever increasing 
budget for the MOJ.  While the SIB is in effect, the Peterborough system has a legal 
obligation to set aside a portion of the savings from the program to pay the investors for 
successful outcomes (Loder, et al. 2010, Mulgan, et al. 2011).  In the end, the 
Peterborough SIB does not benefit the MOJ if it does not reduce/save costs (Glahn and 
Whistler 2011), yet the program still needs funds in order to function properly. 
 However, without the proper funds the rehabilitation program loses its 
effectiveness.  Aesop used a tale of a farmer with a goose that could lay golden eggs to 
depict the need to sustain what is good in our lives over the “I need it now” mentality 
(Paxton 1988).  In Aesop’s fable, a farmer is blessed the gods to receive a goose that lays 
golden eggs (Paxton 1988).  The farmer feeds and cares for the goose, and the farmer 
grows rich, but then the farmer gets greedy and kills to goose to take all the gold inside 
(Paxton 1988).  Referring back to Figure 57, the feedback structure of a prison system 
displays a similar ideology to Aesop’s fable.  The SIB is used to initiate the program 
savings by transferring portions of the risk to investors in exchange for a share of the 
savings. The structures shown in Figure 57 can be labeled as characters or characteristics 
from Aesop’s tale of the goose that laid the golden egg. The “Paid-from-Success 
rehabilitation loop” operates as the golden egg because the savings provide funds for 
reinvestment and additional savings.  The “Social Impact Bond loop” operates as the 
goose because the SIB creates the environment for the golden egg to exist. The “Limits 
to Improvement loop” signifies the rarity and/or value of the golden egg because the 
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available improvement drives the value savings generated from the program.  
Additionally, the “Farmer”, seen below as the balancing loop, sells the savings of the 
golden egg to reduce their expenditures. 
It is important for the prison system managers to understand how much of the 
savings could be rescinded after the SIB is complete.  As in Aesop’s fable, practitioners 
may not want to kill their goose.  Instead, practitioners want to know how much of the 
savings can be returned to the government. 
Behavior modes are useful in models where troves of historical data do not exist, 
because they describe the movement of the system and not the values (Sterman 2000, 
Hekimoğlu and Barlas 2010).  Therefore, the value of savings available for reclamation 
by owners is defined in the different SIB behavior modes. 
Tipping Point Structures 
 A tipping point is a set of marginally different (internal) conditions that yield 
very different behavior modes (Taylor and Ford 2008).  A tipping point structure is a 
system of balancing and reinforcing loops that shift behavior modes depending on which 
loop is controlling (Taylor and Ford 2008).  Once a tipping point structure has been 
identified, the behavior modes can be defined.  Therefore, if a tipping point structure 
exists, then the structure of the tipping point can be used to understand the different 
behavior modes. 
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Research Approach and Model Structure 
The system dynamics modeling methodology (Sterman, 2000; Forrester, 1961) is 
used for its ability to formally simulate the dynamic structures and delays of a managed 
system for the Peterborough SIB. 
HMP Peterborough Case 
The HMP Peterborough is the first SIB enacted and is currently underway for 
short-term offenders with high recidivism rates.  The Peterborough SIB was created so 
that the UK and the MOJ could study and understand the drivers and structures of a SIB 
(Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 2011).  Both the Investors and Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ) expect the Peterborough SIB to be successful.  The Peterborough SIB model has 
three sectors, the depiction of the prison system, the performance measurement, and the 
SIB finances.  Therefore, the HMP Peterborough case study model was used to define 
the reference modes. 
Model Calibration, Typical Behavior, and Validation 
Model Calibration 
The model was calibrated to the Peterborough SIB case using publicly available 
literature as referenced above. Langan & Levin (2002), Loder et al. (2010), Strickland 
(2010), Mulgan et al. (2011), Disley et al. (2011), and Cave et al., (2012) describe the 
program impact, costs, assessment process and timing, and magnitude. Mulgan et al. 
(2011) and Loder et al. (2010) describe the expected impact of the rehabilitation program 
as well as various costs added to the assessment. Strickland (2010) identifies the value of 
investment and limits of the investment. Disely et al. (2011) also provide results of a 
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preliminary assessment of the SIB in terms of magnitude and affect. Model values 
coincide with the information on the SIB and program found in this literature. Values that 
were not described in the literature were estimated and the model initially set to steady 
state conditions. For example, Disely et al. (2011) noted that about 315 new offenders 
entered HMP Peterborough in just over six months and the steady state model uses about 
317 in a similar time frame. Cave et al. (2012) noted that the normal reconviction rate for 
HMP Peterborough was 1.64 persons per month for data collected up to one year after the 
close of the cohort.  The calibrated model calculates about 1.53 persons per month in a 
similar time frame.  
Typical Model Behavior 
Typical model behavior is illustrated by the MOJ performance variable. Although 
recidivism is the metric used in the SIB, a (perhaps the) primary performance measure of 
the MOJ is the reduction in the Peterborough population. Figure 3 shows the simulated 
behavior over time of this variable for the calibrated model.  
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Figure 58: Typical Model Behavior – HMP Peterborough Prison Population 
 
After a period of steady state operations (months 0-20) the program begins and more 
prisoners are rehabilitated in the Peterborough system, reducing the prison population 
(months 20-60). However, as available funds decrease, so does the number of prisoners 
allowed to enter the program, slowing the rate of improvement (months 30-60) and 
eventually reversing the progress and causing an increase in prison population when SIB 
funds have been depleted (months 60-75). After the completion of the program funded by 
the SIB the rehabilitation program is continued by the MOJ (consistent with van Golahn 
and Whistler, 2011), initially using the savings generated by the SIB funded program. This 
causes the prison population to reduce again, approaching a steady state at its maximum 
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which is controlled by a minimum recidivism (months 75-200). We later describe the 
potential dangers of the temporary increase in prison population and use the model to 
investigate the causes and a possible solution.    
Model Validation 
Structural Validation 
The model contains a total of 141 variables consisting of 23 basic stocks and 24 
flows (with five arrays), and 29 exogenous variables. The model structure is based upon 
the extensive literature specifically about the Peterborough SIB case referenced in the 
model structure description above. Of the 29 exogenous variables 14 used values taken 
from the literature specifically about HMP Peterborough or HMP system. The values of 
four of the remaining exogenous variables were supported from other literature but that 
literature provided inconsistent values. These ranges were used in extreme conditions 
testing. Four more were supported by other literature. The remaining seven were used to 
establish steady state conditions (e.g. initial values of stocks) or estimated by the modelers.  
The list of equations is found earlier in Appendix I. 
Behavioral Validation 
The model generated reasonable behavior when each of the 29 exogenous 
variables was set to extreme values.  The Peterborough SIB has not progressed adequately 
to provide actual behavior data for use in model validation. However, the literature 
describes the expected behavior for the case.  Lang and Levin (2002) describe the 
perpetual cycle of offence that is created in the program system.  Cave et al. (2012) 
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describe the structure and behavior of the performance sector.  Disely et al. (2011) and 
Mulgan et al. (2011) describe the expected behavior of the financial sector. 
Using the rework cycle structure, with offender in place of work, the model 
behaves as described by Langan and Levin (2002) as a perpetual cycle of offences and re-
offences.  
The third party assessor of performance defines the limits among the different 
cohorts and determines cohort success (Cave, et al. 2012).  A system of stocks and flows 
representing the offenders and their reconvictions create similar behavior as defined by 
Cave et al. (2012).     
Disely et al. (2011) reviews the expectations for both how investors earn money 
as well as how the SIB financially functions. Mulgan et al. (2011) describe the transfer of 
risk, cost savings to the MOJ, and flows of capital between key stakeholders. 
As another example of model behavior validation the model successfully reflects 
the expectation that the government would continue a successful program, as described by 
Glahn and Whistler (2011). The model’s behavior is consistent with what would be 
expected in the operation of the actual SIB at HMP Peterborough. 
Based on these model validation tests the Peterborough SIB model is considered 
valid for investigating the impacts of SIB design parameters on system behavior and 
performance.  
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Model Use 
Identifying the Tipping Point 
 The Peterborough SIB provides the needed feedback structures to model the 
tipping points of a SIB under different forms of duress from a fraction of savings returned.  
Rescinding all of the savings causes the program to fail as seen in Figure 4.  The farmer 
loop from Figure 59 causes the virtuous cycle to grind to a halt and then spin viciously 
back to the previous state of stability.  The increase in prison population implies an 
increase in the total prison system budget. 
 
 
Figure 59: Difference between Rescinding All or None of the SIB Savings 
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Varying the fraction of savings returned changes the amount of savings that is 
returned to be repurposed.  This varies the program funds which turns the program on 
and off.  When the program shuts down for a long enough period of time, the “Farmer 
Loop” extinguishes the “Golden-Egg Loop.”  Therefore, a tipping point structure for a 
SIB exists between the “Farmer Loop” and the “Golden-Egg Loop” because the 
recapturing of savings causes the system to revert. 
Defining Behavior Modes for the Tipping point 
 
 
Figure 60: 3D plot of “Fraction Returned's” Effect on Prison Population 
 
  
231 
Figure 60 and Figure 61 show how increasing the fraction of savings returned 
causes the prison population to increase and the cumulative government savings to 
decrease.  Figure 60 shows the prison population behavioral change when 40-50% of the 
savings are rescinded.  Figure 61 shows a similar change for the accumulation of owner 
returns after 10 years.  Therefore, the MOJ could capture the savings that have thus far 
been invested, or the MOJ could continue to reinvest in the program and continue to see 
net benefits. 
 
 
Figure 61: 3D plot of "Fraction Returned's" Effect on Cumulative Government 
Savings 
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Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the SIB has an inflection in owner savings based on the percent of 
savings the owner captures.  The change is not seen for more than 10 years after the start 
of the program.  The change is seen in both the program savings and the prison system 
performance.  If governments rescind too much of the savings, then the program 
performance collapses and the savings stop collecting.  The government can use the 
prison population as a precursor to future savings and as a measure program funding. 
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APPENDIX III    
         TAMU MODEL SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS1 
 This appendix details the supporting documents for the TAMU Model including 
the Equations, Stock Flow Diagrams, Tables from the Excel file used in conjunction 
with the model, values used for Statistical Screening Analysis, and additional testing 
results. 
  
                                                 
1 This Appendix uses the case study documented in Kim, Hessami, Vahid and Ford (2011) unless 
otherwise noted. 
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Equation List 
Legend 
Variable Name 
Equation or Value 
Units 
Description 
Equations1 
"% Energy (type) Reduction for Bldg (name) due to Efficiency"[Buildings, Energy 
Types]= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Buildings Data', 'F4' ) 
Units: kWh/Month 
This is how much electricity Bldg consumes after the improvement (i.e. reduced 
electricity consumption) based on contract. 
 
"% Reduction in Conservation Improvement Due to Automation of Bldg (name) 
for Energy (type)"[Buildings, Energy Types]= 
IF THEN ELSE("Invested in Bldg (name)"[Buildings]<=0,0,0) 
Units: Dmnl 
The reduction amount in BM impact before and after hardware improvements in the 
building between 0 and one. 
                                                 
1 Author defined where the document used had voids.  
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"% Reduction of energy use due to Conservation installation for Bldg 
(name)"[Buildings]= 
IF THEN ELSE("Invested in Conservation for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]<=0, 0, 
"Assigned % reduction in energy use for the Conservation tools for Bldgs") 
*"Conservation Rebound Effect (name)"[Buildings] 
Units: Dmnl 
If there has been investment for BM in a building, then its value will be equal to the 
assigned percentage otherwise will be zero, meaning that the BM has no effect for the 
building. 
 
"Actual Efficiency Installation Month for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
 INTEG (IF THEN ELSE("Spending to Improve Bldg (name)"[Buildings]>0, Time , 0), 
0) 
Units: Month 
This represents the month where improvements are made. 
 
"Assigned % reduction in energy use for the Conservation tools for Bldgs"= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'C7' ) 
Units: Dmnl 
Assigned percent reduction in energy use for the Behavior Modification tools for each 
buildings 
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"Bldg (name) Basecase Energy (type) Usage Intensity"[Buildings, Energy Types]= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Buildings Data', 'C4' ) 
Units: kWh/Month 
This is how much electricity Bldg A consumes before the improvement (i.e. baseline 
electricity consumption) 
 
"Bldg (name) Energy (type) Savings"[Buildings, Energy Types]= 
"Energy (type) Usage Reduction for Bldg (name)"[Buildings, Energy Types]*"Cost of 
Energy (type)"[Energy Types] 
Units: $/Month 
The cost of saved energy for each building for each type of energy per month 
 
"Bldg (name) Energy Cost Savings"[Buildings]=  
INTEG ("Bldg (name) Energy Savings"[Buildings]-"Owner's Savings from Bldg 
(name)"[Buildings] -"Sust. Savings from Bldg (name)"[Buildings], 0) 
Units: $ 
Savings from energy consumption improvement from building 
 
"Bldg (name) Energy Savings"[Buildings]= 
SUM("Bldg (name) Energy (type) Savings"[Buildings, Energy Types!])*(1+"O&M 
Saving Ratio") 
Units: $/Month 
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This is the total cost of energy saved by implementing the change (i.e. improvement) to 
Bldg. 
 
"Calculated Bldg (name) Energy (type) Usage"[Buildings, Energy Types]= 
"Bldg (name) Basecase Energy (type) Usage Intensity"[Buildings, Energy Types]*(1-   
"% Energy (type) Reduction for Bldg (name) due to Efficiency"[Buildings, Energy 
Types]* "Efficiency Depreciation Rate for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]) 
Units: kWh/Month 
This is the calculated amount of how much electricity Bldg consumes after the 
improvement (i.e. reduced electricity consumption). 
 
"Conservation Effects Life-span"= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'C12' ) 
Units: Months 
This represents the duration of decay for conservation or behavioral modification effects. 
 
"Conservation Rebound Effect (name)"[Buildings]= 
IF THEN ELSE("Invested in Conservation for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]<=0, 1, IF 
THEN ELSE(Time>=Stopping Month of Conservation Effect, IF THEN ELSE( 1-(Time-
Stopping Month of Conservation Effect)*Switch Rebound Effect/"Conservation Effects 
Life-span">0, 1-(Time-Stopping Month of Conservation Effect)*Switch Rebound 
Effect/"Conservation Effects Life-span" , 0 ), 1) ) 
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Units: Dmnl 
This represents the percent energy reduction  due to behavioral modification efforts. 
 
"Cost of Conservation Tools for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
Installment Real Discount Rate*Cost of Conservation tools Installment per Bldg 
Units: $ 
Cost associated for BM tools installment. 
 
Cost of Conservation tools Installment per Bldg= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'C8' ) 
Units: $ 
Total cost for installing BM tools. 
 
"Cost of Energy (type)"[Energy Types]:= 
GET XLS DATA( 'Model_AVA.xls' , 'Extra Variables' , 'I' , 'J4' ) 
Units: $/kWh 
This is the current electricity price (Cent per kWh) /*GET XLS DATA(Model_AVA.xls' 
, 'Extra Variables' , 'I' , 'J4' )*/ 
 
"Cost of Improving Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Buildings Data', 'I4' ) 
Units: $ 
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Initial cost of improving Bldg A from 1990 Fort Leavenworth report (INCANDESCENT 
LIGHTING). 
 
"Current Bldg (name) Energy (type) Usage"[Buildings, Energy Types]= 
IF THEN ELSE("Invested in Bldg (name)"[Buildings]<=0,"Bldg (name) Base case 
Energy (type) Usage Intensity"[Buildings, Energy Types],"Calculated Bldg (name) 
Energy (type) Usage"[Buildings, Energy Types])*(1 -"% Reduction of energy use due to 
Conservation installation for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]*(100-"% Reduction in 
Conservation Improvement Due to Automation of Bldg (name) for Energy (type)" 
[Buildings,Energy Types])/100) 
Units: kWh/Month 
This is the amount electricity Bldg A consumes after the improvement. 
 
"Current Cost for Bldg (name) Improvement"[Buildings]= 
Real Discount Rate*"Cost of Improving Bldg (name)"[Buildings] 
Units: $ 
Total required fund to implement the decided improvement to the building A. 
 
Depreciation Lag= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'C10' ) 
Units: Months 
This represents the time before depreciation occurs. 
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"Efficiency Age for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
IF THEN ELSE( "Actual Efficiency Installation Month for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]>0 
,IF THEN ELSE( "Actual Efficiency Installation Month for Bldg (name)"[Buildings] 
+Depreciation Lag<Time ,Time-"Actual Efficiency Installation Month for Bldg 
(name)"[Buildings]-Depreciation Lag, 0 ) , 0 ) 
Units: DMNL 
This represents the value of improvements during their use. 
 
"Efficiency Depreciation Rate for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
IF THEN ELSE(Switch Efficiency Depreciation=1, IF THEN ELSE( 1-"Efficiency Age 
for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]/"Efficiency Devices Life-span">0 , 1-"Efficiency Age for 
Bldg (name)"[Buildings]/"Efficiency Devices Life-span",0 ),1) 
Units: DMNL 
This represents the rate of improvement depreciations. 
 
"Efficiency Devices Life-span"= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'C11' ) 
Units: Months 
This represents the length of efficiency improvements 
 
"Energy (type) Saved"[Energy Types]= 
SUM("Energy (type) Usage Reduction for Bldg (name)"[Buildings!,Energy Types]) 
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Units: See Table 8 
Monthly energy saved added to total amount, calculated separately for each energy type. 
 
"Energy (type) Usage Reduction for Bldg (name)"[Buildings,Energy Types]= 
"Bldg (name) Basecase Energy (type) Usage Intensity"[Buildings,Energy Types]-
"Current Bldg (name) Energy (type) Usage"[Buildings,Energy Types] 
Units: kWh/Month 
Monthly Energy saved for Building A. 
 
"Excel Order?"= 
1 
Units: Dmnl 
Use Excel data for ordering the building improvement or not. 
 
External Fund Received= 
Incoming Funds+"Total External Fund Received (Total Debt)"*Interest Rate 
Units: **undefined** 
Monthly calculated external fund received, added to the total amount. 
 
"External Funds (source)"[External Funds]= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'External Funds', 'C3*' ) 
Units: $ 
  
242 
Amount of money received from the external resource as funding to the project. 
 
"Fraction of Savings to Sust. Fund"= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'C2' ) 
Units: Dmnl/Month 
% of rewards payments from sustainability. 
 
"Fund for Installing Conservation Tools (source)"[External Funds]= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'External Funds', 'C9*' ) 
Units: $ 
Amount of money received from the external resource as funding to the BM tools. 
 
HI= 
1 
Units: Dmnl 
This represents whether the sustainability improvements are being run in the simulation. 
 
Installment Real Discount Rate= 
(IF THEN ELSE(Time<12,1,1+(0.05*Time)/12)*0+1) 
Units: Dmnl 
The real discount rate for cost increment in BM tools base on the literature review. 
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Incoming Funds= 
SUM(IF THEN ELSE(Time="Month of Receiving External Fund (source)"[External 
Funds!], 1, 0)*("External Funds (source)"[External Funds!]*HI+"Fund for Installing 
Conservation Tools (source)"[External Funds!]*Switch Conservation)) 
Units: $/Month 
Monthly incoming fund to the system. 
 
"Install Order?"= 
1 
Units: Dmnl 
Use Excel data for ordering the building BM improvement or not. 
 
Install Prerequisites Order[Buildings,Prerequisites]= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'AH3' ) 
Units: Dmnl 
Order of improvement for buildings. 
 
Interest Rate= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'C3' ) 
Units: Dmnl/Month 
This represents the interest rate. 
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"Invested in Bldg (name)"[Buildings]=  
INTEG ("Spending to Improve Bldg (name)"[Buildings],0) 
Units: $ 
Total cost of investment to Bldg. 
 
"Invested in Conservation for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]=  
INTEG ("Spending for Conservation for Bldg (name)"[Buildings], 0) 
Units: $ 
Total cost of BM investment to Bldg. 
 
"Is Bldg (name) improved?"[Buildings]= 
IF THEN ELSE("Invested in Bldg (name)"[Buildings]>0, 1, 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
Changes from initial zero to 1 if the fund is invested in the building for improvement or 
remains the same if not. 
 
"Is the tools for Bldg (name) installed?"[Buildings]= 
IF THEN ELSE("Invested in Conservation for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]>0, 1, 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
Changes from initial zero to 1 if the fund is invested in building for BM improvement or 
remains the same if not. 
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"Month of Installment for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Buildings Data', 'K4*' ) 
Units: Month 
The month number in which the BM improvement should be added to the building. 
 
"Month of Performing Improvement in Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Buildings Data', 'J4*' ) 
Units: Month 
The month number in which the improvement should be added to the building. 
 
"Month of Receiving External Fund (source)"[External Funds]= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'External Funds', 'D3*' ) 
Units: Month 
Number of the month in which the external fund is received. 
 
Monthly Conservation Maintenance Cost per Bldg= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'C9' ) 
Units: $/Month 
This represents the monthly cost of behavioral modifications for conservation efforts. 
 
"Monthly Conservation Maintenance Costs for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
  
246 
Monthly Conservation Maintenance Cost per Bldg*"Is the tools for Bldg (name) 
installed?" [Buildings]*"Switch On/Off Conservation Effects" 
Units: $/Month 
Monthly cost for maintaining the BM tools. 
 
Negative Balance Fine= 
IF THEN ELSE(Sustainability Fund<0, Sustainability Fund*Negative Balance Interest 
Rate/12, 0) 
Units: $ 
Calculating the extra money to be paid when the sustainability fund gets negative. This 
is simulating short term loan receiving which should be paid back with its defined 
interest rate. 
 
Negative Balance Interest Rate= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'C6' ) 
Units: Dmnl 
Interest rate for the amount of additional loan to overcome negative balance of the 
Sustainability Fund. 
 
 
"O&M Costs":= 
GET XLS DATA( 'Model_AVA.xls' , 'External Funds' , 'L' , 'M3' ) 
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Units: $/Month 
Operation and maintenance costs based on the contract. 
 
 
"O&M Saving Ratio"= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'C4' ) 
Units: Dmnl 
Operation and maintenance savings indicated in the contract 
 
Owner's Fund=  
INTEG (SUM("Owner's Savings from Bldg (name)"[Buildings!]), 0) 
Units: $ 
Depository for rewards payments. 
 
"Owner's Savings from Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
"Bldg (name) Energy Cost Savings"[Buildings]*(1-"Fraction of Savings to Sust. Fund") 
Units: $/Month 
Percent of the savings spent for rewards. 
 
Payback Deductions Amount:= 
GET XLS DATA( 'Model_AVA.xls' , 'External Funds' , 'H' , 'I3' ) 
Units: $ 
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Monthly payback amount based on the contract. 
 
Paybacks and Costs= 
(IF THEN ELSE(Sustainability Fund>=Payback Deductions Amount, Payback 
Deductions Amount, Payback Deductions Amount)+"O&M Costs")*HI+SUM("Monthly 
Conservation Maintenance Costs for Bldg (name)"[Buildings!])*Switch Conservation 
Units: $/Month 
Total payback needed per month. 
 
Prerequisites Order [Buildings, Prerequisites]= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'O3' ) 
Units: Dmnl 
Order of improvement for buildings. 
 
Real Discount Rate= 
(IF THEN ELSE(Time<12,1,1+(0.05*Time)/12)*0+1) 
Units: Dmnl 
The real discount rate for cost increment base on the literature review. 
 
"Spending for Conservation for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
IF THEN ELSE(Sustainability Fund>="Cost of Conservation Tools for Bldg (name)" 
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[Buildings], "Cost of Conservation Tools for Bldg (name)"[Buildings], 0)*"Start Invest 
for Installing for Bldg (name)"[Buildings] * Switch Conservation 
Units: $/Month 
Should be less than the Sustainability Fund since we cannot invest if we don't have 
enough funding, accumulates per month but actual investment may not be made until the 
minimum required amount is available. 
 
"Spending to Improve Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
IF THEN ELSE(Sustainability Fund>="Current Cost for Bldg (name) Improvement" 
[Buildings], "Current Cost for Bldg (name) Improvement"[Buildings], 0)* "Start 
Investing in Bldg (name)"[Buildings]*HI 
Units: $/Month 
Should be less than the Sustainability Fund since we cannot invest if we don't have 
enough funding, accumulates per month but actual investment may not be made until the 
minimum required amount is available. 
 
"Start Invest for Installing for Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
VMIN(IF THEN ELSE(Install Prerequisites Order[Buildings, Prerequisites!], IF THEN 
ELSE("Install Order?"=1,"Is the tools for Bldg (name) installed?"[Prerequisites!] , 1), 
1))*(1-"Is the tools for Bldg (name) installed?"[Buildings]) *IF THEN ELSE(Time>= 
"Month of Installment for Bldg (name)"[Buildings], 1, 0) 
Units: Dmnl/Month 
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Gets 1 if bldg should be invested for BM and 0 otherwise. 
 
"Start Investing in Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
VMIN( IF THEN ELSE(Prerequisites Order[Buildings, Prerequisites!], IF THEN 
ELSE("Excel Order?"=1, "Is Bldg (name) improved?"[Prerequisites!], 1), 1))*(1-"Is 
Bldg (name) improved?"[Buildings]) *IF THEN ELSE(Time>="Month of Performing 
Improvement in Bldg (name)"[Buildings],1,0) 
Units: Dmnl/Month 
Gets 1 if bldg should be invested and 0 otherwise. 
 
Stopping Month of Conservation Effect= 
GET XLS CONSTANTS( 'Model_AVA.xls', 'Extra Variables', 'C13' ) 
Units: Month 
This represents the month that conservation efforts stop. 
 
"Sust. Savings from Bldg (name)"[Buildings]= 
"Bldg (name) Energy Cost Savings"[Buildings]*"Fraction of Savings to Sust. Fund" 
Units: $/Month 
As long as the Bldg fund is larger than 0, the savings go back to the Sustainability Fund. 
 
Sustainability Fund=  
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INTEG(SUM("Sust. Savings from Bldg (name)"[Buildings!]) - SUM("Spending to 
Improve Bldg (name)"[Buildings!]) -SUM("Spending for Conservation for Bldg (name)" 
[Buildings!]) + Incoming Funds - Paybacks and Costs - Negative Balance Fine, 0) 
Units: $ 
Depository as sustainability fund which would be used to invest for building 
improvements. 
 
Switch Conservation= 
1 
Units: Dmnl 
Switch the Behavior Modification loop on/off. 
 
Switch Efficiency Depreciation= 
1 
Units: DMNL 
This determines whether the efficiency is depreciating in the model. 
 
"Switch On/Off Conservation Effects"= 
IF THEN ELSE(Time>=Stopping Month of Conservation Effect, (1-Switch Rebound 
Effect), 1 ) 
Units: DMNL 
This switch controls whether conservation efforts are used for behavior modifications. 
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Switch Rebound Effect= 
0 
Units: DMNL 
This switch controls the conservation rebound effect. 
 
"Total Energy (type) Saved"[Energy Types]= 
INTEG ("Energy (type) Saved"[Energy Types], 0) 
Units: kWh 
Total Energy saved from all Buildings. 
 
Total Energy Saved= 
0.0034*"Total Energy (type) Saved"[Electricity]+"Total Energy (type) Saved"[Chilled 
Water]+"Total Energy (type) Saved"[Heating Hot Water] 
Units: MMBtu 
Some of all the energy type savings. 
 
"Total External Fund Received (Total Debt)"= 
INTEG (External Fund Received, 0) 
Units: $ 
Total external funding received considering interest rate. 
 
Total Investment= 
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SUM("Invested in Bldg (name)"[Buildings!]) 
Units: $ 
This is the accumulated investment in building improvements. 
 
 
Figure 62: Stock Flow Diagrams TAMU Case 
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Table 17: Building Data (Yearly) 
 
 
Table 18: Building Data (Usage) 
 
 
Building Name Electricity Chilled Water Heating Hot Water Electricity Chilled Water Heating Hot Water
378 1,314,525         -                     -                               600,418            -                     -                               299,910                  
379 663,823            -                     -                               244,015            -                     -                               205,850                  
388 1,329,573         -                     -                               670,353            -                     -                               420,550                  
469 590,234            518                    178                              230,167            -                     -                               169,060                  
1559 2,580,321         1,233                 176                              1,050,097         -                     -                               675,890                  
386 7,626,621         50,473               14,030                        255,207            6,722                 2,843                           398,220                  
387 2,070,470         19,695               8,768                           125,476            5,007                 3,018                           567,640                  
391 2,193,433         13,328               3,980                           189,429            2,659                 1,278                           336,420                  
392 893,313            5,428                 1,621                           80,242              865                    601                              297,816                  
446 1,872,562         9,700                 6,046                           219,246            1,374                 2,427                           591,065                  
463 810,416            5,564                 1,956                           67,050              665                    754                              292,150                  
518 5,028,997         24,161               4,674                           170,429            877                    812                              688,090                  
1194 2,478,276         29,928               10,677                        228,386            3,381                 2,346                           471,500                  
1501 3,745,173         26,634               13,962                        416,730            8,038                 5,774                           691,750                  
1504 4,564,034         35,036               7,744                           511,925            3,626                 3,499                           785,430                  
1507 4,840,192         53,138               20,856                        150,294            5,899                 6,466                           1,192,755               
1508 434,985            2,057                 196                              726                    387                    53                                141,270                  
Bldg # Basecase Energy ## Usage Intensity Improvement in Bldg # Energy ## Usage Cost of Improving 
Bldg #
Electricity (kwh) Chilled Water (mbtu) Heating Hot Water (mbtu)
1501 387,235.27                 2,466.06                          1,080.96                                    
1507 500,455.67                 4,920.09                          1,614.71                                    
378 135,916.40                 -                                    -                                             
388 137,472.30                 -                                    -                                             
1559 266,794.43                 114.16                             13.63                                         
1194 256,243.40                 2,771.05                          826.63                                       
469 61,027.73                   47.96                               13.78                                         
379 68,636.53                   -                                    -                                             
392 92,364.84                   502.58                             125.50                                       
463 83,793.63                   515.17                             151.44                                       
518 519,977.32                 2,237.08                          361.87                                       
1508 44,975.63                   190.46                             15.17                                         
Building Name
Bldg # Basecase Energy ## Usage Intensity (per Month)
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Table 19: Building Data (Percent Improvement) 
 
 
Table 20: Building Information (Costs and Savings) 
 
 
Electricity (kwh) Chilled Water (mbtu) Heating Hot Water (mbtu)
1501 11.13% 30.18% 41.36%
1507 3.11% 11.10% 31.00%
378 45.68% 0.00% 0.00%
388 50.42% 0.00% 0.00%
1559 40.70% 0.00% 0.00%
1194 9.22% 11.30% 21.97%
469 39.00% 0.00% 0.00%
379 36.76% 0.00% 0.00%
392 8.98% 15.94% 37.08%
463 8.27% 11.95% 38.55%
518 3.39% 3.63% 17.37%
1508 0.17% 18.81% 27.04%
Building Name
Predicted % Improvement in Bldg # Energy ## Usage (per Month)
1501 840,996                    9 0 12949.77924 0.015398 Buildings
1507 1,450,094                 9 0 10105.4766 0.006969 Buildings
378 364,616                    9 0 4780.215219 0.01311 Buildings
388 511,284                    8 0 5337.001244 0.010438 Buildings
1559 821,714                    9 0 8360.325075 0.010174 Buildings
1194 573,227                    9 0 5801.480453 0.010121 Buildings
469 205,535                    7 0 1832.469707 0.008916 Buildings
379 250,262                    7 0 1942.720266 0.007763 Buildings
392 362,070                    9 0 1658.567389 0.004581 Buildings
463 355,182                    8 0 1558.837613 0.004389 Buildings
518 836,546                    10 0 2558.074803 0.003058 Buildings
1508 171,749                    7 0 283.7442437 0.001652 Buildings
Month of Performing 
BM in Bldg #
Total Savings per 
Year
Building 
TypeBuilding Name
Benefit / 
Cost
Cost of Improving 
Bldg # ($)
Month of Performing HI in 
Bldg #
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Table 21: Payback Schedule 
 
Loan Payback Payback Month Amount M&V Cost Payback Month Amount
01/01/2011 0 0 01/01/2011 0 0
02/01/2011 1 0 02/01/2011 1 0
12/02/2011 11 0 12/02/2011 11 0
01/02/2012 12 0 01/02/2012 12 0
02/02/2012 13 0 02/02/2012 13 0
12/01/2012 23 0 12/01/2012 23 0
01/01/2013 24 375,934.49 01/01/2013 24 10,000.00
02/01/2013 25 0 02/01/2013 25 0
12/01/2013 35 0 12/01/2013 35 0
01/01/2014 36 375,934.49 01/01/2014 36 10,000.00
02/01/2014 37 0 02/01/2014 37 0
12/01/2014 47 0 12/01/2014 47 0
01/01/2015 48 375,934.49 01/01/2015 48 10,000.00
02/01/2015 49 0 02/01/2015 49 0
12/02/2015 59 0 12/02/2015 59 0
01/02/2016 60 375,934.49 01/02/2016 60 10,000.00
02/02/2016 61 0 02/02/2016 61 0
12/01/2016 71 0 12/01/2016 71 0
01/01/2017 72 375,934.49 01/01/2017 72 10,000.00
02/01/2017 73 0 02/01/2017 73 0
12/01/2017 83 0 12/01/2017 83 0
01/01/2018 84 375,934.49 01/01/2018 84 10,000.00
02/01/2018 85 0 02/01/2018 85 0
12/01/2018 95 0 12/01/2018 95 0
01/01/2019 96 375,934.49 01/01/2019 96 10,000.00
02/01/2019 97 0 02/01/2019 97 0
12/02/2019 107 0 12/02/2019 107 0
01/02/2020 108 375,934.49 01/02/2020 108 10,000.00
02/02/2020 109 0 02/02/2020 109 0
12/01/2020 119 0 12/01/2020 119 0
01/01/2021 120 375,934.49 01/01/2021 120 10,000.00
02/01/2021 121 0 02/01/2021 121 0
12/01/2021 131 0 12/01/2021 131 0
01/01/2022 132 375,934.49 01/01/2022 132 10,000.00
02/01/2022 133 0.00 02/01/2022 133 0.00
09/02/2027 200 0.00 09/02/2027 200 0.00
01/01/2051 480 0.00 01/01/2051 480 0.00
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Table 22: TAMU Model (Base Case) Funding 
 
 
Table 23: Extra Variables in TAMU Model 
 
 
Cost of Energy 
𝐶𝑖+1 = 𝐶𝑖(1 + 0.03/12) 
Funding Source Name Funding Amount Month Payback ratio
A 3,371,638 0 0.111499072
B 0 0
PA:
Funding Source Name Funding Amount Month Payback ratio
A 58,500 0 0.111499072
B 0 0
Fraction of Savings to Sust. Fund 0.5
Interest Rate 0.02
Operational (O&M) Savings Ratio 0.0421
Base case Saving at Month 200 9737849
Interest rate for Negative SF 0.02
Assigned % reduction in energy usage 0.12
Cost of installing tools per building 4833.33
BM Maintenance Monthly Cost 41.67
HI Depreciation Lag 0
HI Device Life-span 240
BM Effects Life-span 24
Stopping Month of BM Effect 50
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Table 24: Sustainability Improvement Matrix Order 
 
 
Table 25: Improvement Matrix Order 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
building no month
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
11 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
HI Prerequisites Order
building no month
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
BM Prerequisites Order
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Additional Testing Results1 
 
 
Figure 63: Energy Reduction [Chilled Water] 
 
 
Figure 64: Energy Reduction [Heating Hot Water] 
                                                 
1 These graphs are the additional univariate sensitivity plots from the body of the dissertation and 
performed in this study. 
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Figure 65: Cost of Energy 
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
2
2.25
2.5
-100 -50 0 50 100
P
er
ce
n
t 
C
h
an
ge
 f
ro
m
 B
as
e 
C
as
e
Percent Change Cost of Energy
Owner's
Fund
Total
Energy
Reduction
